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This thesis comprises three essays on the impact of conflict and disease on household welfare 
in Sierra Leone. 
In the first essay, we examine the impact of the Sierra Leone civil war on average 
household expenditure and poverty incidence using data from three rounds of household 
surveys. The key findings reveal that households located in areas subject to high conflict 
intensity and a protracted period of occupation by the rebel forces during the war experienced 
lower per capita expenditure levels and higher poverty rates post-conflict. The adverse welfare 
impact on households situated in the conflict-affected zones was found to persist almost a 
decade after the conflict’s conclusion. 
The second essay investigates the immediate and long-run impact of the Sierra Leone 
civil war on household inequality measured using selected household expenditure quantiles 
and the Gini coefficient. The findings reveal that households located in chiefdoms that 
experienced a protracted length of occupation by the rebel forces had lower per capita 
expenditure across the unconditional household welfare distribution, but much stronger 
negative effects were experienced by those households at the top end of the distribution. The 
conflict was found to reduce inequality in the short-run, with the effects still persisting 10 years 
after the war.  
The third essay addresses the impact of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone on 
household poverty (measured both objectively and subjectively), food insecurity, and 
household expenditure distribution and inequality. We explore two Ebola treatment measures 
(confirmed cases and quarantined chiefdoms) to investigate the effects of both the disease itself 
and the policy responses to it on household welfare. The empirical analysis reveals that the 
overall impact of the Ebola virus was to reduce household expenditure and increase poverty 
and food insecurity. The evidence suggests that the quarantine policy implemented rather than 
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 1 Chapter One - Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays dedicated to an empirical analysis of the 
nexus between conflict, disease outbreak and household welfare in Sierra Leone. Specifically, 
the research initially investigates the relationship between the ten-year conflict endured by the 
country at the turn of the century and household expenditure, poverty, and inequality. It then 
explores the link between disease and household welfare by analysing household exposure to 
the West Africa Ebola outbreak and the impact of the quarantine policies imposed by the 
government on the same set of household outcome measures.  
 
Each essay in the thesis investigates the impact of these two adverse economic shocks (conflict 
and disease outbreak) on dimensions of household welfare outcomes in Sierra Leone. The 
essays’ themes are closely connected and have been the subject of research interest in past 
literature. However, the research questions investigated in this thesis address a significant gap 
in the literature, particularly at the micro-level of analysis. In the first essay, we explore the 
impact of the ten-year civil war on household welfare, as measured by household expenditure 
and poverty. A significant part of the existing literature has focused on evaluating the macro-
level impact of conflict on socio-economic indicators, and this has mostly been undertaken 
using cross-country analysis. The more recent conflict literature has evolved around a more 
granular, micro-level investigation of genocide conflict, tribal or ethnic conflict, civil wars, and 
global wars. A significant strand of the existing micro-level empirical analysis has focused on 
the impact of conflict on human capital accumulation and labour market outcomes, with less 
research investigating the direct impact on household welfare itself. This first essay attempts 





Essay two elaborates and extends the research undertaken at the mean-level to investigate the 
impact of conflict on household inequality at selected unconditional expenditure quantiles in 
addition to a Gini-based measure of inequality. The existing literature in this area has generally 
been more descriptive in nature and again situated largely within a macroeconomic framework. 
Thus, this essay contributes to the existing literature on the important topic of conflict impact 
on household inequality at the micro-level and is one of the first to do so in a systematic fashion, 
detailing the mechanism through which conflict impacts the distribution of household 
expenditure. The third and final essay studies the impact of disease on household welfare in 
Sierra Leone. Thus, the household-level impacts of the West Africa Ebola epidemic are 
investigated for Sierra Leone. This empirical analysis contributes to the emerging literature 
relating to the impact of epidemics and pandemics on socio-economic indicators at the micro-
level. It also highlights the mechanisms through which epidemics or pandemics adversely 
affect socio-economic outcomes.  
 
The common contribution of the three essays is centred on the evaluation of the effects of 
economic shocks on household welfare indicators for a developing economy. The development 
process is at the heart of any developing country’s economic agenda. The main objectives of 
development include increasing the standard of living and reducing poverty and thus 
inequality. These objectives have driven the poverty reduction strategies enacted by national 
governments in Africa in concert with international organisations like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund in recent decades. The global focus on and effort against poverty, 
inequality, and low levels of household welfare, in general, were articulated in the Millennium 
Development Goals. The development goals have been adopted and set by many countries, 
especially those in Africa. The purpose of a country’s economic policy is to provide an 




conflicts and diseases can have repercussions for growth and subject developing nations to a 
greater degree of poverty vulnerability. The mechanisms through which conflict and disease 
affect socio-economic indicators can be different, but the established findings corroborate their 
sharp negative effects. Hence, understanding the magnitude of the impact and its persistence 
(either short or long term) is important at the micro-level. It will help inform the nature and 
design of interventions at the individual household level that help strengthen household 
resilience.  
 
Sierra Leone is an appropriate country for the analysis of the effects of conflict and disease on 
household welfare and inequality given its recent history. As a developing economy, it 
experienced ten years of civil war between 1991 and 2002. The civil war led to deaths, severe 
human rights violations, brutality, damage to physical infrastructure, and a substantial and 
persistent disruption of the economic system. The fact that the civil war was long-lasting and 
concluded over 15 years ago, however, provides the basis for an evaluation of the short-term 
and longer-term impacts of the conflict. The existing literature on the Sierra Leone civil war 
has largely explained its legacy in terms of its effects on institutions, local collective actions, 
and household socio-economic, firm-level, and asset ownership outcomes (see Miguel and 
Bellow, 2006, 2009; Collier and Duponchel, 2013; and Sam, 2015, respectively). A focus on 
household expenditure, poverty, and inequality has been neglected to date in the literature but 
is required in order to understand the micro-level impact of the conflict on households and 
evaluate the post-conflict recovery policies instituted by the government. Although Sierra 
Leone remained a fragile state post-conflict, its economy was on a trajectory of recovery and 
it was set to achieve middle-income country status by 2035 when hit by the shock of the 2014 
Ebola epidemic. Regarding the disease outbreak, descriptive work has demonstrated a negative 




evidence in more detailed and systematic fashion but finds broadly similar conclusions to those 
of the more descriptive literature.   
 
Overall, the empirical work undertaken in this thesis confirms both a negative impact of 
conflict and health shocks on household welfare and substantial levelling effects on inequality. 
The conflict impact is persistent, while the disease impact is sharper and more short-term in 
nature. A key approach post-conflict was the introduction of financial and other support for the 
victims. The type of mitigating safety nets introduced by the government for conflict victims 
are not necessarily relevant for Ebola victims. This is because the conflict survival victims have 
physical scars that impede their economic capacity and productivity (for example, amputation 
or mental trauma), while the Ebola disease survivors exhibit more minor disabilities that are 
not significant enough to hinder their productivity in work-related activities. 
 
All three essays build on micro-level theoretical arguments regarding the effect of conflict and 
disease on household expenditure, poverty (both total and food), and inequality. In addition, 
the empirical analysis uses reasonably high-quality household-level surveys conducted and 
compiled by the national statistics office of Sierra Leone in collaboration with the World Bank. 
The survey data are nationally representative and contain useful information for informing the 
empirical analysis. The first two essays also exploit conflict information data compiled from a 
thorough documentation of the Sierra Leone conflict contained in the No Peace Without Justice 
(NPWJ) report. This report presents detailed information on the civil war activities that 
occurred over the ten-year period. The final essay of the three exploits additional data on 
confirmed and suspected Ebola cases compiled by clinical experts who worked closely with 




with the household survey data, providing a basis for the empirical identification strategies 
used in the empirical analysis of conflict and disease outbreak.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter examines the Sierra Leone civil war’s 
impact on two household welfare measures (i.e., household expenditure and poverty 
incidence). We evaluate the geographical variation of conflict intensity and the impact of 
directly incurred individual conflict events on the key outcome variables of interest. The 
chapter uses three rounds of household survey data from Sierra Leone (one before the conflict 
in 1989, and two after in 2003 and 2011, respectively) to identify the impact of the conflict on 
the welfare outcomes over both short-run and long-run periods. The empirical approach uses a 
propensity score matching (PSM) technique in conjunction with a difference-in-difference 
framework. The second chapter builds on the empirical work undertaken in the first essay and 
goes beyond the average effect to account for the conflict’s distributional impact on household 
welfare. It examines the short-term and long-term impact of the Sierra Leone civil war on 
household inequality. First, we employ a recentred influence function (RIF) for the 
unconditional quantile regression models and the Gini coefficient. Second, to investigate the 
distributional welfare impact of the conflict on household expenditure, we estimate quantile 
treatment effects (QTEs) based on the work of Firpo (2007). In the third chapter, using 
chiefdom-level exposure to confirmed Ebola cases and the quarantine policy measures 
implemented by the government, we examine the impact of the Ebola epidemic two years after 
its outbreak on household expenditure, poverty, and inequality. 
 
The key findings from the first essay reveal a negative reduction in household expenditure by 
a statistically significant 28.3% and an increase in household poverty of approximately 16 




groups. The negative consequences persisted a full 10 years after the end of the war. The 
findings in the second essay confirm the negative impact of the conflict across the household 
expenditure distribution with the top 10 percent of households incurring the greatest loss in 
welfare. On average, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient decreased by 7.5 
percentage points immediately after the civil war. The impact of the conflict on the inequality 
measure persisted 10 years after the war, with a slight reduction in magnitude for chiefdoms 
with protracted rebel group rule but not for the direct individual household effects.  
 
The final essay confirms a negative impact of the Ebola outbreak on household expenditure 
and increased poverty status for households in chiefdoms subjected to the government’s 
national quarantine policy. The level of inequality also decreased by 2.3 Gini percentage points, 
on average. Objective food poverty increased by 11.6 percentage points for the Ebola-
quarantined chiefdoms. The impact is confirmed by the subjective food security estimates, 
which exhibit a similar negative impact.  
 
The structure of the thesis is relatively straightforward, with each essay contained within the  
 
next three chapters. A concluding chapter brings some common themes together and outlines  
 




















 2 Chapter Two - The Impact of the Civil War on Household 




It is generally accepted that conflict impairs the economic development and social progress of 
affected countries and regions. It is associated with death and injury, the depletion of 
productive capital (both human and physical), the disruption of markets and social cohesion, 
and the weakening and erosion of civic and other institutional structures. It has been 
characterised by some as ‘development in reverse’ (for example, see Collier, Elliot, Hegre, 
Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003). There is persuasive empirical evidence that it 
reduces economic growth at the macro-level (e.g., see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000) and 
negatively impacts household welfare at the micro-level (see Justino, 2011).  
 
The theoretical framework used to model the economic impact of conflict at the macro-level 
has generally exploited Solow-type growth models, with the empirical literature emphasising 
a slow recovery after the end of conflict (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Rodrik, 1999; 
Collier, 1999; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). Micro-level analysis has generally explored the 
impact of conflict on human capital outcomes relating to education and health, institutions, 
social cohesion, labour market participation, and household consumption (see respectively 
Shemyakina, 2011; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009; Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 
2009; Serneels and Verpoorten, 2015). In contrast, understanding the patterns of household 
expenditure and poverty profiles that emerge as a consequence of conflict has attracted less 
research interest at the micro-level. The limited nature of the data available on household- and 
individual-level conflict experience, in conjunction with an absence of compatible data prior 
to and after a conflict, has posed particular challenges for researchers in this field. The objective 




devasting experience of the longest civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. This will provide 
additional and complementary evidence for the small amount of existing researched focused 
on the micro-level impact of conflict in other countries.  
 
This paper uses a number of household-level surveys from Sierra Leone to directly examine 
the legacy of conflict relating to the country’s civil war, with a specific emphasis on its 
household welfare and poverty consequences. The conflict spanned the period from 1991 to 
2002 and led to a conservatively estimated 50,000 fatalities, with many more injured. It also 
temporarily displaced about two million of the population, damaged the country’s physical and 
social infrastructures, and disrupted economic activity. A peace agreement between the warring 
factions (i.e., the government and the rebels) was eventually signed in 2002. The subsequent 
peace helped stimulate a modest economic recovery but one that was sluggish in character. The 
primary objective of this study is to examine the short-term and long-term impacts of the 
conflict on household welfare using both a household expenditure metric and a household 
poverty incidence measure.  
 
The potential endogeneity of conflict poses a challenge for identifying the causal impact of the 
war on household welfare. Therefore, the empirical approach exploits a propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique to estimate a difference-in-difference average treatment on the 
treated effect using cross-sectional data across three separate time periods. One of the 
household surveys available pre-dates the conflict and provides the baseline for analysis, while 
the other two were conducted, respectively, immediately after the end of the conflict and about 
ten years later. The empirical approach exploits the fact that the intensity of the conflict and 
the incidence of protracted territorial occupation by rebel forces was concentrated in certain 




unaffected by the conflict and not subject to rebel force occupation. These largely unaffected 
areas provide the control group for a core part of the empirical analysis undertaken in this 
paper.  
 
Our empirical findings reveal that households located in areas that experienced intensive 
conflict and protracted rebel force occupation exhibited lower household expenditure levels 
and were more likely to be in poverty in the immediate aftermath of the war. In particular, the 
short-run impact of the civil war is estimated to have reduced total household per capita 
expenditure in Sierra Leone by approximately 28%. The proportion of households below the 
poverty line increased by about 16 percentage points. These welfare estimates comport with 
those reported in the existing and fairly sparse literature for other African conflicts. Further, 
the estimated effects did not dissipate markedly ten years after the war in those areas subject 
to intense conflict and protracted rebel control, confirming a very slow post-war recovery 
process. 
 
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. The next two sections outline respectively 
the contextual background and some relevant literature within which the empirical analysis is 
situated. Two subsequent sections focus on data issues including the construction of the conflict 
measures. These are followed by two further sections that focus in turn on the econometric 
methodology used and the empirical results obtained. The penultimate section provides some 
robustness checks, and the final section provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Contextual Background  
Sierra Leone is located in West Africa and covers a geographical area of 71,740 square 




country endured poor governance, with corruption a hallmark of both the civilian and military 
administrations that had assumed power. In the years preceding the start of the war in 1991, 
the economy experienced very poor growth rates and the resultant low per capita income levels 
confirmed the country’s status as one of Africa’s (and indeed the world’s) poorest. This led to 
widening economic discontent among the population, encouraging some degree of sympathy 
with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group. It was this faction, with the support 
of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia, that originally launched an invasion of 
the country from neighbouring Liberia in March 1991 in an attempt to overthrow the then 
military-led Sierra Leone regime of Joseph Momoh. The conflict started in the Eastern region 
of the country, with rebel forces eventually reaching as far as the outskirts of the capital of 
Freetown by early 1999.1 
 
The government of Sierra Leone was allied with a coalition of international forces in opposing 
the rebels and preventing their encroachment into all parts of the country. The western area, 
and some chiefdoms in the north, were protected by an array of international military forces 
drawn from the United Nations, the British Army, the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the privately-hired Executive Outcomes, and the local 
Civil Defence Forces (CDF). This significant military presence and the poor inter-connections 
provided by road networks to neighbouring chiefdoms restricted the activities of the rebel 
forces to certain areas of the country.  
 
 
1 The natural resources of Sierra Leone (e.g., diamonds) are often implicated as providing one of the key motives 
for the war in Sierra Leone. However, the work of Voors, Van der Windt, Papaioannou, and Bulte (2017) reports 
no evidence that natural resources triggered the onset or affected the duration of the country’s civil war, although 
Keen (2005) suggests otherwise. However, see Bazzi et al. (2019) for an interesting study on the difficulties in 




The conflict was one of the longest within the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). It was also viewed as one of the most brutal in terms of acts perpetrated largely 
by the rebel groups (e.g., killings, limb amputations, rape, and the destruction of private 
property and public infrastructure). Military action was heavily concentrated in certain 
geographical areas of the country, with households in the Eastern regions in particular exposed 
to intense violence and a protracted period of occupation by RUF forces. Although the conflict 
extended its geographical reach during the course of the war, it had limited impact in the 
western and northern areas of the country. The delineation of chiefdoms into those under the 
authority of the government and those under rebel occupation for extended periods of time is 
exploited in implementing the empirical strategy for this study.2 
   
A peace agreement was signed in Lomé in 2002, marking an official end to the conflict. The 
recovery process was underpinned by post-war support from international organisations 
including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), USAID, the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DfID), and a variety of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established prior 
to the end of the war following the passage of an act of the Sierra Leone Parliament in 2000. 
The subsequent TRC findings were released in October 2004 (see Conibere, Asher, Cibelli, 
Dudukovich, Kaplan, and Ball, 2004). The TRC report, based on an evaluation of the 
insurgency and conflict-related activities that had occurred during the war, outlined a set of 
recommendations for post-conflict recovery. One of the recommendations was the provision 
 
2 The chiefdom represents the finest level of regional disaggregation in Sierra Leone. There were 152 chiefdoms 
in Sierra Leone during the time governing the empirical analysis undertaken in this particular study. The 
chiefdoms were originally a legacy of British colonial rule, with paramount chiefs appointed by the colonial 
authorities to rule the interior of the country outside Freetown. As noted by Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 
(2004), the powers of the chiefs endured beyond the colonial era and have been implicated in weakening the 




of a reparation programme for war victims who were wounded or suffered war-related 
amputations, had been subject to sexual violence, or were war widows.  
 
A Sierra Leonean government institute, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), 
was tasked with proposing and implementing a strategy to provide social service packages to 
war victims in accordance with the terms of the peace agreement and the recommendations of 
the TRC. These interventions were first introduced in 2009 and were intended, inter alia, to 
enhance the livelihood skills of war victims and their families. The implementation of the 
reparation programme in conjunction with a war victims’ trust fund was launched by the then 
president of the Republic of Sierra Leone with the assistance of the United Nations Peace 
Building Fund (UNPBF). The primary purpose of the fund was to provide financial support for 
war victims to mitigate the extreme effects of poverty, disability, trauma, and unemployment 
















2.3 Literature Review  
 
The proliferation of civil wars in the aftermath of World War Two has attracted the research 
interest of economists. The literature has used economic theories and empirical methods to test 
propositions about the determinants, duration, and costs of such conflicts, in an attempt to 
explain them in order to prevent them occurring in the future. The popular theoretical base has 
been whether greed or grievance is the motivating factor, and the conclusions have centred 
around a reverse two-way relationship between economic growth and conflict. Poor economic 
conditions can increase a population’s frustration and can invoke conflict as a fight against the 
status quo. Economic frustration can be caused by greed or grievance. However, there is strong 
empirical support for the greed concept (Hoeffler and Collier, 2004). Likewise, conflict 
activities have been found to have a negative impact on economic conditions. In essay two, we 
provide a more in-depth discussion on the two-way relationship between conflict and economic 
growth and extend it to inequality. 
 
One of the most influential pieces of macroeconomic research on the economic effects of 
conflict was undertaken by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The authors conducted a cross-country 
analysis of 92 countries from 1960 to 1989 and found that economic growth decreased by 15% 
after seven years of conflict. The broad magnitude of their findings was corroborated in later 
work by Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003), who reported a drop of about 2% of GDP per 
annum after five years of conflict. At the macroeconomic level, the literature suggests that civil 
war induces a sharp reduction in per capita income, which also has the potential to trigger a 
resurgence in conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2002). In the analysis 
of African countries between 1981-1999, a negative causal relationship has been predicted 
between economic growth and the incidence of civil conflict, using rainfall as an instrumental 




reduction in growth rate by 5 percentage points increases the likelihood of civil conflict by 1.5 
percentage points in the following year. 
  
It is fairly well established that conflict in its many forms (e.g., civil war, ethnic violence, and 
genocide) leaves in its wake a horrific set of legacies. Depending on its scale and reach, it has 
the potential to propel households into extreme forms of poverty (see Verwimp, 2005; 
Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2007; Shemyakina, 2011; Justino, 2009). Justino and Verwimp 
(2008) evaluated the effect of the Rwanda civil war and genocide on household welfare and 
poverty dynamics using household consumption data. The authors found that households with 
destroyed or lost land incurred a 20-percentage point higher risk of entering into poverty. 
Ibáñez and Moya (2010) used household-level data for war-displaced Colombians to estimate 
welfare loss and analyse the coping strategies adopted. The authors computed a 19% 
contraction in household consumption consequent on forced migration.   
 
Arcand and Wouabe (2009) studied the 27-year civil war in Angola and attempted to address 
conflict endogeneity by instrumenting a conflict intensity variable using the distance of a local 
community from the rebel headquarters. They found no statistically significant effect on either 
household expenditure or school enrolment in the short-run, though the quality of the 
identification used in this study was questionable. In contrast, the work of Bozzoli and Bruck 
(2009) for the northern Mozambique conflict reported a reduction in per capita household 
welfare of between 16% and 31% for households engaged in cotton production.  
 
As already noted, the empirical evidence on the effect of the Sierra Leone conflict is limited 
and largely focuses on its effects on political engagement, local institutions, individual 




(2009) used individual-level data from three household surveys collected after the war to 
construct victimisation indices for 2005 and 2007. The authors found that individuals in 
conflict-affected communities tended to be more politically engaged, made larger contributions 
to public goods, and were more likely to be members of social and political groups.  
 
Cecchi, Leuveld, and Voors (2016) explored the effect of conflict exposure on the competitive 
behaviour of young people in both a local street football tournament in Sierra Leone and in a 
series of laboratory experiments. The authors found that exposure to conflict when young 
fosters greater in-group co-operation but exacerbates out-group antagonism. The authors 
concluded that this also poses a challenge to policy-makers, who need to appreciate the 
potential impact of conflict in altering behaviour, preferences, and beliefs. Collier and 
Duponchel (2013), using firm-level data from the Sierra Leone Employers’ Survey (SLES), 
investigated the effect of the conflict on selected enterprise-level outcomes. The authors 
provided evidence that the conflict had a negative impact on the existence of firms, their size, 
and their employment levels.   
 
Overall, the foregoing suggests a gap in the existing literature investigating the direct impact 
of the Sierra Leone conflict on household welfare and poverty. The civil war in Sierra Leone 
is a unique case for study, as the rebel activities somewhat differed from those suggested by 
the conflict insurgency theory of greed or grievance. The rebels’ brutality, inflicted on the very 
people they claimed to be protecting, is an interesting addition to the conflict literature. The 
10-year civil war was lived through and become an embedded part of the country rather just 
having a one-off impact. Hence, the dynamic episodes of the civil war in Sierra Leone are an 




paper is to fill this gap and augment the fairly modest empirical literature on the micro-level 
relationship between conflict and household welfare for Sierra Leone and Africa in general.   
2.4 Data Description 
 
The 1989 Sierra Leone Household Survey (SLHS) and the 2003 and 2011 Sierra Leone 
Integrated Household Surveys (SLIHS) implemented by Statistics Sierra Leone in association 
with the World Bank provide the main data sources for this study. These data reflect household 
welfare and socio-economic status prior to the war (1989) and at two points in time (2003 and 
2011) after the peace settlement was agreed in 2002.  
 
A key difference between the sampling approach used in the earliest survey in 1989 and that 
of the two later surveys was that sampling was restricted to a randomly selected set of 64 
chiefdoms from a total of 152 in Sierra Leone for the initial survey, whereas the sampling of 
households was drawn from all 152 chiefdoms in the follow-up surveys undertaken in 2003 
and 2011. We investigate, as part of a robustness check, whether the econometric estimates 
reported are sensitive to the more restrictive chiefdom sampling used at the baseline in 1989.      
 
We construct two welfare metrics for each of the three years. First, we construct a logged 
measure of per capita household expenditure. Second, we use the household expenditure data 
to determine whether a household is above or below the relevant national poverty line for Sierra 
Leone. The resultant outcome variable is expressed as a binary measure adopting a value of 1 
if the household is found to be below the national poverty line and 0 otherwise.   
 
The 1989 survey data collected before the onset of the civil war provide a baseline or 
benchmark for calibrating the welfare status of households against which the conflict effects 




respectively on the immediate and longer-term post-war socio-economic status of households. 
In particular, the first post-war survey permits the empirical estimation of the short-term effects 
of the civil war on the two household welfare outcomes. The more recent of the two post-war 
surveys provides insights on how household welfare was affected by the conflict nearly ten 
years after the war’s end. Hence, this survey may also potentially reflect the impact of the war-
related reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes implemented by the government of Sierra 
Leone from 2009 onwards.   
 
The empirical strategy used entails allocating households to chiefdoms within Sierra Leone 
that were either characterised by high conflict intensity and protracted rebel occupation (i.e., 
the treatment group) or by low/no conflict intensity and limited/no protracted rebel occupation 
(i.e., the control group). The conflict brought substantial destruction to areas that experienced 
prolonged rebel occupation. In contrast to the eastern chiefdoms, the western and some 
northern ones witnessed limited or even no conflict due to the protection provided by 
government and other forces, and thus remained largely free from rebel occupation. The rebel 
penetration of the western and surrounding areas occurred near the end of the war, was transient 
in nature, and exerted minimal impact on the economic activity of the populations located 
within these areas.  
 
In order to classify households by their conflict exposure, we create a conflict dummy variable 
that captures conflict incidence by exposure to violence and the degree of rebel occupation in 
each administrative chiefdom. The conflict intensity data used to construct this dummy variable 
are obtained from the No Peace Without Justice report (see Smith, Gambette, and Longley, 
2004). The binary measure for a household’s exposure to the conflict is defined as 1 for those 




occupation (as defined by the presence of a rebel military headquarters in the chiefdom for 
more than eight years) and a high incidence of conflict-related death and other war-related 
activities, and is coded 0 otherwise. The eight-year threshold for protracted rebel rule is used 
because the peace talks, which halted the rebels’ invasion and activity, began after eight years 
of war. The start of the peace talks reduced rebel activity, and although some level of danger 
remained in some occupied regions, it was not as substantial as in the first eight years. The 
construction of the dummy variable is restricted to using chiefdom-level information as this 
represents the finest compatible level of regional disaggregation available across the three 
datasets. Table A2.1 of Appendix 1 lists the chiefdoms allocated to the treatment and control 
groups by survey year.  
 
It is again emphasised that the treatment not only reflects the experience of conflict-related 
violence but also the influence of protracted rebel occupation. The occupation endured for most 
of the war for those within this treatment group and was characterised by an absence of the 
‘rule-of-law’, the perpetration of sometimes gratuitous acts of brutality by (mostly) rebel 
forces, a failure to maintain physical infrastructure, and an absence of investment in health and 
educational facilities. Therefore, the treatment exposure is interpreted in broader terms than 
that captured or described by conflict intensity alone. Its definition also captures more 
explicitly the mechanisms through which the civil war potentially impacted economic activity 
and thus household welfare in Sierra Leone.    
 
In order to examine the robustness of our core empirical results using the treatment and control 
groups defined above, an alternative treatment measure is also constructed to capture the 
impact of the conflict on household welfare. This uses information on households that have 




destroyed or lost, household members raped, or household members displaced). The data 
obtained for this measure are based on respondents’ answers to questions about the conflict in 
the two post-war integrated household surveys from 2003 and 2011. This alternative conflict 
measure is again a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual in a household (or the household 
itself) is reported to have suffered from any of the stated events listed above and is 0 otherwise. 
In essence, this construct captures whether or not a member (or members) of the household 
report themselves as war victims.   
 
2.5 Selected Summary Statistics  
The kernel density plots for the log of per capita household expenditure by conflict exposure 
status are depicted in Figures 2.1 to 2.3 for the years 1989, 2003, and 2011, respectively. The 
density plots for the first year (see Figure 2.1) roughly overlap with each other with little 
marked evidence of a significant difference in the central location of the distributions between 
the conflict and non-conflict zones. In contrast, the density plot for the non-conflict areas in 
2003 (see Figure 2.2) exhibits a locational shift to the right compared to the corresponding plot 
for the conflict zones. A similar pattern is evident also in the density plots for the most recent 
year of 2011 (see Figure 2.3). 
 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the two outcome variables (i.e., the log of per capita 
household expenditure and the poverty rate) by conflict exposure for the three years (i.e., prior 
to the civil war (1989), immediately after the civil war (2003), and then almost ten years after 
the civil war had ended (2011)). No statistically significant difference in the mean log per capita 
expenditure between the treatment and control zones is detected prior to the start of the conflict. 
However, there exists evidence of a statistical difference in the poverty rates between what 




rates, on average, prior to the civil war. In contrast, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict 
the households in the conflict zone exhibit statistically significant lower average expenditure 
levels and considerably higher poverty rates. These gaps persist for both household welfare 
measures to 2011 and exhibit only a very modest tendency to decline. The negative association 
is also visible for the conflict event measure in the short-run (see Table A2.2 in Appendix 1).  
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Expenditure and Poverty Rate and Conflict Exposure 









Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test 
Log per capita expenditure 5.85 5.80  0.81 13.32 13.58 -5.18 13.82 14.06 -6.04  
(1.78) (1.62)  (1.51) (1.53)  (1.52) (1.69)  
Poverty rate  0.71 0.78 -4.38 0.80 0.68   8.44 0.57 0.41 13.87  
(0.45) (0.41)  (0.39) (0.46)  (0.50) (0.49)  
Sample Size 1167 2272  1666 2036  2591 4172  
Notes to Table 2.1: standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Conflict exposure refers to whether a household is located in the conflict-affected chiefdoms as defined in the text. 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of Household Expenditure by Conflict Exposure (2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Distribution of Household Expenditure by Conflict Exposure (2011) 
 
 
The household survey data also contain information on individual and household-level 
characteristics. These include, inter alia, the age of the household head, the head’s educational 
level, the head’s marital status and gender, the household dependency ratio, and the 
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methodology used in this study (see section below). Table 2.2 provides selected summary 
statistics for these variables by treatment and control groups.  
 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Household Characteristics by Conflict Exposure 







Head’s characteristics:   
  
  
Age  44.43 43.75 46.80 46.19 45.70 45.48  
(11.44) (11.91) 13.99 14.29 14.69 13.84 
Age squared 2104.39 2056.01 2386.05 2337.35 2304.36 2259.98  
(1119.90) (1193.83) 1461.48 1483.03 1515.09 1409.95 
Gender: Male 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.73 0.75 
Female 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.25 
Education: Primary 0.68 0.56 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 
High 0.32 0.44 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.10 
Secondary - - 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.21 
No education - - 0.75 0.64 0.76 0.59 
Marital Status: Married 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.77 
Cohabiting 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Other status 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 
Single 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Tribes: Mende  - - 0.38 0.37 - - 
Temne  - - 0.24 0.23 - - 
Other tribes - - 0.38 0.40 - - 
Religion: Muslim - - - - 0.78 0.74 
Christian - - - - 0.21 0.25 
Other religions - - - - 0.01 0.01 
Other characteristics:       
Urban 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.40 0.17 0.48 
Dependency ratio 0.99 0.91 0.95 0.94 1.08 1.15  
0.91 0.93 0.90 0.87 1.03 1.16 
Household size 6.16 5.29 6.28 6.11 5.65 5.62  
4.05 3.34 2.61 2.85 2.47 2.67 
Household size squared 54.37 39.14 46.28 45.43 37.98 38.76  
69.71 50.22 40.48 45.55 35.66 42.79 
Sample size 1167 2272 1666 2036 2591 4172 
Notes to Table 2.2: Standard deviations for continuous variables reported in parentheses; Conflict exposure refers 










2.6 Econometric Methodology 
 
Table 2.1 above provides an indication of a negative correlation between household welfare 
and the Sierra Leone conflict. However, this does not provide evidence of a causal effect. 
Therefore, a propensity score matching (PSM) technique is used in an attempt to causally 
identify the key effects of interest. The procedure is applied separately to the cross-section of 
households prior to the conflict and then to the two post-conflict datasets. This then allows the 
use of a difference-in-difference procedure to eliminate the influence of any time-invariant 
confounding factors that may impact the outcome measure of interest here.  
The first step of the empirical approach is to estimate a treatment assignment equation using a 
logistic regression model. In the case of the conflict exposure measure, the probability that a 
household is in a conflict-intensive and protractedly rebel-occupied zone (i.e., the treatment 
group) is empirically predicted. The specified logistic regression model includes as explanatory 
variables a set of household head and household-level characteristics. The specification used 
is not informed by economic theory and may comprise polynomial and interactive terms for 
the covariates. The specification is largely driven by the need to achieve good predictions and 
effective covariate balancing in the matching. The model estimates are used to construct the 
propensity scores on which the households from the two groups are subsequently matched. The 
variables used in the logistic regression are assumed to be correlated with the outcome variables 
but uninfluenced by the conflict to avoid any threat to the internal validity of the approach. The 
identifying assumption is that conditional on the input variables, the assignment to the 
treatment group (i.e., high conflict intensity areas with protracted rebel occupation) and the 




can be regarded as random and independent of the treatment. This is known as the 
unconfoundedness assumption, or the conditional independence assumption (CIA).3 
 
The treatment and control groups used are restricted to a common support which eliminates 
those cases for which the propensity scores for the treatment and control observations do not 
overlap. Epanechnikov kernel density with a bandwidth of 0.06 is used for matching purposes. 
This bandwidth is found to be the most effective in all cases and it should be noted that 
adjusting the bandwidth by a small margin above or below 0.06 does not materially alter the 
estimated treatment effects reported in this paper.  
 
After implementing the matching exercise, the pre-determined (or input) variables for the 
treatment and control groups are required to have a similar distributional pattern. If the quality 
of the match is satisfactory, the households assigned to the treatment and control groups should 
be observationally identical in terms of the marginal distributions of the input variables. If this 
balancing property is satisfied, this implies that no measured confounder bias remains. The 
property is assessed using a number of different diagnostics. These include the standardised 
bias approach suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), which measures the distance in the 
marginal (or unconditional) distributions of the input variables between the control and 
treatment groups both prior to and after matching. In addition, t-statistics and variance ratios 
(i.e., F-tests) for each variable included in the treatment assignment equation are also used to 
determine if there are statistical differences between the means and variances (of the continuous 
input variables) after matching. In investigating the balancing property, the logistic treatment 
assignment model is also re-estimated using the set of matched data. The expectation is that 
 
3 See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), Smith and Todd (2005), and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for 




with good matching, the regression model’s pseudo-R2 should be close to zero and the 
corresponding Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) for the overall statistical significance of the logistic 
regression model should yield a low value. We also use Rubin’s B and R statistics (see Rubin, 
2001), which provide a set of criteria for comparing the distribution of the propensity scores 
between the treatment and control groups. These latter two test statistics indicate whether the 
regression-based procedure adequately eliminates any measured confounder bias using an 
appropriate set of confidence intervals.  
 
Once the balancing property is satisfied, the impact of the treatment (i.e., the conflict) is 
obtained as the average difference between the treated units and the weighted average of the 
comparator units in the control group, where the standardised weights are based on the 
magnitude of differences in the propensity scores between individual treated units and the 
comparator control units. The average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect is computed using 
the data from all three survey years. This is defined for the period prior to the conflict (1989) 
as ATT0. The immediate post-war ATT effect using the 2003 survey is defined as ATT1, while 
the long-term ATT effect from the 2011 survey is expressed as ATT2. The difference between 
each of the two post-war ATTs and the baseline pre-war ATT0 (i.e., the difference-in-
difference) is taken to represent the causal impact of the conflict for the subset of households 
subjected to conflict in the short-run and long-run respectively.  
 
In contrast to a cross-sectional PSM approach, which eliminates any biases attributable to 
measured confounders, the difference-in-difference approach is more effective in dealing with 
bias from unmeasured confounders, provided these are immutable across time. Therefore, the 
combination of both approaches in the current application eliminates potential estimation 




analytical standard errors is not straightforward in the PSM framework, given the predicted 
nature of the standardised weights used for the matching. Therefore, a bootstrapping method 
with 250 replications is used to estimate the standard errors of the various ATTs reported in 
this study.  
 
It is acknowledged that the definition of the primary conflict treatment measure raises a number 
of concerns that may potentially challenge the identification strategy used here. First, there 
were circumstances when chiefdoms allocated to the control group by this definition were 
exposed to very short periods of intense violence during the civil war. The most notable episode 
occurred on January 6th, 1999, when rebel forces breached the western defensive perimeters 
protecting the capital of Freetown and engaged in an intense, three-day battle with government 
and allied forces. The rebels were eventually expelled from the municipality and order was 
restored by the end of that month. However, we re-emphasise that our definition of the 
treatment is broader than simply the incidence of conflict and relies more heavily on the 
protracted nature of rebel force occupation in particular chiefdoms. It was the extended nature 
of the occupation that provided the primary channel through which the economic activity of 
these chiefdoms was undermined and adversely affected.  
    
Second, it could be argued that the geographical allocation of households to zones with no (or 
minimal) conflict intensity and no protracted rebel occupation (i.e., the control group) neglects 
the fact that some households may have escaped, migrated, or been displaced from conflict-
zones to the non-conflict zones. This creates a potential spill-over effect, which might bias the 
estimated effect of conflict on household welfare. However, it should be stressed that during 
the civil war there were tight restrictions on individuals entering the non-conflict zones, as they 




network during the war period was not well maintained and was regularly subject to military 
checkpoints. The population generally moved by foot in a bid to avoid contact with rebels. This 
constrained the distances actually travelled by the displaced and explains why most movement 
was restricted to within the conflict-affected zones. Thus, there was minimal opportunity for 
movement of individuals into the government-controlled zones. Overall, although there was 
significant displacement, movement was restricted to within the conflict-affected areas and 
rather than between the conflict and non-conflict zones. Therefore, we believe this type of spill-
over effect is likely to exert a small effect on the key short-run estimates of interest. 
Nevertheless, this issue is explored in more detail when discussing the empirical results below.  
 
Finally, the treatment assignment equation is also specified using an alternative treatment 
measure based on whether a member (or members) of a household or the household itself was 
affected by conflict-specific events. Essentially, this models the treatment on the basis of 
whether the household self-reports that it contains a war victim or not. This treatment 
assignment equation is only estimable for the two later surveys, so the computation of a 
difference-in-difference estimate relative to the baseline of 1989 is not feasible. Nevertheless, 
the use of an alternative, complementary, household-specific conflict measure based on war 
victimhood rather than the exposure measure permits an assessment of the robustness of the 















2.7 Empirical Results 
 
Table 2.3 presents estimates for the treatment assignment models used to generate propensity 
scores for all three years and both treatment definitions. Given the need for a good balance in 
the distribution of the covariates across both groups, the specifications differ slightly between 
years. Further, as noted earlier, there is no underlying economic theory that motivates the 
specification and the estimates are not amenable to an economic interpretation. The key 
objective of the exercise is to obtain a regression model that yields sufficiently adequate 
predictive power to ensure good propensity scores for the matching exercise. Only a small 
number of household observations failed to satisfy the common support condition. The pre-
war sample registered just one observation outside the common support. In the 2003 (2011) 
post-war sample four (13) observations in the control group were outside the common support. 
In all cases, these observations are excluded from the empirical analysis.  
 
The matching exercise yielded good balancing quality for the input variables for all three years. 
The variance ratios for the continuous variables for the treatment and control groups lie within 
the specified 95% confidence intervals. The mean and median standardised bias estimates are 
well below the required threshold and none of the individual variables yields a standardised 
bias outside the ± 5% range. The Pseudo-R2 values for the logistic regression models re-
estimated using matched data are negligible and the LRT values for the overall significance of 
these regression models are statistically insignificant in all specifications. The estimated Rubin 
criteria for good balancing are both satisfied in all cases. The full array of statistics and 
diagnostics for the balancing property for all years is contained in Tables A2.3 to A2.6 





Table 2.4 reports the impact of conflict exposure and conflict-specific events on household per 
capita expenditure and poverty status separately. Column (1) reports, among other things, the 
ATT estimates of the conflict on log household expenditures for the three separate years. The 
initial interpretation focusses on the treatment estimate based on conflict exposure and rebel 
occupation in the immediate aftermath of the civil war. The point estimate for the average log 
difference in per capita household expenditures for the matched households between the 
conflict and non-conflict zones prior to the conflict is found to be positive and suggests a 16% 
advantage for the treatment group. However, this point estimate is not statistically significant 
at a conventional level (prob-value = 0.103). Thus, prior to the conflict, the evidence suggests 
no statistical difference in average household expenditure between the control group and what 
subsequently became the treatment group.     
 
The immediate (or short-run) post-war average treatment effect (ATT1) in column (1) reveals 
a significant decrease in average household expenditure for those households located in the 
conflict-affected chiefdoms compared to those that are not. The estimated effect suggests a 
15.4% reduction (i.e., [e–0.1674 – 1]´100) in average per capita household expenditure for those 
in the conflict zones. Therefore, the causal effect, which is based on the difference-in- 
difference between the two ATTs, suggests the civil war significantly reduced the average 
expenditure of those households in the high-conflict intensity and protractedly rebel-occupied 
chiefdoms by approximately 28.3% (i.e., [e–0.3331 – 1]´100). This represents a substantial loss 








Table 2.3 Logistic Treatment Assignment Model for Conflict Exposure & Conflict Events 













Age of head 0.0079 0.0183 0.0275* -0.0364*** 0.0229* 
 (0.0199) (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0105) (0.0119) 
Age of head squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003*** -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Head male 0.2060 -0.1920 0.6200*** -0.0640 -0.2460** 
 (0.1260) (0.1540) (0.1850) (0.0825) (0.1130) 
Head married -0.0147 -0.1640 -0.5680*** -0.0603 0.5640*** 
 (0.1630) (0.1660) (0.2080) (0.0990) (0.1250) 
Dependency ratio 0.0241 0.0530 -0.0995* -0.0230 0.0943** 
 (0.0554) (0.0499) (0.0589) (0.0309) (0.0456) 
Urban -0.1180 -0.9780*** -1.0820*** -2.1270*** -1.3130*** 
 (0.1490) (0.2460) (0.2840) (0.2010) (0.2020) 
Head with prim educ 0.5350*** -0.0175 0.8820*** -0.2280* 0.3490* 
 (0.0804) (0.1600) (0.2240) (0.1250) (0.1830) 
Head with higher educ - -0.4690** -0.4780** -0.0724 -0.1930* 
  (0.2060) (0.204) (0.1230) (0.1080) 
Household size -0.0322 0.2100*** -0.2750*** -0.00466 0.0749** 
 (0.0376) (0.0492) (0.0601) (0.0297) (0.0326) 
Head with prim educ × urban - 0.4080* -0.7670** 0.0986 0.1780 
 
 
(0.2430) (0.303)0 (0.2190) (0.2390) 
Head male × urban - 0.1310 -1.1420*** -0.3100** -0.0545 
 
 
(0.2570) (0.2980) (0.1570) (0.1590) 
Dependency ratio × urban 0.0530 -0.0706 -0.3260*** -0.0557 -0.2180*** 
 (0.0873) (0.0799) (0.0948) (0.0545) (0.0565) 
Household size squared 0.00615*** -0.0114*** 0.0086** -0.0019 -0.0046** 
 (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Household size × urban 0.0023 -0.0409 0.0953*** 0.0886*** 0.0867*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0268) (0.0297) (0.0225) (0.0237) 
Head married × urban -0.2000 0.9670*** 1.5520*** 0.3900** -0.2300 
 (0.3260) (0.2620) (0.3110) (0.1710) (0.1670) 
Head Muslim - 0.3300*** 0.5200*** -0.0841 -0.1030 
  (0.0836) (0.0940) (0.0771) (0.1050) 
Head × Temne tribe - -0.0129 -1.7110*** - - 
  (0.0817) (0.0911)   
Head × Muslim × urban - - - 0.1510 0.3630*** 
    (0.1410) (0.1410) 
Constant -1.2940*** -1.2990*** 1.4490*** 1.2150*** 0.3500 
 (0.4860) (0.3930) (0.4650) (0.2740) (0.3120) 
LRT 105.55 137.95 590.44 781.26 552.67 
LRT prob-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden R2 0.0240 0.0271 0.1290 0.0868 0.0740 
Observations 3439 3702 3697 6763 6685 
Notes to Table 2.3: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
The foregoing estimate comports with the findings of Sevastianova and Polachek (2010) who 
exploited panel data comprising 90 war-affected (including many African) countries, albeit 
using an alternative and broader measure of aggregate welfare (i.e., per capita GDP). Although 




of correlation in the changes exhibited by both. Therefore, it could be tentatively argued that 
our empirical results are in broad accord with the 15% decrease in per capita GDP over seven 
years of war reported by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) or the estimates recorded by Knight, 
Loayza, and Villanueva (1996) suggesting a similar effect. 
 
The ATT estimate based on the alternative treatment measure (i.e., whether or not any members 
of the household were war victims) is reported in column (3) of Table 2.4. In contrast to the 
chiefdom-based exposure measure, we cannot compute a difference-in-difference effect given 
the absence of a baseline for this measure. The ATT estimate confirms that being in a household 
which was directly and adversely affected by the civil war induces a reduction in per capita 
household expenditure of about 34%, on average, relative to comparable households unaffected 
by the conflict. This is larger in absolute terms than the corresponding ATT estimate reported 
for the same metric using the conflict exposure measure. However, as noted by Bellows and 
Miguel (2009), an important limitation of the war victimhood data from the two more recent 
surveys is their self-reported nature. The responses are thus prone to bias and potential over-
reporting. In particular, the size of the treatment groups reported for these measures in Table 
2.4 suggests considerably higher victimisation rates than are actually implied in the conflict 
exposure data. This may reflect respondents using a wider definition of what constitutes their 
households (e.g., by including extended family members when framing responses). 
Nevertheless, the strong and statistically significant effects for both definitions point to a 
pronounced negative relationship between conflict and household welfare.   
 
Our attention now turns to the poverty outcome measure. Again, on the basis of the matched 
households, the point estimate for the differential in poverty rates in 1989 suggests lower 




hostilities. However, there is no statistical difference in average poverty rates at the baseline in 
1989 between what subsequently became the conflict and non-conflict zones (see Table 2.4). 
The absolute value of the t-ratio is 1.42 with a corresponding prob-value of 0.16. The short-
run difference-in-difference estimate, reported in column (2) of Table 2.4, reveals that the 
household poverty rate in Sierra Leone increased by about 16 percentage points as a direct 
consequence of the conflict. The ATT estimate based on the alternative war victimhood 
treatment measure (see column (4) of Table 2.4), suggests an increased poverty rate for 
conflict-affected households of about 21 percentage points compared to their matched control 
group counterparts. Again, both measures indicate substantial increases in household poverty 
rates in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. In addition, the estimates reported in Table 2.4 
are similar to the findings of Justino and Verwimp (2008), who reported a 20-percentage point 
increase in the poverty rate in the immediate aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. 
 
The ATT and causal estimates over the longer period are also presented in Table 2.4 and relate 
to 2011 (i.e., ATT2 and D-i-D2). The coefficient of the ATT effect, approximately 10 years 
after the end of the war, is still negative but smaller in absolute magnitude when using the 
conflict exposure measure. The estimated long-run ATT effect suggests an 8.5% per capita 
household expenditure penalty for those households in chiefdoms exposed to conflict and 
protracted rebel occupation during the war compared to matched households in the control 
group chiefdoms (see column (1)). However, the difference-in-difference (D-i-D2) estimate 
between 2011 and pre-war 1989 reveals a statistically significant effect of the civil war on 
household welfare, with the estimated adverse effects of conflict remaining stubbornly high 
well after the conflict’s end (i.e., [e–0.2533 – 1]´100 = –22.4%). Further, although there is 
evidence of a slight decline in the poverty rate, it remains about 14 percentage points higher 





The empirical ATT estimates for the alternative treatment measure based on whether the 
household contained war victims or was directly affected by the conflict in other ways yields 
a more nuanced set of results over the longer term. For instance, the estimated ATT in column 
(3) of Table 2.4 is positive 10 years after the end of the civil war, and the poverty rate in column 
(4) of the same table is over five percentage points lower. The point estimates for the average 
treatment effects are small in magnitude, though both are found to be statistically significant. 
Therefore, households that incurred conflict-related loss or damage do not appear to have 
endured a long-term negative legacy in terms of either welfare metric – indeed the opposite 
appears to be the case.  
 
This is in contrast to what is found using the exposure measure where legacy effects of conflict 
are seen to persist over the 10-year period of analysis. A possible and very tentative conjecture 
is that the negative impacts of these war-related effects have been mitigated by the targeted 
support provided to war victims by both government and non-government agencies. It is 
possible that the reparation programme introduced by the government in 2009 might have 
contributed to an attenuation of the negative effects of the conflict on household welfare.4  
 
However, this remains a suggestive rather than a compelling account and one that clearly 
requires further empirical investigation. In addition, the caveats raised earlier regarding the 
self-reported nature of the responses used in the construction of this treatment measure remain 
 
4 A total of 21,700 war victims received compensation payments in the first year of the reparation programme. A 
permanent monthly pension adjusted for inflation was also introduced to ensure continued basic support for war 
victims. A comparison between the 2011 ATT estimates and those for 2003 provides a potential basis for a 
suggestive intention to treat analysis around the policy interventions introduced in 2009. If interpreted thus, the 
programme appears to exert a substantial effect on the welfare of war victim recipients. However, given the period 
over which the comparison is undertaken and concerns about the self-reported nature of the responses (particularly 
those for 2011 which may be subject to greater recall bias than for the earlier post-war year), it would be erroneous 




apposite, with the average victimisation rate reported by households in 2011 inordinately high. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence here demands a high degree of interpretational caution. 
 
Table 2.4 Average Treatment on the Treated Effects of Conflict on Welfare Metrics 
 Conflict Exposure Conflict Events  










1989(ATT0) 0.1636 -0.0882 - -  
(0.1002) (0.0622) - - 
2003(ATT1) -0.1674*** 0.0728*** -0.4187*** 0.2099***  
(0.0507) (0.0142) (0.0378) (0.0181) 
2011(ATT2) -0.0897** 0.0491*** 0.0785*** -0.0534***  
(0.0365) (0.0127) (0.0157) (0.0141) 
D-i-D1(ATT1-ATT0) -0.3331*** 0.1610*** - -  
(0.1122) (0.0638)   
D-i-D2(ATT2-ATT0) -0.2533*** 0.1373*** - - 





Treated 1167 1167 - - 




Treated 1666 1666 2460 2460 




Treated 2591 2591 5051 5051 
Control 4172 4172 1631 1631 
Notes to Table 2.4: Bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
2.8 Robustness Checks 
 
Sierra Leone’s capital Freetown was heavily protected by national and international forces 
during the war and so provided a relatively safe environment within which economic activity 
continued in a largely uninterrupted fashion. During the conflict, it was the centre of 
government and many non-governmental institutions engaged in either military or relief 
activities. Therefore, it is arguable that the economic opportunities in Freetown would have 
been different from the rest of the control group within the country because of the conflict. 
Therefore, this creates the potential for a downward bias in our empirical causal estimate. In 




group post-conflict. The results of this exercise are reported in Table A2.7 of Appendix 1. The 
core finding of the exercise is that the key ATT and difference-in-difference estimates are not 
materially altered by the exclusion of Freetown from the analysis.   
 
The intensity of the civil war varied across chiefdoms and conflict years, leading to some 
movement of the civilian population. Therefore, as noted earlier, there may be potential spill-
over effects due to voluntary migration and forced displacement. This would be particularly 
acute if movement between control and treatment zones were sizeable in nature. However, 
although migration and displacement may have been sizeable overall, the patterns reported in 
the SLIHS data from 2003 suggest that movement was largely confined to within the relevant 
treatment and control groups rather than between these two groups. Movement between the 
conflict and non-conflict areas accounted for 3% of total movement according to the survey 
data for 2003. The exclusion from the analysis of households that were subject to movement 
across the treatment and control boundaries does not alter the key short-run estimates reported 
in Table 2.4.  
 
In addition, household displacement during the civil war may undermine the interpretation of 
our long-term empirical estimates. The results could be driven by returnee contributions to 
socio-economic activity. The 2004 NPWJ report indicates an estimated two million Sierra 
Leoneans were displaced during the civil war. This accounted for over one-third of the Sierra 
Leone population in 2004 (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004 Population and Housing Census 
report). However, displacement was mostly internal, as neighbouring Liberia was also 
undergoing civil war and the border to the north was heavily guarded by the Guinean military, 
deterring entry to the country. A self-reported question on whether a household was displaced 




accounted for 7% of the total households surveyed. This percentage is clearly not representative 
of the general displacement pattern. However, if we drop the relevant 7% from our short-term 
analysis, the core results are not significantly altered from the results in Table 2.4.  
 
It was noted earlier that the baseline survey from 1989 is comprised of data drawn from only 
64 of Sierra Leone’s 152 chiefdoms, while the post-conflict data are drawn from all 152 
chiefdoms. Therefore, the analysis is re-done restricting the data (both pre-conflict and post-
conflict) to the original 64 chiefdoms. Although the short-run point estimates are larger in 
absolute terms using the restricted data, the same pattern of effects emerges as in Table 2.4. In 
addition, the long-run point estimates are broadly similar to the corresponding estimates from 
Table 2.4. Overall, the core empirical findings reported appear robust with the use of data 
restricted to the originally used 64 chiefdoms in the 1989 survey. The relevant ATT and 
difference-in-difference estimates for this exercise are reported in Table A2.8 of Appendix 1.  
  
As a final robustness check a placebo test is implemented. This involves randomly assigning 
half the chiefdoms to a pseudo-treatment group and the other half to a pseudo-control group. 
This random assignment exercise is replicated 40 times for each of the three years, with the 
ATTs computed for each exercise. The averages of the ATTs are reported in Table A2.9 and 
the key focus of interest relates to the average ATTs for the two post-conflict years. In neither 
year are the ATTs found to be statistically significant. This suggests that the key findings of 
this study reflect the impact of a systematic process on household welfare mediated through 
the conflict treatment variable defined on the basis of conflict intensity and rebel occupation.    
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the empirical work of Bellows and Miguel (2009) on war and 




household expenditure in 2003. However, the authors used data aggregated at chiefdom level 
rather than at the level of the individual household and restricted their analysis to the 64 
chiefdoms from the 1989 survey. The estimates reported in this study are clearly in conflict 
with those of Bellows and Miguel (2009). Their empirical analysis may be subject to a 
combination of aggregation bias and regression model over-parameterisation. In contrast, we 
believe the data and empirical approach adopted in the current study is not subject to either of 
these limitations and provides more meaningful insights on the effects of conflict on household 
welfare in Sierra Leone in both the short and long runs. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
   
This chapter investigates the effect of the Sierra Leone civil war on household welfare using 
household expenditure data and poverty rates. The study contributes to a sparse literature on 
the impact of the Sierra Leone conflict on selected socio-economic outcomes. Our analysis 
differs in terms of empirical methodology and research objectives from earlier work undertaken 
in this area. It uses household-level data and focuses on the impact of the conflict on household 
welfare outcomes rather than on social, political, behavioural and firm level outcomes – themes 
that have featured more prominently in the conflict research agenda for this country to date. 
 
The study uses three-household level surveys in conjunction with geographical (i.e., chiefdom-
level) data on the conflict and finds that households in the conflict and rebel-occupied zones 
experienced a sharp reduction in per capita household expenditures of about 28% in the short-
run. The civil war is also found to have increased the household poverty rate by about 16 
percentage points over the same period. The magnitude of these estimates is broadly 
comparable with the research findings for other countries and regions where the immediate 




affected and rebel-occupied areas experience a reduced level of welfare are likely to be rather 
prosaic in nature. These relate to the fact that it takes an economy longer to recover from the 
destruction inflicted by such a brutal conflict. This is due to the erosion of national institutions 
and trust, the depletion of physical and human capital, damage to infrastructure, the disruption 
of social and transportation networks, and the breakdown in the functioning of product and 
other markets.  
 
The long-run empirical analysis using conflict exposure measures suggests a glacially slow 
recovery in household expenditure, with a conflict penalty persisting approximately 10 years 
after the end of the civil war, and poverty rates also remaining stubbornly high. The less than 
positive long-run outcomes obtained using the chiefdom exposure measure may reflect the fact 
that the adverse structural effects of conflict at the local level take time to erode. In particular, 
limited government resources restrict the level of infrastructural investment available to 
mitigate the legacy effects of the conflict, and the findings also possibly reflect the absence of 
a systematic regional development policy.  
 
In contrast, the empirical analysis using a treatment measure based explicitly on household war 
victimhood suggests no long-term negative impacts. Indeed, it suggests modest improvements 
in household expenditure and accompanying reductions in poverty rates for those households 
that self-report being directly affected by the conflict. Sierra Leone’s reparation programme 
for war victims, introduced in 2009, was configured to empower war victims economically and 
to provide them with skills to enhance their livelihoods. The implementation of such 
programmes for war victims potentially softens the harsher channels through which conflict 
may impact household welfare. It may be the case that the finding reported here, suggesting 




partially reflects the beneficial role of this programme. However, it is also acknowledged that 
this measure may be subject to response bias with recall bias over the longer period, which is 
a potentially salient issue here. Therefore, a high degree of interpretational caution is justified 
with regard to the findings based on these victimhood data.  
 
Further, it is worth noting that in the Sierra Leone conflict, the effects of the war were not 
simply confined to those localities directly impacted by the conflict through rebel occupation 
and the incidence of military engagements.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that all areas of 
Sierra Leone are likely to have suffered from the conflict to one degree or another.  Given the 
estimates reported here only compare the conflict to the no conflict chiefdoms, they are likely 
to under-estimate the overall impact of the conflict on Sierra Leone.  Therefore, it is arguable 
that these estimates possibly represent a set of lower bound estimates and this should be borne 
in mind in interpretation.      
 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the identification strategy used in this study to estimate the 
causal effect of the civil war on household welfare using the conflict exposure measure is not 
the cleanest, and purists could legitimately challenge the authenticity of the causal effects 
reported in this study.  As noted by Ruhm (2019), there is a trade-off in applied work, 
particularly when restricted to using observational data, between clean identification of key 
estimates and the need to seek answers to important questions (like the household welfare 
impact of the Sierra Leone civil war). Even if purists are unconvinced and argue that the 
evidence presented here is largely descriptive in nature, the description points persuasively to 
a sizeable impact of conflict on household welfare in the immediate aftermath of the war. At 
the very least, this study should be interpreted as adding to a body of evidence on the impact 











































































































































































Table A 2.1: Chiefdom Allocation to Treatment and Control Groups across the Three Survey 
Years 
Years in Survey Chiefdoms in Treatment Group  Chiefdoms in Control Group 







































Gorama Kono  
Northern Region: 
Paki Masabong  
Samu  
Dembelia Sinkunia  
Follosaba Dembelia  
Sulima  
Wara Wara Yagala  





Kholifa Mabang  









Kpanga Kemo  
Bumpeh  






Central 1  
Central 2  
East 1  
East 2  
East 3  
West 1 
West 2  
West 3  
2003 and 2011 only Eastern Regions: 












Safroko Limba  
Sanda Tendaren  
Eastern Regions: 
Kissi Tongi  
Kpeje Bongre  
Kpeje West  
Dodo  
Gaura  

















Bureh Kasseh   
Buya Romende  
Dibia  
Sanda Magbolontor 
Southern Region:  
Jong  












Wara Wara Bafodia  
Masimera  






Southern region:  
Bumpe Ngawo  
Niawa Lenga  





Lower Banta  
Timdale  
Gallinas Peri  
Mano Sakrim  

































Table A 2.2: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables by Conflict Events  
2003 2011  
Conflict Non-conflict Conflict Non-conflict  
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Log per capita expenditure 13.41 13.88 13.93 14.15  
(0.77) (0.95) (0.50) (0.68) 
Poverty Rate 0.81 0.59 0.60 0.45  
(0.39) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
Sample  2377 1319 4041 2722 





Table A 2.3: Pre-war (1989) Covariate Balancing Tests Using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio  
Age of head 42.87 43.01 -1.20 -0.48 0.63 0.98 
Age of head sq 1958.50 1971.20 -1.10 -0.45 0.65 1.07 
Head male 0.86 0.87 -2.60 -0.98 0.33 0.99 
Head cohabiting 0.93 0.93 -0.90 -0.34 0.73 1.02 
Dependency ratio 0.90 0.88 1.90 0.84 0.40 1.13 
Urban 0.34 0.36 -3.20 -1.17 0.24 1.00 
Head prim educ 0.57 0.59 -4.40 -1.55 0.12 0.97 
Head higher educ 0.43 0.41 4.50 1.55 0.12 0.97 
Household size 5.41 5.44 -0.70 -0.28 0.78 1.01 
Household size sq 41.52 41.65 -0.20 -0.09 0.93 1.07 
Head prim educ ´ urban 0.19 0.19 -1.20 -0.44 0.66 0.98 
Head male ´ urban 0.29 0.31 -2.90 -1.06 0.29 0.99 
Notes to Table A2.3: * if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2]; 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2.0 
  
 
Table A 2.4: Post-war (2003) Covariate Balancing Tests using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio 
Age of head 46.80 46.66 1.00 0.29 0.77 0.99 
Age of head sq 2386.00 2374.70 0.80 0.22 0.82 0.99 
Head male 0.82 0.83 -4.90 -1.47 0.14 0.87 
Head married 0.84 0.86 -5.10 -1.58 0.11 1.11 
Dependency ratio 0.95 0.94 1.50 0.44 0.66 1.10 
Urban 0.30 0.30 -0.80 -0.24 0.81 0.99 
Head prim educ 0.09 0.09 0.30 0.09 0.93 1.01 
Head higher educ 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.95 1.01 
Household size 6.28 6.25 1.30 0.40 0.69 1.01 
Head prim educ ´ urban 0.04 0.04 0.70 0.22 0.83 1.04 
Head male ´ urban 0.25 0.25 -0.60 -0.17 0.86 0.98 
Dependency ratio ´ urban 0.30 0.30 -0.20 -0.08 0.94 1.08 
Household size sq 46.28 45.75 1.20 0.38 0.71 1.01 
Household size ´ urban 1.87 1.90 -0.80 -0.24 0.81 0.99 
Head married ´ urban 0.25 0.26 -1.60 -0.46 0.65 0.98 
Head a Muslim 0.80 0.80 -0.10 -0.02 0.99 1.00 
Head from Temne tribe 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.07 0.94 1.00 
Notes to Table A2.4: * if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2]; 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2 





Table A 2.5: Post-war (2011) Covariate Balancing Tests using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio 
Age of head 45.70 46.05 -2.40 -0.87 0.38 1.05 
Head primary educ 0.07 0.06 0.90 0.36 0.72 1.05 
Head higher educ 0.05 0.04 1.60 0.70 0.48 1.09 
Head male 0.73 0.74 -2.20 -0.78 0.44 1.03 
Head married 0.81 0.82 -2.40 -0.92 0.36 1.03 
Dependency ratio 1.08 1.09 -0.80 -0.30 0.77 1.01 
Household size 5.65 5.66 -0.40 -0.17 0.86 1.11 
Age of head sq 2304.40 2320.10 -1.10 -0.38 0.70 1.06 
Urban 0.17 0.17 -0.20 -0.09 0.93 0.99 
Dependency ratio ´ urban 0.19 0.19 -0.40 -0.19 0.85 1.04 
Head married ´ urban 0.12 0.12 -0.30 -0.12 0.91 0.99 
Head male´ urban 0.11 0.12 -0.80 -0.36 0.72 0.97 
Head prim educ ´ urban 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.96 0.99 
Household size ´ urban 0.96 0.94 0.50 0.22 0.82 1.01 
Household size sq 37.98 37.45 1.30 0.54 0.59 1.11 
Head a Muslim 0.78 0.78 -1.10 -0.40 0.69 1.02 
Head a Muslim ´ urban 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.99 1.00 
Notes to Table A2.5: * if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2]; 




Table A 2.6: Pre-war and Post-war Balancing Property Diagnostics for Conflict Exposure 









B R %concern %bad 
1989: Unmatched 0.038 105.55 0.00 18.20 21.80 43.10* 2.52* 33.00 8.00 
Matched 0.002 11.20 0.43 2.10 1.60 9.10 1.24 0.00 0.00 
2003: Unmatched 0.149 137.95 0.00 18.40 14.00 97.6* 0.73 59.00 12.00 
Matched 0.003 19.84 0.283 2.40 2.10 13.00 1.46 0.00 0.00 
2011: Unmatched 0.127 781.26 0.00 25.00 11.30 89.70* 1.03 35.00 24.00 
Matched 0.001 10.79 0.867 1.20 0.80 7.40 1.15 0.00 0.00 

























Table A 2.7: Average Treatment on the Treated Effects of Conflict on Welfare Metrics 
(excluding Freetown from the post-conflict data) 
 Conflict Exposure Conflict Events  










1989(ATT0) 0.1636 -0.0882 - -  
(0.1002) (0.0622) - - 
2003(ATT1) -0.1370*** 0.0562*** -0.4187*** 0.2099***  
(0.0505) (0.0134) (0.0378) (0.0181) 
2011(ATT2) -0.0878** 0.0495*** 0.0785*** -0.0534***  
(0.0382) (0.0135) (0.0157) (0.0141) 
D-i-D1(ATT1-ATT0) -0.3006*** 0.1444*** - -  
(0.1122) (0.0636) 
  
D-i-D2(ATT2-ATT0) -0.2514*** 0.1380*** - - 






Treated 1167 1167 - - 




Treated 1666 1666 2460 2460 




Treated 2591 2591 5051 5051 
Control 4065 4065 1631 1631 
Notes to Table A2.7: Bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table A 2.8: Average Treatment on the Treated Effects of Conflict on Welfare Metrics (based 
on 64 chiefdoms) 
 Conflict Exposure Conflict Events  










1989(ATT0) 0.1636 -0.0882 - -  
(0.1002) (0.0622) - - 
2003(ATT1) -0.3984*** 0.1402*** -0.4187*** 0.2099***  
(0.0596) (0.0186) (0.0378) (0.0181) 
2011(ATT2) -0.0888** 0.0562*** 0.0785*** -0.0534***  
(0.0589) (0.0184) (0.0157) (0.0141) 
D-i-D1(ATT1-ATT0) -0.5620*** 0.2302*** - -  
(0.1037) (0.0625) 
  
D-i-D2(ATT2-ATT0) -0.2524*** 0.1444*** - - 





Treated 1167 1167 - - 




Treated 894 894 2460 2460 




Treated 1519 1519 5051 5051 
Control 2259 2259 1631 1631 
Notes to Table A2.8: Bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications in parentheses. 







Table A 2.9: Average Treatment on the Treated Effects of Conflict using a Placebo in Space 
 Conflict Exposure  





1989(ATT0) 0.0984* -0.0536*  
(0.0420) (0.0242) 
2003(ATT1) 0.0015 -0.0116  
(0.0049) (0.0138) 
2011(ATT2) 0.0056 -0.0078  
(0.0405) (0.0126) 
D-i-D1(ATT1-ATT0) -0.0969 -0.0652  
(0.0422) (0.0278) 
D-i-D2(ATT2-ATT0) -0.0928 -0.0614 
 (0.0583) (0.0272) 
 
Average Sample 1989: 
  
Treated 1506 1506 
Control 1968 1968 
Average Sample 2003: 
  
Treated 1894 1894 
Control 1808 1808 
Average Sample 2011: 
  
Treated 3429 3429 
Control 3344 3344 
Notes to Table A2.9: The chiefdoms were randomly allocated to either an artificial control or treatment group using a 
random number generator, and this exercise was repeated 40 times; the estimates reported are based on the average of the 40 
exercises; average bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications for each are reported in parentheses. 
































 3 Chapter Three - The Impact of Civil War on Inequality in 




It has long been acknowledged that conflict has consequences for the socio-economic 
indicators of the countries it affects. As widely discussed in the development literature, these 
adverse effects emerge from the loss of life, destruction of physical infrastructure, disruption 
of markets and social networks, and increased uncertainty that conflict induces. The effect of 
conflict on household welfare is mediated through changes in socio-economic outcomes as 
well as through institutional and cultural changes (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010). It can cause 
a paradigm shift in the socio-economic status of households in an affected country. The 
vulnerability of developing countries can be exacerbated and amplified through the impact of 
economic shocks like civil conflict, leading to increased poverty and reductions in household 
expenditure levels (see Essay 1 of this thesis and Justino and Verwimp, 2006). In contrast, the 
evidence on the impact of conflict on the distribution of household expenditure or income is 
somewhat limited. Thus, investigating the impact of conflict on household welfare distribution 
and inequality can help provide insights on the type of policies required to mitigate the adverse 
effects of civil conflict.  
 
The existing literature on the relationship between inequality and conflict has largely focussed 
on the impact of vertical inequality (e.g., income distribution across individuals) or horizontal 
inequality (e.g., endowment differences across groups defined in terms of ethnicity or religion) 
in triggering conflict. The limited set of empirical results on the impact of inequality on conflict 
are mixed. The evidence suggests that vertical inequality is a less important promoter of 
conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) compared to different forms 




research, with the limited work undertaken to date confined to cross-country macro-level data 
analysis (see Bircan, Bruck, and Vothnecht 2010) suggesting that conflict in Africa – in 
particular civil war – increases vertical inequality as measured by country-level GDP. 
However, to the author’s knowledge, no systematic research to date has been undertaken on 
the impact of conflict on household welfare inequality using micro-level data.   
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone endured for over a decade and eventually came to an end in 2002. 
The objective of this research is to understand the short-term and long-term impacts of this 
conflict on vertical inequality as measured by distribution of household expenditure. Using 
three cross-sectional household-level datasets – one covering the pre-war period (1989) and 
two covering the post-conflict period (2003 and 2011) – we analyse the impact of the civil war 
on household expenditure distribution using both quantile-based measures and Gini index 
regression methods. It is argued that this empirical work contributes to the small volume of 
literature on the causal relationship between conflict and household welfare inequality.   
 
The key finding of this paper is that conflict exerts an overall negative impact on the 
distribution of household expenditure, but one that is particularly deep at the top end of the 
distribution. In addition, the level of household expenditure inequality reduces significantly 
immediately after the end of the civil war by approximately eight Gini points. However, the 
estimated effect on inequality is found to have dissipated a decade after the end of the civil 
war. The potential explanation for the findings rests on the destructive strategies employed by 
the rebel groups towards visible high value assets like residential properties and the policy 





The next section of this essay provides some background on the nature and activity of the rebel 
groups involved in the conflict. This is then followed by a literature review, which details the 
relationship between conflict and inequality, placing a particular emphasis on the distinction 
between vertical and horizontal concepts of inequality. This is then followed by a data section 
and a section outlining the empirical methodology used. The empirical results are reported in 
a subsequent section, which is followed by a section reporting a series of robustness checks. A 
penultimate section provides a discussion of the results, with a final section providing 




3.2 Background: The Civil War in Sierra Leone and Rebel Group Activities 
 
As noted in Essay 1, Sierra Leone was originally constituted as a British protectorate and is 
bordered by Liberia to the east and Guinea to the north. The country provided for export 
unprocessed raw materials like agricultural products and minerals. The municipality of 
Freetown was used as a trading and administrative centre during the period of British rule. The 
country gained its independence from Britain in 1961. Since independence, economic 
development was uneven, and governance was marked by weak institutions and autocratic 
political rule by the All People’s Congress (APC) party. A civil war initially started in the 
neighbouring country of Liberia in 1989 but Sierra Leone was vulnerable to the conflict spilling 
over given the prevalence of political distrust within the country (see Clapham, 2001; Keen, 
2005).  
 
The civil war eventually started in Sierra Leone in March 1991 and ended in May 2002. The 
war centred around brutal civilian attacks, armed battles, and two successful coups d’état. The 
civil war can be described with respect to three important phases. The first phase (1991-1995) 
includes the country’s invasion by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from the eastern 
border with Liberia in 1991, led by Foday Sankoh. In 1992, a military junta group led by a 
military captain, Valentine Strasser, staged a coup and overthrew the ruling president. The 
military junta group was called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Their leader 
became head of state from 1992 to 1994. The country was still experiencing unrest as the rebel 
groups extended their control in the provincial areas. In 1995, a ceasefire agreement between 
the rebel factions and the government marked the end of the first phase of the war.  
 
The second phase (1996-1999) was initiated with the election of President Tejan Kabba in 




Party (SLPP). A second military coup d’état took place in May 1997, but the ruling party was 
reinstated after a few months. A period of unsuccessful negotiations with the RUF led to the 
junta intervention on January 6th 1999. The rebels temporarily captured part of the capital city 
from the control of national and international armed forces. A short and intense military 
exchange between the rebel and allied groups forced the rebels out of the capital by the end of 
the month. The final phase of the conflict (2000-2002) encompasses the peace talks, an amnesty 
for RUF combatants, and retirement packages for the national soldiers. The 2002 peace 
agreement was eventually signed in Lomé and marked the official end of the civil war.  
 
Societies emerging from protracted violence are faced with numerous socio-economic 
challenges (see Sesay, 2007). An understanding of the cause(s) of violence can help in building 
policies to mitigate a conflict’s negative effects and prevent a resurgence of unrest. Sierra 
Leone, prior to the civil war, was characterised by widespread popular discontent with corrupt 
government rule, and an unequal distribution of developmental projects and public services 
(see Keen, 2005; Bellows and Miguel, 2006; Raleigh and Bruijne, 2017). The country was 
situated at the bottom of the World Development Index in 1990, two years before the civil war 
(United Nations Report, 1993). The factors that animated the civil war are not clear, but there 
is agreement that the state’s failure to provide public services and promote economic growth 
were significant factors (see Keen, 2005; Bellows and Miguel, 2006). The failure of the state 
in providing education and employment opportunities led to an increase in the willingness of 
the disenfranchised youth to use violent means to express their disgruntlement with the state 
(see Richards, 1996). Interestingly, there is no evidence to be found that the war was motivated 
by ethnic or religious fractionalisation (i.e., horizontal inequality). The war became more 
controversial as the RUF turned against the civilian population that it purported to have come 




generally gratuitous in nature and described elsewhere as senseless (see Keen, 2005). However, 
the lack of popular support and funding for arms and ammunition, food, and other resources 
impeded the rebellion. 
 
It has been argued that if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs, then rebellion becomes an 
attractive option (see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). These perceived benefits could be derived 
from external support or the use of personal extortive activities. The RUF and later some 
‘Sobels’ (so called because they were government soldiers acting like rebels) engaged in 
exploitation techniques. The civil war saw a high proliferation of attacks on civilian wealth 
assets and public infrastructure. The looting of private property and other household wealth 
assets constituted a deliberate strategy on the part of the rebels. The leader of the RUF group, 
Foday Sankoh, encouraged the rebels to undertake these activities, classifying them as 
‘operations’. These strategies included ‘operation pay yourself’ and ‘operation hit, run and 
destroy’. Sankoh instructed the RUF rebels to conduct these activities as a form of self-payment 
and to terrorise local communities in order to establish control and weaken opposition to rebel 
presence in their communities.  
 
Agricultural activities were disrupted as the war became concentrated in agriculturally rich 
regions. These areas were targeted to provide food resources for the rebels. The widespread 
theft and killing of animals and the looting and destruction of physical assets exacerbated the 
poor economic conditions (see, for example, United Nation Development Program, 1995; 
World Food Program, 1996; Keen, 2005). The strategy was designed to depopulate resource-






As a protective measure against the rebels, local communities formed militia groups 
collectively known as the Civilian Defence Force (CDF). They generated support locally and 
gained widespread support across the country. However, during the later stages of the war, 
most CDF units lost discipline and eventually engaged in stealing and looting of private 
possessions and participated in illicit diamond mining. Thus, ‘operation pay yourself’ was 
eventually adopted by all sides during the war (see Keen, 2005). The national army and their 
allies’ offensives against the RUF and other rebel sub-groups encouraged the rebels to use the 
tactic of ‘hit, destroy and run’ leading to further death and destruction of property and assets 
(see Hoffman, 2011, p. 41).  
 
There is some evidence that the rebel groups systematically targeted public infrastructure 
installations, primarily in rural areas. This involved the burning down of schools, hospitals, 
and other public administrative units of the government. However, public infrastructure in 
urban centres was protected by national and international peacekeeping forces and was largely 
unaffected by this strategy. As a consequence, however, the targeting strategy switched from 
public to private, unprotected properties (see Keen, 2005; Sesay, 2007). Raleigh and De 
Bruijne (2010) reported high levels of lootings of private property in areas controlled by the 
rebel groups compared to those controlled by government forces.  
 
In combating and suppressing the rebels, strong measures were implemented by the 
government of Sierra Leone. This helped prevent the insurgents from controlling all parts of 
the country. The western area, and some chiefdoms in the north, were protected by a coalition 
of international forces. The coalition included the United Nations, the British Army, Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces, and the privately-




interconnections provided by road networks to neighbouring chiefdoms restricted the activities 
of the insurgent groups to certain areas. In particular, the defeat of the rebel forces in Freetown 
initiated a brutal and desperate reaction by the rebels, including widespread rape and looting. 
The reversal of the rebels’ effort to control and impose authority was usually followed by 
greater destruction of life and property.  
 
In 2002, a peace agreement was signed in Lomé, marking the official end of the war. The 
recovery process was underpinned by post-war support from international organisations like 
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, USAID, the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), and a variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
As part of the agreement signed in Lomé, and following an act of the Sierra Leone Parliament, 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established. As noted in Essay 1, the TRC 
report (see Conibere, Asher, Cibelli, Dudukovich, Kaplan, and Ball 2004) was released in 
October 2004. The report, based on an evaluation of the insurgency and conflict-related 
activities that had occurred during the war, outlined a set of recommendations for post-conflict 
recovery. One of the recommendations was the provision of a reparation programme for war 
victims who fell under the following categories: war-related amputations, sexual violence, war 
wounded, child victims, and war widows. International financial aid and other developmental 
support came as a response to the post-conflict recovery strategies set by the government of 









3.3 Literature Review on Conflict and Inequality 
 
The impact of conflict on inequality is difficult to cleanly identify, as the relationship may be 
subject to reverse causality. For example, there is a strand of literature, using cross-country 
data, which suggests that the resultant impact of conflict is to increase inequality (see Bircan, 
Bruck, and Vothnecht, 2010). In contrast, a more widely held view within the literature that 
reverses the direction of causality asserts that inequality can act as a catalyst for conflict 
insurgence (see Stewart, 2008). However, the provenance of the inequality is found to be 
important, with horizontal inequality seen as providing a more significant driver for conflict 
compared to vertical inequality. The focus of this essay is on the relationship between conflict 
and vertical inequality, with this review assessing the potential for a relationship to run in either 
direction. The first sub-section of this review concentrates on the theoretical relationship 
between conflict and inequality and reports the limited empirical evidence on this theme. The 
second sub-section reviews the reverse direction and discusses the supportive empirical 
literature around this theme.  
 
 
The concept of vertical economic inequality has generally been defined using a measure of 
disparity in income. This can be evaluated among individuals or groups within a society. 
However, other welfare indicators of inequality based on household expenditure patterns 
reflect underlying patterns in income inequality and better capture the inequality inherent in 
permanent income. This part of the review focuses on the main theoretical arguments and the 
empirical findings on the role of inequality in determining conflict. 
 
The key factors that lead to civil war have been broadly addressed by the grievance theory 
popularised by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). The determinants of inequality in an economy can 




an economy given the presence of socio-economic deprivation, political exclusion, and 
favouritism towards certain elite groups in society. Economic grievance in the form of 
protracted income inequality is a mechanism through which inequality can fuel conflict. The 
conflict is motivated by a bid to demand political change and redistribution. The argument is 
that persistent inequality can lead to grievance among the disadvantaged population. If there 
are no meaningful reforms and state-led repression is prevalent, the aggrieved section of society 
may turn to and deploy violent options.  
 
A common measure of vertical economic inequality within a society is the Gini coefficient, 
which captures the extent to which the observed income across households deviates from 
equality. Higher values indicate higher inequality. The conventional Gini coefficient can be 
adopted to define disparity in the distribution of a variety of different welfare measures 
including income and household expenditure. The empirical literature that uses the Gini 
coefficient as a proxy for vertical economic inequality has found no evidence of a relationship 
with conflict insurgence (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). However, 
the absence of statistical significance has been attributed to poor quality data and aggregation 
bias related to the use of country-level data as the primary unit of observation. In contrast, 
inequality measures based on horizontal inequality that take into consideration social class, 
caste, and ethnic differences have provided evidence that inequality of this kind provides 
incentives for violent revolution (see Boix, 2008; Acemoglou and Johnson, 2006). The role of 
grievance stemming from vertical inequalities as a catalyst of conflict has found little support 
in the conflict literature (see Gurr, 1968; Davies, 1962; Muller and Sleigson, 1987; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). Vertical inequality (either individual or group) motivating grievance finds 




Tilly (1978) and Muller (1972) have strongly criticised such individual-level frustrations as 
plausible drivers for political action or civil war.  
 
However, the grievance-based theory, despite its shortcomings, is still far from being discarded 
in the literature. Stewart (2008) presents a neater way to conceptualise the relationship between 
group-based vertical inequality and conflict. The author hypothesises that conflicts usually 
involve a contest between organised individuals or groups, on the one hand, and the 
government or status quo on the other. This group-based inequality is termed horizontal 
inequality in this conceptualisation. The important contrast between vertical inequality and 
horizontal inequality is that the latter measures inequality across groups defined in terms of 
social class, ethnicity or religion. Specifically, Stewart (2008) defines horizontal inequality as 
disparities across economic, social, and political dimensions, or the absence of cultural esteem 
between defined groups. An ethnic group-based perception of being deprived or excluded from 
accessing skills, resources, social status, or an equal distribution of political representation may 
lead to conditions within which conflict insurgency can occur (Tilly, 2007; Gamson, 1992; 
Buhaug, 2010). Thus, these dimensions of inequality tend to be a more potent catalyst of 
conflict than inequalities measured exclusively along a vertical dimension (e.g., household 
income or expenditure).  
 
Horizontal inequality in the grievance-conflict theory has provided a plausible mechanism 
through which grievance can potentially determine conflict. The horizontal inequality literature 
has focused on ethno-political and economic grievances (see Gellner, 1983). This has 
motivated the work of Sambanis (2001) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), who used cross-country 
analysis to investigate these propositions. The evidence is mixed, with the empirical work 




researchers find a positive relationship (e.g., Sambanis, 2001), while others find no evidence 
primarily due to the fact that fractionalisation is too broad a proxy to capture ethnic discontent 
(e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
 
However, and of direct relevance to this research, it is generally acknowledged that the civil 
war in Sierra Leone was not motivated by religious or ethnic identity issues (Fanthorpe, 2005; 
Dupuy and Binningsbø, 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). Hence, it is difficult to argue 
that horizontal inequities provided any motivation for the conflict. The foregoing discussion 
emphasises that the literature suggests that vertical inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, does not fully capture all the relevant dimensions of disparities within society. 
Nevertheless, the Gini coefficient is very important in conveying the magnitude of individual-
level welfare disparities and may be a key indicator in understanding other facets of inequality 
within a society.  
 
The emergence of the greed versus grievance theory in the conflict insurgence literature 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) has provided a basis for discussion about what are the significant 
catalysts of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found the greed-based model to provide the 
most likely explanation for civil war insurgence and resurgence. The investigation of grievance 
as a driver of conflict opened a debate that remains ongoing. The literature has centred around 
ethno-political and economic deprivation in an attempt to understand the relationship between 
grievance and civil war, but has found no statistically significant relationship (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
 
Using the horizontal inequality concept, Ostby (2011) undertook a cross-sectional study of 36 




Surveys. The results supported the argument that conflict is positively determined by economic 
and ethnic polarisation (i.e., horizontal inequality) rather than income inequality (i.e., vertical 
inequality). The author concluded that horizontal inequalities may enhance grievance and 
motivate group cohesion among relatively deprived groups within a society. 
 
Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) concluded that horizontal inequality between 
politically relevant ethnic groups can promote ethno-nationalist conflict. The authors employed 
geo-coded data to construct global spatial wealth estimates and found that highly unequal 
societies engage in conflict more often than those with less wealth inequality. Buhang, 
Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) reported country-level computations of both vertical and 
horizontal inequality indices. They asserted that common indicators like the Gini coefficient (a 
proxy for vertical inequality) failed to adequately capture aspects of political exclusion and 
economic inequality that can lead to conflict. In contrast, group-based inequality indices that 
explicitly considered political discrimination and wealth differentials provided better 
predictors for the onset of civil war than the more conventionally used inequality measures.  
 
Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh (2009) debunked the mainstream findings that economic inequality 
between individuals does not increase the risk of conflict. Their study provided country-level 
analysis using information on group-based vertical inequality metrics. Using household and 
conflict data for Liberia, the authors investigated the link between local levels of poverty and 
the location of actual fighting during the conflict. Their empirical methodology used spatial 
interpolation and information about the geographical location of respondents to generate local-
level variables for absolute and relative wealth using data drawn from household assets. The 
study revealed that conflict events took place in wealthy regions. At the end of the civil war, 




provide some support for the ‘opportunity’ explanation for armed conflict emphasised by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) rather than for the relative ‘deprivation’ explanations. The research 
revealed evidence of combatants targeting high-value ‘lootable’ goods, either in the form of 
natural resources or consumer goods. The rebel strategy encouraged retaliation against the 
ruling community in the form of shootings, looting property, and burning houses (see 
Duyensteyn, 2005; Reno, 1999).  
 
The foregoing has shown that the recent literature provides some empirical evidence that 
political and economic horizontal inequalities increase conflict risk. This provides justification 
for the view that the onset of conflict may be grievance-based. However, the country level 
evidence is more nuanced, and it should be noted that the civil war in Sierra Leone was not 
driven by fractionalisation or ethnic grievance. This view is confirmed by a statistical analysis 
of the documented human rights violations, which reveals that no ethnic group was 
disproportionately represented among RUF victims (see Conibere et al., 2004). There is also 
no evidence that levels of civilian abuse were higher when a particular armed faction and the 
local community were predominantly from different ethnic groups (see Humphries and 
Weinstein, 2006). Hence, horizontal inequality might not be an important factor in 
understanding the impact of inequality on the civil war. The factors driving the conflict in 
Sierra Leone are likely to be more prosaic. The country was characterised as one of the poorest 
in the world prior to the onset of the conflict and was ranked bottom of the World Development 
Index in the late 1980s. In addition, high levels of corruption and the absence of effectively 
functioning institutions created stronger conditions for vertical income inequality.  
 
There is no clear empirical evidence regarding the presence of horizontal inequality in Sierra 




activities were largely based on acquisitive motives, with some evidence that their activities 
focussed on high-value, wealthy targets. This was most evident in the confrontation with the 
national and international armed forces over alluvial diamond access and the scale of household 
looting in occupied areas (see Cederman et al., 2011; Keen, 2005).  
 
The foregoing empirical studies provide mixed results on whether vertical inequality 
significantly impacts the emergence of conflict. The conceptualisation of the potential impact 
of conflict on inequality, on the other hand, has been limited and less discussed in the existing 
literature. In particular, the impact of conflict on inequality defined along a vertical dimension 
has attracted less research interest in the literature but is critical to the design of post-conflict 
recovery policies. This part of the review deals with the theory and the empirical literature on 
the potential impact of conflict on inequality.  
 
An interesting line of argument regarding the relationship between conflict and inequality has 
recently emerged in the work of the economic historian Walter Scheidel (2017) in his book, 
The Great Leveler. Scheidel extensively documented the potential impact of conflict on income 
inequality, drawing on evidence from both recent and distant history. The author provided 
analysis supporting the interpretation of conflict (among other events) as a mechanism through 
which inequality can be levelled out within a country or region.  
 
Scheidel (2017) argued that conflict, which affects society through the destruction of capital 
assets and a direct assault on ‘the haves’, contains a strong inequality-levelling potential. The 
levelling outcome can be achieved through the redistribution of income from the rich to the 
poor or through the total destruction of wealth assets held by the rich. Levelling through total 




theft of assets from society’s more affluent sections. Using the Gini coefficient in a large 
number of historical contexts between the period 1932-2010, Scheidel (2017) documented 
strong and persuasive evidence that conflict can lead to a sharp reduction in income inequality. 
 
Conflict alters the economic structure of a country through the physical destruction of 
infrastructure and the disruption of markets and networks, and exerts a negative impact on 
welfare indicators as confirmed in the first essay of this thesis. The relational direction of 
conflict impacting economic inequality has been less researched and mostly limited to cross-
country analysis. It should be stressed that data availability on household consumption, income, 
and expenditure prior to and after a conflict has posed a major challenge in empirically 
investigating the impact of conflict on household inequality. Thus, only a small number of 
studies have overcome this challenge, and it is to these that our attention now turns.  
 
Analysing the poverty risk and the distribution of income in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 
civil war there, Bisogno and Chong (2002) found contrasting differences with respect to 
regional variation, ethnic differences, and household characteristics. They compared poverty 
indices and the Gini coefficient across these three dimensions and reported a mixed set of 
results. There was evidence of heterogeneity in terms of inequality after the war had ended. 
This was attributed to the role of different factors with outcomes dependent on the extent of 
physical infrastructure destruction, differences in international aid flows, external trade links, 
and the incidence and level of remittances at the regional level. The regions or households that 
had endured limited infrastructure destruction, enjoyed good external links, and were recipients 






Ansoms (2005) provided a descriptive analysis of Rwanda’s post-war growth path using cross-
country evidence. Using cross-country data, the empirical methodology treated Rwanda as a 
special (impulse) dummy in the estimated specification. The study provided evidence of 
redistribution and increased household poverty rates after the Rwanda conflict. The authors 
calculated income elasticities across quintiles and found a disproportionately higher 
contraction for the poorest, with evidence of a significant income shift from the poor to the 
rich. Secondly, comparing growth elasticities and poverty, the study found increasing poverty 
incidence, although absolute poverty remained low. The civil war in Rwanda resulted in higher 
inequality in the country. However, pre-conflict data made it difficult to empirically identify 
the inequality impact. In addition, McKay and Loveridge (2005) provided evidence of a 
widening income gap for Rwandans when comparing real income pre-conflict and post-
conflict. 
 
In contrast to the two previous papers in this strand, Bircan, Bruck, and Vothknecht (2017) 
used macro-level panel data fixed effects for 128 countries covering the period 1960-2004. 
They analysed the impact of violent conflict on economic inequality as measured by the Gini 
index. They empirically computed the distributional effects of conflict and its persistence over 
time. They found that, on average, inequality increased over the course of a conflict. They 
estimated an average increase of 1.7 and 2.7 Gini points during and immediately after a 
conflict, respectively. This emerges as a result of the negative impacts on tax revenue 
generation, the demographic deterioration in the labour market through death and 
displacement, and the disruption of agricultural production activities. The subsequent decline 
is observable within the first five years after the end of a conflict, suggesting the role of 




in social spending, large military budgets, and an increased age dependency ratio are implicated 
as possible mechanisms for increased inequality post-conflict.  
 
Building on his theory that war or conflict is a leveller of inequality, Scheidel’s (2017) 
empirical evidence suggests inequality levelling post-conflict. Evaluating countries’ top 
income percentiles across different war periods (1932-2010), the author reported a decline in 
the top income share immediately after a war’s end and for several subsequent decades. The 
wartime changes varied across countries in line with their degree of involvement. However, 
conflict predicts an overall decline in inequality, with the top 1% the most affected.  
 
An interesting empirical case for the foregoing is provided by Japan in terms of the mechanism 
through which conflict leads to a reduction in inequality. Scheidel (2017) analysed the direct 
effect of war on Japan’s inequality using the Gini coefficient. Given the available data, Japan 
saw a dramatic drop in the national Gini after the end of World War II. Income inequality in 
Japan has been estimated to have been reduced by between 0.45 to 0.65 Gini points (see 
Moriguchi and Saez, 2008). Data discontinuities impact the full account of the change from 
1940-1955. This massive shift in the distribution of income in Japan was associated with the 
destruction of the wealth of the top 1% of wealth holders (i.e., the Japanese elites). The nature 
of the military bombing strategy used by the US Air Force saw high deaths and widespread 
destruction of Japanese industrial wealth owned by the elites (i.e., the Zaibatsu). The defeat 
came with the subjection of the Japanese to US-imposed institutional and constitutional 
reforms. This led to a sharp levelling effect that impacted wealth inequality in Japan. 
Government interventions that created a planned economy, together with high inflation and 
physical capital destruction, flattened Japan’s wealth and income distribution by the end of the 




Scheidel (2017) persuasively documented evidence that the most prevalent and persistent 
outcome of war for affected economies from the earliest periods of history to contemporary 
times has been the destruction of the wealth of the elites.  
 
As noted in Essay 1 of this thesis, the empirical evidence on the effect of the Sierra Leone civil 
war is limited and largely focuses on political engagement, local institutions, and behavioural 
and enterprise-level outcomes (see Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009; Cecchi, Leuveld, and 
Voors, 2016; Collier and Duponchel, 2013). Sam (2015) analysed the impact of the Sierra 
Leone Civil war on asset accumulation, and Essay 1 above focuses on the conflict’s effect on 
average household expenditure levels and poverty rates.  
 
The above literature review reveals that the more conventional approach when exploring the 
relationship between equality and conflict is to focus on the role of inequality – in either its 
vertical or horizontal form – in providing a trigger for conflict. The empirical evidence reveals 
limited support for the notion that vertical inequality as measured by income inequality is a 
catalyst of conflict. In contrast, there does appear more persuasive evidence that horizontal 
inequality, as measured by group-based disparities in political representation, access to public 
resources, and labour market opportunities, provides a more potent driver for the start of civil 
conflict. However, there is a significant gap in the existing literature investigating the direct 
impact of conflict on household welfare distribution and inequality. The contribution of 
Scheidel (2017) points to the importance of such a relationship as one of the legacies of a 
catastrophic conflict. Thus, the motivation for this paper is to use the framework advanced by 
Scheidel to investigate the relationship between conflict and household welfare inequality in 





3.4 Data  
The distributional impact of the Sierra Leone civil war on household welfare and inequality is 
assessed using three separate cross-sectional datasets, as used in Essay 1. These are the 1989 
Sierra Leone Household Survey that pre-dates the war and two post-war Sierra Leone 
Integrated Household Surveys from 2003 and 2011, respectively. The datasets contain 
information on household expenditure, which allows us to construct two metrics that inform 
on household inequality. The first outcome of interest is provided by the log of per capita 
household expenditure evaluated at different quantiles, while the second is the Gini coefficient 
based on total (unlogged) household expenditure levels.  
 
The 1989 SLHS dataset provides the baseline against which household inequality, either 
immediately after the civil war in 2003 or about a decade after the war’s end in 2011, is 
evaluated. Statistics Sierra Leone in conjunction with the World Bank conducted the two 
SLIHS post-war surveys (in 2003 and 2011). The survey data from 2003 provide a profile of 
the socio-economic status of households in Sierra Leone immediately after the Lomé peace 
agreement in 2002. These post-war data provide a basis for empirically estimating the short-
term effect of the civil war at different household expenditure quantiles using a household 
inequality measure (i.e., the Gini coefficient). The latter of the two post-war datasets is 
exploited to obtain empirical estimates for the longer-term effect of the civil war on the selected 
outcome variables. It might also provide an understanding of the post-war recovery trends, 
potentially shedding light on the strategies and programmes implemented to mitigate the 
impact of conflict on household welfare.  
 
The above surveys utilise the same sampling method, which was based on 2,553 Enumeration 




enumeration areas were updated for the 2003 survey using a census conducted by Statistics 
Sierra Leone in 2000. This was designed to account for any systematic population movements 
since 1985.  
 
As already documented in the first empirical chapter, a central difference between the sampling 
approach used in the earliest survey in 1989 compared to that of the two later surveys was the 
number of chiefdoms sampled. In 1989, the sampling was restricted to a randomly selected set 
of 64 chiefdoms from a total of 152 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. In the subsequent surveys, 
undertaken in 2003 and 2011, the sampling of households was drawn from all 152 chiefdoms. 
Therefore, as in Essay 1, we explore as part of a robustness check whether the estimates 
obtained are sensitive to the more restrictive chiefdom sampling used at the baseline in 1989. 
 
The empirical methodology employed relies on the allocation of households to either high 
conflict intensity or low/no conflict intensity chiefdoms within Sierra Leone. As indicated in 
the contextualisation section, the war began in the eastern regions of the country and gradually 
spread to chiefdoms in other areas. There was substantial destruction in those chiefdoms that 
experienced prolonged occupation by the rebels. These regions suffered from the destruction 
of private property and other wealth-generating assets due to the tactics employed by the rebel 
groups. The rebels exercised a strategy based on targeting high-value assets, which comprised 
looting, occupying, and (in some cases) destroying private property. In contrast to the eastern 
chiefdoms, the western and some northern chiefdoms experienced limited or even no conflict. 
These areas were protected by the government’s armed forces in collaboration with four other 
international military groups and largely remained free from rebel force occupation. The 




some property destruction in this area during this short, intensive event, but not on the same 
scale as experienced in other regions subjected to protracted territorial control by the rebels.  
 
In order to classify the households that were exposed to or affected by the civil war, following 
the approach in Essay 1, two measures of conflict based on binary variables are again used. 
The first is the conflict exposure variable, which captures conflict incidence by exposure to 
violence in each administrative chiefdom. As in Essay 1, the conflict intensity information used 
to construct this dummy variable is obtained from the No Peace Without Justice report (see 
Smith, Gambette, and Longley, 2004). The binary measure for a household’s exposure to the 
conflict is defined as 1 for those households in chiefdoms that experienced a protracted period 
of rebel group activity and occupation, a high incidence of conflict-related deaths, and other 
war-related activities. The dummy is otherwise set to 0. The construction of the dummy 
variable is restricted to using chiefdom level information, as this represents the highest level of 
compatible regional disaggregation available across the three datasets used. Appendix 1 in 
Essay 1 contains a map that highlights the administrative chiefdoms of Sierra Leone and the 
intensity of conflict to which they were exposed during the war (see Figure A 2.1 in Appendix 
1).  
 
The binary conflict variable defined above delineates the treatment and the control groups for 
our analysis. It is emphasised that the treatment reflects not only the effects of conflict-related 
violence but also the influence of a protracted occupation by rebel forces. The treatment 
exposure is interpreted in broader terms than those captured or described by conflict intensity 
alone. Its definition also provides a more explicit sense of the mechanisms through which the 





Second, as in Essay 1, we use a second binary treatment measure based on information on 
households that have directly suffered war-related events (e.g., family or relatives killed, limbs 
amputated, household members raped, household members displaced, or property destroyed or 
lost). This measure is taken to capture whether or not any members of the household are war 
victims. For obvious reasons, this treatment variable is only available for the two post-conflict 
datasets of 2003 and 2011. This will again be referred to as ‘conflict event’ as opposed to the 
first measure, which is defined as ‘conflict exposure’.  
 
The three household-level surveys contain both individual-level demographic information and 
household-level characteristics across the chiefdoms of Sierra Leone. We construct two welfare 
metrics for each of the three years. First, we construct a measure of per capita household 
expenditure at different quantiles.5 Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL) prepared the 1989 dataset and 
provided the data containing aggregate household expenditures. However, the original source 
data for the different expenditure items are not now accessible from SSL, so it is not possible 
to disaggregate this measure into its component parts. In contrast, for the 2003 and 2011 
household surveys, the household expenditure data are computed using the different 
components of household expenditure. The computations used in this study adhere to the 
definitions originally used by SSL for the 1989 survey. Second, we use the household 
expenditure data to determine a measure of household inequality using the Gini coefficient. 
The resultant outcome variable is a continuous index that ranges from 0 to 1. The closer the 
Gini coefficient to 0, the lower the level of inequality across households based on their 
expenditure levels. These two measures are used to estimate the impact of the civil war on 
household welfare distribution.  
 
5 This per capita expenditure level is calculated by dividing total household expenditure by the number of adults 




As a prelude to the econometric analysis, summary statistics for our first outcome variable (i.e., 
the log of per capita expenditure) are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 below for selected 
quantiles. The statistics are represented for the three years of investigation (i.e., 1989 SLHS 
pre-war dataset and the two follow-up datasets, 2003 and 2011 SLIHS). A general overview 
from Table 3.1 provides the first insight on the distribution of household expenditure pre-war 
and post-war using percentile ratios for both conflict measures (i.e., conflict exposure and 
conflict events).  
Table 3.1: Sierra Leone Household Expenditure Percentile Ratios by Conflict Status  
Exposure Events 
  90th  – 10th  
       50th 
90th  – 50th  
     50th  
50th – 10th  
    50th 
90th  – 10th  
       50th 
90th  – 50th  
     50th 
50th – 10th  
     50th 
1989:       
Overall 10.1315 9.3909 0.7406    
Conflict 8.1130 7.2757 0.8373 
   
Non-conflict 9.3891 8.6631 0.7260 
   
Change -1.2761 -1.3874 0.1113    
2003: 
      
Overall 2.5614 2.0107 0.5507 2.5614 2.0107 0.5507 
Conflict 1.6637 1.1458 0.5178 1.7371 1.2310 0.5061 
Non-conflict 3.2174 2.6255 0.5919 2.5779 1.9142 0.6636 
Change -1.5537 -1.4797 -0.0741 -0.8408 -0.6832 -0.1575 
2011: 
      
Overall 1.7594 1.2538 0.5056 1.7594 1.2538 0.5056 
Conflict 1.4519 0.9523 0.4995 1.7169 1.2285 0.4884 
Non-conflict 1.8489 1.3409 0.5079 1.7918 1.2212 0.5706 
Change -0.3970 -0.3886 -0.0084 -0.0749 0.0073 -0.0822 
Note to Table 3.1: ‘Change’ denotes the difference between conflict and non-conflict. 
 
The percentile ratios calculated allow the analysis of the expenditure differences when 
comparing two points within the distribution. We are interested in determining the welfare 
differences for those at the bottom half and top half of the distribution. The difference between 
the 50th and the 10th percentile relative to the median in column 4 of Table 3.1 represents the 
expenditure distribution at the lower end of the distribution. The difference between the 90th 
and the 50th percentile relative to the median represents the welfare gap at the top end of the 




bottom 10 percent of the expenditure distribution. This is reported in columns 2 and 5 in Table 
3.1 for conflict exposure and conflict events, respectively. This latter comparison presents the 
first insight on the relationship between the civil war and household welfare inequality. Prior 
to the civil war, Sierra Leone exhibited a much higher expenditure gap between the ‘richest’ 
and ‘poorest’ compared to the post-war years. The dispersion of household expenditure in 
Sierra Leone denoted by the standard deviations (see Table 3.2) also indicates a higher variation 
in household expenditure prior to the civil war than in its immediate aftermath.  
Table 3.2: Standard Deviation of Log of Household Expenditure by Conflict Status  
Exposure Events 
 1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
Standard dev:      
Overall 1.4596 0.7627 0.6121 0.7627 0.6121 
Conflict 1.5661 0.6013 0.5602 0.6469 0.5971 
Non-conflict 1.3997 0.8608 0.6230 0.8099 0.6553 
Change 0.1664 -0.2595 -0.0628 0.1630 -0.0582 
F-test 1.2518 2.0493 0.8086 1.2519 1.097 
Observations: 3439 3702 6685 3696 6685 
Treatment 1167 1666 4041 1319 5,110 
Control 2272 2036 2722 2377 1653 
Note to Table 3.2: ‘Change’ denotes the difference between conflict and non-conflict. 
 
This pre-war phenomenon of a highly unequal expenditure distribution is also evident from the 
estimated Gini coefficients (see Table 3.3). The overall estimated Gini coefficient stood at 
0.672 prior to the conflict. Chiefdoms that ultimately became the conflict-affected zones did 
not exhibit a different degree of inequality in 1989 compared to what became the non-conflict 
zones using either percentile ratios or the Gini coefficient. Therefore, the distribution of 
household per capita expenditure before the civil war was not significantly different between 






Table 3.3: Gini Coefficient for Log of Household Expenditure by Conflict Status  
Exposure Events 
Decomposition 1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
Gini coefficient:      
Overall 0.672 0.442 0.3380 0.442 0.338 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Conflict 0.659 0.377 0.302 0.374 0.335 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) 
Non-conflict 0.677 0.434 0.344 0.437 0.343 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) 
Change -0.017 -0.057 -0.042 -0.063 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) 
t-value for difference -1.219 -3.563 -0.700 -3.938 1.143 
Note to Table 3.3: ‘Change’ denotes the difference between conflict and non-conflict; bootstrapped standard 
errors with 250 replications in parenthesis. 
 
Figure 3.1 represent the kernel density of household expenditure approximately two years 
before the civil war. The general distribution was similar across what became the conflict and 
non-conflict areas. The conflict zone had higher expenditure levels for most of the distribution. 
This provides further complementary evidence that the conflict zones were marginally better 
off in terms of their expenditure profiles before the onset of the civil war, particularly for those 
households at the top end of the distribution. However, those at the bottom end of the 
distribution in what became the conflict-affected areas were worse-off pre-war. It is arguable 
that this level of inequality may have given the conflict greater traction in these areas.  
Table 3.4: Difference in Log of Household Expenditure between Conflict and Non-
conflict Areas 
 1989 2003 2011 
Mean & Percentiles Exposure Exposure Events Exposure Events 
Mean 0.0526 -0.2641*** -0.5345*** -0.2462*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0502) (0.0419) (0.0407) (0.0419) 
10th -0.2506*** -0.0996*** -0.2045*** -0.1530 0.0210  
(0.0611) (0.0485) (0.0456) (0.0026) (0.0382) 
25th -0.1037*** -0.1388*** -0.3553*** -0.1718*** -0.0879***  
(0.0649) (0.0360) (0.0434) (0.1805) (0.0326) 
50th -0.0000 -0.1613*** -0.4663*** -0.2392*** -0.2296***  
(0.1028) (0.0324) (0.0370) (0.0184) (0.0340) 
75th 0.3696*** -0.3527*** -0.6084*** -0.3385*** -0.3289***  
(0.0777) (0.0413) (0.0374) (0.0240) (0.0335) 
90th 0.1589** -0.5881*** -0.7859*** -0.4461*** -0.3280***  
(0.0813) (0.0503) (0.0403) (0.0349) (0.0367) 
Significance levels 
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Figure 3.3: Log of Household Expenditure for Conflict Exposure (2011) 
 
 
The foregoing narrative changes dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the civil war. The 
household expenditure percentile ratios are lower across the two measures of conflict (exposure 
and events). The contraction in the percentile ratio is more prominent at the top end of the 
distribution. The emergence of lower standard deviations in the log of expenditure and a 
contraction in the Gini coefficients is also evident (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively). These 
estimates suggest a sharp reduction in the inequality in household welfare after the conclusion 
of the civil war. The overall inequality measure (i.e., the Gini coefficient) reduces to 0.442 as 
compared to the pre-war level of 0.672. Furthermore, over the longer term, the Gini estimates 
exhibit a further contraction to 0.338 for households in chiefdoms affected by the civil war.  
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The short-term summary statistics using the percentile ratios, the Gini coefficient, and 
household expenditure quantiles depict a reduction in household expenditure inequality after 
the war.  
 
The above statistical summary provides an insight on how the 11 years of conflict in Sierra 
Leone impacted the distribution of household welfare. A possible explanation can be related to 
the civil war having a negative effect on those households at the top end of the expenditure 
distribution with either marginal or no improvement for those at the bottom. These descriptive 
statistics suggest a negative association between conflict and household inequality, though 
reveal nothing about the presence or otherwise of a causal effect. In order to empirically 
estimate the casual impact of the conflict on the distribution of household expenditure, two 

















3.5 Empirical Methodology 
 
The objective of this research is to attempt to causally estimate the impact of the Sierra Leone 
civil war on household welfare distribution. Two main empirical methodologies are used. They 
are based on the estimation of Recentred Influence Function (RIF) regression models for the 
Gini index, and the estimation of an unconditional Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE).  
 
3.5.1 Recentred Influence Functions  
 
This methodology is exploited to evaluate the impact of the civil war on household inequality 
using the Gini coefficient as the inequality measure. This is actually done using a methodology 
exploiting a concept known as the Recentred Influence Function (RIF). This approach was 
developed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and initially utilises the concept of the 
influence function. Assuming a distributional statistic is continuously differentiable, the first 
order directional derivative is known as the influence function (IF). The IF represents the 
influence of an individual observation (or, more broadly, data contamination) on the 
distributional statistic of interest. For example, the influence function of the population mean 
μ (i.e., E(Y)) is the demeaned value of the outcome variable Y – μ. Thus, the IF is centred 
around 0. If the distributional statistic of interest is added back to the IF, this yields the RIF. 
This is centred around the statistic of interest (μ) and not 0.  
 
As discussed by Firpo et al. (2009), the RIF can be obtained for any distributional statistic and 
not just the mean. In particular, it can generally be done for most inequality measures like the 
variance and the Gini Coefficient. In the current context, the RIF for the Gini coefficient is 
used and enables us to examine the impact on the distribution of household inequality as 




systematic linear relationship between the selected household and conflict-specific covariates.6 
Essamah-Nssah and Lambert (2011) outlined how the RIF concept can be applied to the Gini 
coefficient. The RIF for the Gini is given by: 
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while the RIF for the Lorenz ordinates is given by: 
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where y is the household expenditure level. Hence, the RIF-based Gini is expressed as a linear 
function of household 𝑖 characteristics (X) and conflict as follows:  
𝐸[RIF(y.; 	υ)|X, Conflict] = 𝐗𝒊¢𝛃		 + αConflict.,     (3.3) 
 
where α represents the marginal effect of household conflict exposure or conflict-specific 
events status (Conflict.) on the Gini Coefficient (ν). Household- and chiefdom-level 
characteristics are represented as X.. Equation 3.3 is our main regression specification for 
which the estimates are discussed in the empirical result section for the RIF-based Gini.  
 
We regress equation 3.3, the RIF-based Gini coefficient measure on a set of household 
covariates (𝑋0) and the conflict variable. In addition to the inclusion of conflict status in the 
regression model above, we also control for head of household characteristics like age, gender, 
education, and marital status. Household size, the dependency ratio, and a dummy variable for 
 




settlement type (urban area) are also included as controls. The RIF regression is estimated by 
OLS and has a similar set of interpretations as an OLS estimator (see Firpo et al., 2009). The 
parameter estimates from the RIF regression model represent unconditional marginal effects.  
 
The above estimation approach helps us to determine the impact of conflict on the overall Gini 
coefficient as per equation (3.3). In order to assess the robustness of the key estimate, the 
regression model is estimated in three different ways: (i) unweighted; (ii) weighted by 
propensity scores; (iii) unweighted but with propensity scores included as an additional 
regressor. In addition, we also compute the average treatment effect on the Gini using a 
propensity score matching (PSM) technique and an inverse probability weighting (IPW) 
procedure. Four of these methods require the estimation of a treatment assignment equation. 
The treatment assignment equation depends on household characteristics that can determine 
household inequality but are not affected by the conflict. The estimation is done using a binary 
logit model (see Table A3.1 in the appendix) to predict the propensity scores based on the 
specified set of characteristics as described earlier in Essay 1. The characteristics used for the 
matching are reported in Tables A3.2-A3.5 in Appendix 2.  
 
The above estimation methods provide an understanding of how household expenditure 
inequality is affected by the conflict (through using either the exposure measure or the conflict 
event measure) as mediated through the Gini coefficient. A disadvantage of the above set of 
methods, though, is that they do not provide insight on the impact at different points of the 
welfare distribution as they only provide the impact of conflict on overall inequality. An 
analysis of the conflict effect at specific points of the household expenditure distribution may 




quantiles of the household expenditure distribution. This provides insights on the impact of the 
conflict on selected quantiles and hence inequality, and a suggested approach is now outlined.  
3.5.2 Quantile Treatment Effect 
 
The unconditional Quantile Treatment Effect on the Treated (QTT) method is used to provide 
in finer detail the impact of conflict on the distribution of household expenditure. This approach 
allows the analysis to go beyond the average effect and reveals the heterogeneous distributional 
impacts on the outcome of interest, which is not discernible from a Gini coefficient. The 
empirical methodology and the assumptions underlying the computation of the QTT, as 
originally proposed by Firpo (2007), are now discussed below.  
 
The Quantile Treatment Effect (QTT) is defined as a marginal difference between two 
cumulative functions at a particular percentile distribution (see Doksum, 1974; Lehmann, 
1974). This estimation of this particular quantile definition is conditional on the rank position 
of the individual observation in the distribution remaining unchanged regardless of its 
treatment status. This assumption is referred to as the rank preservation assumption (see Firpo, 
2007). The rank preservation assumption can be unreasonable if the policymaker is interested 
in the marginal distribution of the potential outcomes, which can be computed through quantile 
treatment estimation. This reinforces the fact that QTT represents the differences in the 
marginal distributions of the potential treatment and control outcomes between quantiles. The 
above definition was invoked by Firpo (2007) to estimate the QTT with an additional strong 
assumption of exogeneity of the treatment conditional on selected covariates.  
 
The following definitions are necessary to an understanding of the empirical methodology of 
Firpo (2007), which is followed in this study. T is defined as an indicator variable for the 




will be observed as 𝑌0(1) if T=1. Alternatively, it becomes 𝑌0(0) if T=0. Respectively, 𝑌0(1) 
and 𝑌0(0) are the potential outcomes of being in the treatment or control groups. The treatment 
assignment for individual 𝑖 can be expressed as follows:  
𝑌0 = 𝑌0(1) ∙ 	𝑇0 	+ 	𝑌0(0) ∙ (1 − 𝑇0)       (3.4) 
The treatment effect parameters for the QTT are identified under a set of necessary restrictions 
required for estimation. The relevant restriction imposed in the estimation by Firpo (2007) is 
the assumption that selection into the treatment is based on observable characteristics. This is 
simply a restatement of the exogeneity assumption based on the conditional independence 
assumption, which implies that the assignment of individuals to either the treatment or control 
group given a set of observables is random. This is also known as the unconfoundedness 
assumption in the literature (see Rubin, 1977) and was originally encountered when using the 
propensity matching score (PSM) technique in Essay 1. The assumption is used for the 
computation of the conditional average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) in the estimation 
of the unconditional quantile treatment on the treated (QTT) estimates.  
 
A key identification strategy in the estimation of QTT with control variables is the requirement 
of having both observable and unobservable characteristics that ensure the response variable is 
independent. This has been done by generating the marginal quantile distribution within a 
common support framework to identify the cumulative distribution function of the response 
variables conditional on the covariates. However, in this approach suggested by Firpo (2007), 
the identification results are directly related to the quantiles of the marginal distribution. This 
mitigates against the need for the calculation of the cumulative density functions as suggested 
by Imbens and Newey (2003). Firpo (2007) adopted a semi-parametric method of estimating 




of the propensity scores, which are then used as part of the weighting estimator to simulate a 
random allocation into treatment and control groups.  
 
We now consider the case of the QTT estimation in the context of the Sierra Leone civil war, 
where we explore the impact of the war at different points of the household expenditure 
distribution. In order to estimate the quantile treatment effects of the conflict on household 
expenditure, we first predict household conflict status and follow the estimation technique 
suggested by Firpo (2007). We create two separate dummies for conflict measures as 
mentioned in the data section. We denote T=1 if either (i) a household is in a chiefdom that 
was under protracted rule by rebel groups (conflict exposure) or (ii) a household or a household 
member was directly affected by the civil war (conflict events). If a household is not in one of 
these respective categories (i.e., not affected by the conflict for the two measures), then T=0. 
The two scenarios are considered as two different treatments, with the estimated impact effect 
computed separately. The quantile treatment effect on the treated (τ) as described by Firpo 
(2007) can be expressed as follows: 
△1= 𝑞#,1|34# − 𝑞',1|34#        (3.5) 
where 𝑞#,1|34#is the outcome variable for conflict-affected households at quantile τ, while 
𝑞',1|34# is the outcome in the absence of either conflict exposure or a household conflict event. 
The above is obviously characterised by an inference problem known in this setting as the 
counterfactual quantile for the treated sample, 𝑞',1|34#, which is unobserved. Given that we 
have observational data and neither a panel nor data from a randomised control trial, the 
simulation requires the creation of a counterfactual distribution of the household welfare 
measure. So as to bring this into the context of the unconditional quantile treatment effect of 
the treated household, the following propositions are evaluated. Household welfare is proxied 




treatment status 𝑇. This provides a joint distribution of household expenditure and observable 
characteristics conditional treatment status as follows: 
𝐹(𝑦, 𝑋|𝑇 = 𝑡)          (3.6) 
 
Following Firpo (2007), we assume conflict is exogenous, conditional on household 
characteristics (i.e., the selection on observables assumption). We further assume that the 
support of included covariates is independent of the treatment (i.e., conflict status). These 
assumptions can be denoted as follows: 
(𝑦', 𝑦#) ⊥⊥ 𝑇|𝑋 
0 < Pr(𝑇 = 1|𝑋) < 1 
The densities of household expenditure at each conflict status are estimated by weighted kernel 
estimators with the Epanechnikov kernel function and the Silverman (1986) bandwidth.7 The 
weighting estimator for each quantile is a traditional (inverse) propensity score-weighting 
estimator and can be expressed as: 
(𝛼,\ ∆1̂) = arg𝑚𝑖𝑛5,△ ∑𝑤0







          (3.8) 
The above weight follows the inverse probability weighting approach using the estimated 
propensity scores obtained semi-parametrically from a treatment assignment equation. The 
weight of being in a conflict-affected zone based on observable characteristics, Pr(𝑇 = 1|𝑋0), 
is needed for the above weighting procedure.  
 
 
7 The Silverman bandwidth is the optimal smoothing parameter that should be generated based on the 
characteristics or distribution of the data. The optimal bandwidth usually falls with the range of 0.6 to 1.4 for the 




The estimated quantile treatment effect of the conflict on the distribution of household welfare 
is the expected difference between households randomly allocated into conflict and non-
conflict states. The estimation itself uses the minimisation approach outlined in Firpo (2007) 
based on the expected differences using the above weights. The estimated quantile treatment 
effect on the treated can then be expressed as: 
𝑄𝑇𝑇1 = ∆1̂= arg𝑚𝑖𝑛; ∑ 𝑤#|34#
7<
04# 𝜌1(𝑞0) −	arg𝑚𝑖𝑛; ∑ 𝑤'|34#
7<
04# 𝜌1(𝑞0)  (3.9)8 
This above equation is the difference between the unconditional quantiles of the observed 
treated distribution and the counterfactual (or untreated) distribution. The difference provides 
the quantile treatment effect for a specific quantile (th). The crucial assumption is the ‘selection 
on observables’ in the re-weighting function. The selected observables should be sufficient to 
control for the fact that difference in household expenditure between the conflict and non-
conflict zone is driven by being either exposed to rebel occupation or directly affected by the 
civil war. Equation (3.9) is our main estimate specification for the quantile treatment effect that 
will be discussed later in the empirical result section.  
 
We first estimate a model of the probability of a household being in the conflict zone based on 
the included set of observable variables relative to those in the non-conflict zone. This follows 
a local logistic model estimation approach embedded in the ‘ivqte’ command in Stata. The 
observable characteristics included should be pre-determined and not affected by the conflict 
but may be determinants of household expenditure. The non-parametrically estimated 
propensity scores predict the probability of a household being in the conflict zone. We generate 
three smoothing parameters of 0.83, 0.86, and 0.84 for the three years of estimation, 
 
8 In this case, 𝜌"	(𝑢) = {𝑢	 × (𝜏 − 1(𝑢 < 0)} a convex linear programming problem and is solved efficiently with 
the build-up ‘ivqte’ command in Stata with analytical standard errors that are consistent in the presence of 
heteroskedascity (Frollich and Melly, 2010). It should be noted that although the STATA routine is known as 
‘ivqte’, we do not require an instrumental variable for identification here as selection is based on exogenous 




respectively, using the ‘locreg’ command. The selected (observable) controls in the treatment 
assignment equation help to mitigate the selection bias assuming they are highly correlated 
with the unobservable characteristics. The relevant variables were discussed in the data section 
above and include head of household characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, and marital 
status), and other household demographics (e.g., household size, settlement area, dependency 
ratio, tribal and religious status). These controls are assumed to not be influenced by the 
conflict.  
 
As with propensity score matching, there must be overlap of the propensity score distributions 
among households in the conflict and non-conflict groups for the re-weighting procedure to be 
used. In the absence of overlap of the propensity scores, there will be households in the conflict 
zone for whom there are no equivalent households in the non-conflict group. The presence of 
non-overlap in observable characteristics among the groups may lead to a bias in the estimation 
of the quantile treatment effect.9 However, there is sufficient overlap of the predicted likelihood 
of treatment between the two groups, irrespective of the observable characteristics included. 
Finally, the distribution of the covariates between the treatment and control groups used in the 
estimation of the above quantile treatment effect are not systematically different after re-
weighting (see the over-identification tests result with respect to the Inverse Probability 





9 The estimated treatment equation used in the QTT analysis provides broadly similar estimates to those of the 
treatment assignment equation used in the propensity matching technique for the first part of the methodology of 
the Gini coefficient and for the ATT reported in Essay 1. The estimated propensity scores from the two treatment 
equations (QTT of expenditure and the Psmatch regression) are highly correlated (0.999) across the different 




3.6 Empirical Results 
 
3.6.1 Logistic Model and the Propensity Score Estimation  
 
Table A3.1 in the appendix presents the standard logistic model results from the treatment 
assignment equation. The assignment equation generates the probability of being in the conflict 
zone (propensity score) for each household. As discussed in the methodology section, the 
propensity score is used for the two different approaches in estimating the impact of the conflict 
on household inequality. Firstly, it serves as a regression weight for the Recentred Influence 
Function (RIF) using the Gini-based regression model. The second approach uses the 
propensity score as an additional covariate in the estimation. The logistic estimation to obtain 
the propensity scores was done separately for three treatment assignment equations, each for 
three separate years. The specifications differ across years given the objective of achieving 
good balancing of covariates between the conflict and non-conflict zones. Diagnostic checks 
using plots of the continuous variables before and after the weighting estimation on the 
propensity score revealed good predictive power and balancing (see Table A3.5). In addition, 
the local logistic regression model estimates for the treatment assignment equation for the QTT 
are depicted in Table A3.6.  
 
3.6.2 Conflict and Household Inequality using the RIF Gini Coefficient 
 
Table 3.5 presents the estimated household determinants of the RIF-based Gini coefficient for 
the five different specifications based on equation (3.3). We first focus on the conflict exposure 
measure. From the unweighted estimates, there is a statistically significant inverse relationship 
between a household being in the conflict zone and the Gini coefficient in the immediate 
aftermath of the civil war. This effect is absent both prior to the civil war and 10 years after the 
end of the war in all cases. The results of the weighted regression using the propensity scores 




aftermath of the war (see Table 3.5). On average, ceteris paribus, being in the conflict zone 
reduces the Gini coefficient by eight percentage points (see row 2 of Table 3.5). This 
contraction in equality dissipates in the long-run. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the civil 
war in Sierra Leone, there was a reduction in household inequality as measured using the 
household expenditure metric, though this contraction was not long-lived.  
 
The results of the regression technique that includes the propensity score as an additional 
covariate are represented in row 3 of Table 3.5. The results from using this technique do not 
differ materially from the results obtained using the earlier regression weights approach. In 
addition, the use of the propensity score matching technique supports the negative impact of 
the conflict on the Gini coefficient with the magnitude slightly below the other estimates 
reported. The matching technique suggests a reduction in expenditure inequality by 6 
percentage points. The results based on the approach using inverse probability weighting 
provide further evidence of a contraction in inequality in the immediate aftermath of the war 
by 8 percentage points.  
 
We now discuss the impact of a conflict-related event on household inequality. The weighted 
regression results are reported in Table 3.5 (see the last two columns). The estimated effect 
suggests that, on average, ceteris paribus, this measure of conflict reduces the overall Gini 
coefficient immediately after the conflict by 7.5 percentage points. The other estimation 
techniques, including the regression with the propensity score as an additional covariate and 
inverse probability weighting, provide magnitudes closer to the weighted estimation results. 






The conflict event impacts are consistent across the five different estimation approaches used 
here. These are of broadly similar magnitude to the estimates derived from the conflict 
exposure measure. The short-run effect of the conflict events on affected households is a 
reduction in household expenditure inequality. In the long-run, as with the exposure measure, 
the conflict events are not seen to have a persistent effect. Generally, both conflict measures 
are in agreement in suggesting a reduction in the Gini coefficient of between 7 and 8 percentage 
points. In the longer run, 10 years after the end of the war, neither conflict measure is found to 
have any sustained impact on household expenditure inequality. Therefore, the empirical 
evidence provided here suggests the impact of conflict on inequality is more short-term in 
nature than its effect on the mean, which is greater and longer-term.  
 
Table 3.5: The Impact of Conflict on the Gini Coefficient from different RIF Regression 
Specifications & Other Methods  
Exposure Events 
Estimation Methods 1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
      
(1) Unweighted 0.0039 -0.0908*** -0.0052 -0.0802*** 0.0008 
 (0.0156) (0.0126) (0.0050) (0.0183) (0.0069) 
(2) Weighted 0.0025 -0.0804*** 0.0036 -0.0751*** -0.0056 
 (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0048) (0.0214) (0.0062) 
(3) PS regressor 0.0039 -0.0912*** -0.0031 -0.0800*** -0.0031 
 (0.0197) (0.0152) (0.0050) (0.0169) (0.0050) 
(4) Matching (ATT) 0.0108 -0.0552*** 0.0049 -0.0691*** 0.0048 
 (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0081) (0.0265) (0.0081) 
(5) IPW (ATT) 0.0031 -0.0834*** -0.0001 -0.0736*** -0.0063  
(0.0147) (0.0125) (0.0048) (0.0395) (0.0065) 
Observations: 3439 3702 6685 3696 6685 
Treatment 1167 1666 4041 1319 5110 
Control 2272 2036 2722 2377 1653 
Note to Table 3.5: The different regression results are based on (1) OLS without any weights; (2) OLS with the 
propensity score as weights; (3) ‘PS regressor’ indicates the propensity score as an additional covariate; (4) the 
matching estimator is based on a propensity score matching technique (5) the IPW is based on the inverse 
probability score weighting technique. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels 





The foregoing results reveal the impact of the Sierra Leone civil war on household inequality 
as measured by the Gini coefficient. The conflict, on the basis of the overall Gini effect, 
suggests a significant levelling effect on inequality in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
Although the levelling effects are sizeable, they are nowhere near the magnitude reported by 
Scheidel (2017) for either Japan or Germany in the immediate aftermath of World War Two. 
This analysis is useful and provides insight into the causal relationship between the civil war 
and household inequality. However, the Gini coefficient does not provide any insight on where 
along the household expenditure distribution the inequality changes are concentrated. In order 
to gain deeper insight regarding this issue, we compute QTT effects for each percentile. This 
will provide an empirical framework for assessing the provenance of the changes in the 
distribution of household expenditure induced by the conflict, and as observed in the Gini 
coefficient. In other words, the QTT analysis will shed light on whether the overall impact on 
inequality is driven by changes in the distribution at the bottom, median, or top end of the 
household expenditure distribution.  
 
3.6.3 The Impact of Conflict on the Distribution of Household Expenditure  
 
The point estimates and confidence intervals for the estimated QTT effects for the conflict 
exposure measure for each quantile are graphically depicted in Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 for 
each year of analysis, respectively and are based on equation (3.9). The pre-war estimates of 
log per capita expenditure across the percentiles for the conflict exposure measure are captured 
in Figure 3.4. Prior to the civil war, Sierra Leone was characterised by an excessively high 
degree of dispersion in expenditure between what became the conflict and non-conflict zones. 
Specifically, from around the 52nd percentile onwards there is a statistically significant 
widening in pre-war inequality between these zones. However, immediately after the civil war, 




about the 23rd percentile onwards (see Figure 3.5). This negative reduction widens and becomes 
more statistically significant with progress along the unconditional log household expenditure 
distribution. Households at the top end of the distribution incur the greatest conflict-related 
penalty. This negative effect exhibits some long-run persistence, though the magnitude is more 
modest in nature (see Figure 3.6).  
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We provide individual estimates for the conflict exposure measure for selected quantiles of log 
household expenditure in Table 3.6. Before the start of the civil war, households in chiefdoms 
that become subjected to high conflict intensity in the form of protracted rebel rule were better 
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household expenditure contracted across most percentiles of the household distribution. The 
average short-term impact of the conflict was a significant reduction in household expenditure 
by about 36%. This result comes from the last three columns, which represent the wealthier 
households in the economy. Households subject to conflict exposure at the 90th percentile 
exhibited a statistically significant reduction in household expenditure of about 51% compared 
to those not affected by the conflict. This negative distributional impact remains persistent even 
in the long run but with a more modest contraction evident in terms of its magnitude. However, 
there is evidence of some recovery at the bottom end of the household expenditure distribution. 
Ten years after the official end of the civil war, household at the 10th percentile of the 
expenditure distribution exposed to the conflict recorded an 8% increase in their household 
expenditure level. However, households at the 90th percentile continued to endure a sizeable 
negative penalty. In particular, households located in chiefdoms that experienced protracted 
rule by rebel groups still had 26% lower household expenditure almost 10 years after the 
conflict had ended.  
 
Table 3.6: OLS and Quantile Treatment Effects using Log Household Expenditure – Conflict 
Exposure 
 OLS 10th 25th  50th  75th  90th   
1989:       
Conflict exposure -0.0831 -0.0560 -0.1853*** -0.0813 -0.0115 0.1183 
 (0.0588) (0.0825) (0.0769) (0.1476) (0.0876) (0.1213) 
Observations 3,477 3,460 3460 3460 3460 3460 
2003:       
Conflict exposure -0.451*** -0.0968*** -0.2501*** -0.4092*** -0.5853*** -0.7167*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0633) (0.0732) (0.0493) (0.0358) (0.0599) 
Observations 3702 3702 3702 3702 3702 3702 
2011:       
           Conflict exposure -0.277*** 0.0786*** -0.0390*** -0.1401*** -0.2726*** -0.3013*** 
 (0.0499) (0.0327) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0258) (0.0369) 
Observations 6763 6763 6763 6763 6763 6763 
Note: 17 observations were trimmed from the QTT analysis for 1989 with propensity score below 0.0001 and none from the 
two subsequent years. 
The regressions have the following covariates in the treatment assignment equation for the propensity score estimation used 
in QTE and the OLS regression: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size and it square; household 
dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction variables. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 
Significance levels  





Now our attention turns to our second conflict measure, based on conflict events. Table 3.7 
presents the estimated impact of the conflict on households that directly suffered from any of 
the stated events (i.e., household member killed, raped, suffered limb amputation, displaced, 
and property destroyed or lost). This conflict measure’s short-term impact reveals a sharp 
reduction in household expenditure across the distribution. On average, ceteris paribus, 
households or their members reported to have suffered directly from the conflict saw a 36% 
reduction as compared to those not affected. In the short-run, households at the 10th percentile 
experienced a 16.4% reduction in household expenditure. The conflict impact at the 90th 
percentile was sizeable in the short-run but dissipated sharply in the long run. These observed 
long-term estimated effects contrast with those obtained using the conflict exposure measure.  
 
Table 3.7: OLS and Quantile Treatment Effects using Log Household Expenditure – Conflict 
Events 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
2003:       
Conflict events -0.446*** -0.1796*** -0.2906*** -0.3885*** -0.5469*** -0.6834*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0561) (0.0582) (0.0375) (0.0381) (0.0576) 
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 
2011:       
Conflict events -0.0374 0.1788*** 0.0602*** 0.0473*** -0.0206 0.0358 
 (0.0500) (0.0463) (0.0278) (0.0222) (0.0163) (0.0255) 
Observations 6763 6763 6763 6763 6763 6763 
The regressions have the following covariates in the treatment assignment equation for the propensity score estimation used 
in QTT and the OLS regression: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size and it square; household 
dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction variables. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 









3.7 Robustness Checks 
 
In order to verify our empirical results, we conducted a number of robustness checks similar to 
what was done for Essay 1. First, Freetown was protected by coalition forces and was a 
relatively safe environment within which ongoing economic activities occurred. It was the 
epicentre for both government and non-government institutions engaged in post-conflict 
recovery activities. Rebel forces briefly penetrated the city near the end of the war, but failed 
to gain control of the country’s capital city. Hence, the economic opportunities in Freetown 
were different from those in the rest of the country. This has a potential to bias the empirical 
findings as our control group for conflict exposure includes Freetown. We exclude Freetown 
from our control group and implement the analysis again. The results are not found to be 
significantly different from our main analysis (see Tables A3.7 and A3.8 in the appendices). 
Therefore, the results obtained here are not driven by including Freetown in the control group.  
 
Second, we restricted our analysis to the 64 chiefdoms that were originally randomly surveyed 
out of a total of 152 administrative chiefdoms in the 1989 SLHS. This provides consistency in 
regard to the number of chiefdoms used in the analysis. The 2003 and 2011 surveys randomly 
selected households from almost all of the recorded chiefdoms. Table A3.10 in the appendix 
supports the negative impact of the conflict across the distribution, though the small sample 
size leads to less precise estimates. The key findings on the impact of conflict on inequality, 
however, are no different to those when using only the 64 original chiefdoms (see Table 
A3.11).  
 
Third, the intensity of the civil war varied across chiefdoms and conflict years. The estimated 
impact of the conflict might capture spill-over effects due to migration and household 




movement between control and treatment zones was significant. However, and as already noted 
in Essay 1, the migration10 pattern revealed in survey responses was generally restricted to 
within treatment or control groups but not between these two groups. The movement of 
individuals from conflict to non-conflict areas accounts for 3% of those who are reported to 
have moved in the survey data for 2003. If these cases are dropped from the analysis, the key 
findings reported above are not materially altered. The result is not significantly different for 
the impact on household inequality as compared to our main analysis (see Tables A3.12 and 
A3.13).  
 
Household displacement during the civil war may provide nuance to the interpretation of our 
long-term empirical estimates. The results could be driven by returnee contributions to socio-
economic activity. An estimated two million Sierra Leoneans were displaced during the civil 
war as reported in the 2004 NPWJ report. This accounted for over one-third of the Sierra Leone 
population in 2004 (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004 Population and Housing Census report). 
Displacement was mostly internal, as neighbouring Liberia was also undergoing civil war and 
the border to the north was highly guarded by the Guinean military, deterring entry to the 
country. A self-reported question on whether a household was displaced as a result of the civil 
war was asked in the 2003 SLHS. Households displaced during the civil war accounted for 7% 
of the total households surveyed. This percentage is clearly not representative of the general 
displacement pattern. However, if we drop the relevant 7% from our short-term analysis, the 
core results are not significantly altered (see Tables A3.12 and A3.13).  
 
 
10 The migration related question in the 2003 SLIHS captures movement in the last 12 months. We used 




Displacement and the role of returnees might be less problematic for our short-run analysis as 
the data was collected just one year after the conflict ended. However, the long-term impact 
might have potential bias if displacement is not adequately captured. In the 2011 SLIHS, which 
provides the main data for our long-term analysis, 51% of households report displacement as 
a result of the civil war. Summary analysis of the survey data reveals that by the end of 2003, 
93.5% of war-displaced households had returned to their place of origin. Internal displacement 
(within chiefdom or province) accounted for 98.33% of all displacement. It is unlikely that the 
economic conditions of those displaced from their original chiefdoms would have changed 
significantly. Neighbouring Liberia was also experiencing unrest, while language barriers and 
strict Guinean border controls discouraged meaningful external displacement. Re-estimation 
without the 6.5% of households that had not returned to their place of origin after the end of 
the civil war also left our key findings unchanged (see Tables A3.13 and A3.14). 
 
Finally, the course of household inequality after the civil war could also be affected by the flow 
of aid and other forms of international assistance. The provision of aid is usually geared 
towards social reconstruction or providing a financial boost to a government for its 
development policies. The effect can either be an increase or decrease in equality among 
households (Bircan et al., 2017). Post-conflict Sierra Leone saw an increase in international aid 
geared towards rebuilding and enhancing the lives of affected individuals. These aid agencies 
were generally more effective two years after the civil war had ended and had their offices in 
the capital city as most were unsure about the stability of the country. Our immediate post-
conflict data was collected one year after the end of the civil war. Hence our short-term effect 
is unlikely to have been driven by such aid disbursements as they were yet to be rolled out 
effectively. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, we excluded Freetown from the control group 




Hence, aid transfer policies are unlikely to account significantly for the inequality reduction 
noted post-conflict. It is more reasonable to assume that the rebel activities that took place 
during the civil war (i.e., the destructive redistribution of wealth), had more of an effect than 
post-conflict activities. 
 
3.8 Discussion of Results  
 
The existing discussion around conflict and inequality has largely focussed on macroeconomic 
transmission channels. The macroeconomic evidence to date suggests conflict is associated 
with higher income inequality in conflict-affected countries. However, there is potential 
heterogeneity here as conflict-related economic inequality can be dynamic and differ from 
country to country. The empirical results from our analysis of the Sierra Leone civil war reveal 
a reduction in household expenditure and inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
Hence, post-conflict Sierra Leone initially presents as a country with worsening household 
welfare but reduced inequality. This characterisation suggests an economy of increasing 
poverty but one complemented by a lower degree of inequality. This is not an atypical 
occurrence for developing countries that have experienced a prolonged period of conflict. The 
levelling of inequality is generally channelled through the destructive nature of civil war, where 
little redistribution occurs. As discussed by Scheidel (2017) conflicts that cause depletion of 
wealth within the top income brackets can lead to a sharp decline in inequality.  
 
The impact of the civil war in Sierra Leone on inequality can be understood through both the 
military strategies used during the war and the subsequent post-war recovery policies. The 
following provides a discussion of the potential mechanisms for the observed reduction in 





The strategies employed by the rebel groups and other rebellious national soldiers can be used 
as one of the explanations for the negative welfare effect. The ‘operations’ conducted by the 
rebel groups and their accomplices were destructive in nature. These strategies were 
orchestrated and encouraged by the rebel leaders. The targeted households and their 
communities lost assets to the rebels. Looting, raiding, and theft from properties were among 
the strategies used by the rebels, together with the destruction of private dwellings. These 
strategies were driven by acquisitive motives but also by the desire to drive fear into the 
populace to ensure community compliance with the occupation. The targeting of high-value 
assets by the rebels rendered the ‘haves’ in society vulnerable to the expropriation of their 
assets and they thus became the biggest losers during the conflict. In addition, the purloined 
wealth was not redistributed to the poor in the community. The strategy followed a destructive 
pattern as the looted wealth was not directed to any meaningful or productive economic 
activity. Hence, those households at the top end of the welfare distribution incurred the greatest 
loss in the immediate post-conflict era in Sierra Leone with no obvious benefit for others in the 
country.  
 
A strategy designed around destruction and theft instead of redistribution accounts for the 
reduced level of inequality witnessed in Sierra Leone in the post-conflict period. This finding 
supports Scheidel’s (2017) somewhat pessimistic view that conflict is a great leveller of 
inequality. This is evident for a conflict that permeates society in such a way that the wealth of 
the affluent is targeted and destroyed. The unequal distribution prior to the civil war is lost 
during the prosecution of the war. Hence, the immediate post-conflict configuration is an 
economy with reduced welfare and lower inequality. The scale of the destruction during the 
civil war can directly affect the magnitude of inequality, as Scheidel (2017) found for both 





Social and public spending post-conflict also plays an important role in moulding post-conflict 
inequality. The state’s ability to implement and engage in social spending is essential to 
reducing inequality. Prior to the civil war, Sierra Leone was at the bottom of the world 
development index and enjoyed limited economic opportunities. The destructive nature of the 
war led to further deepening of poverty and the development of adverse economic conditions. 
The protracted rule of rebel groups in certain areas potentially caused the collapse in the state’s 
ability to provide social amenities and other public services and goods relevant to development. 
The suppressive tactics of the rebels account for the deepened inequality experienced by the 
rebel-controlled chiefdoms. Corruption, lack of security, and a breakdown in markets provide 
another perspective as to why the conflict had a high levelling impact on inequality. Overall, 
the empirical results obtained in this essay confirm Scheidel’s (2017) discussion on the 
mechanisms through which war exerts an inequality-levelling effect. The end of the civil war 
created more stable economic conditions, which over time have enabled the economic system 
to exert its influence on inequality, which may explain why inequality has subsequently 




















In this chapter, the impact of the Sierra Leone civil war on household welfare inequality was 
examined. The findings contribute to a relatively sparse literature on the link between conflict 
and inequality. This is the first empirical work that has looked into the impact of the Sierra 
Leone conflict on household inequality. Household inequality was measured by the Gini 
coefficient. We used two measures of conflict, one that explored the impact at the chiefdom 
level and another which looked at the specific conflict events that directly affected a household 
or individuals in a household. This chapter used two main empirical methodologies in a novel 
way to estimate the impact of the Sierra Leone conflict on the household expenditure 
distribution. The first empirical approach evaluated conflict impact using a Recentred Influence 
Function (RIF) for the Gini coefficient. This was done using a variety of different regression 
approaches (including RIF regressions). A second approach was used to compute the quantile 
treatment effect at different quantiles of the household expenditure. This approach permitted 
estimation of the causal effects beyond the average, as in Essay 1.  
 
Our analysis revealed that the conflict induced a significant negative effect on household 
expenditure inequality in the short run using both empirical approaches. Households at the top 
end of the expenditure distribution exhibited the greatest reduction in welfare, with their 
expenditure halving. In addition, the level of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
contracted by around 8 percentage points due to the conflict. The effect on inequality dissipated 
after a decade. The empirical evidence of a sharp decline in inequality immediately after the 







Macroeconomic studies have found evidence that conflict increases income inequality. 
However, the nature of conflict and the experiences of affected countries differ. A protracted 
civil war can lead to a breakdown in government effectiveness and the deployment of 
destructive strategies mostly affecting the wealthiest in society. Hence, the immediate impact 
is likely to be associated with a reduction in overall welfare and declining inequality. The 
negative impact of the conflict in terms of general welfare and inequality can be mitigated by 
constructing and implementing policies that are not biased towards one or other end of the 
welfare distribution. In addition, as the wealthiest have the most to lose in a conflict, it may be 
that, in the wake of the civil war, wealthy households are less likely to display their assets 
conspicuously and less inclined to exhibit their wealth in Sierra Leone. This behaviour may act 




















Table A 3.1: Logit Treatment Assignment Equations for Conflict Exposure for Different Years 
 Exposure 
Variables 1989 2003 2011 
Head’s characteristics:    
head’s age 0.00789 0.00145 -0.00221 
 (0.0199) (0.00248) (0.0113) 
head’s age sq -0.000157 - -4.33e-05 
 (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
head male 0.206 -0.211 0.337*** 
 (0.126) (0.153) (0.0736) 
head married -0.0147 -0.151 -0.294 
 (0.163) (0.166) (0.261) 
head’s primary edu 0.535*** -0.0122 0.471*** 
 (0.0804) (0.160) (0.165) 
head’s higher edu - 0.0807 -0.493*** 
  (0.334) (0.0752) 
head Muslim - 0.352*** -0.724*** 
  (0.106) (0.0999) 
Other household characteristics:    
dependency ratio 0.0241 -0.0227 0.173** 
 (0.0554) (0.103) (0.0778) 
dependency ratio sq - - 0.00934 
   (0.0131) 
household size -0.0322 0.207*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0505) (0.0379) 
household size sq 0.00615*** -0.0116*** 0.00334* 
 (0.00219) (0.00304) (0.00196) 
Urban -0.118 -1.009*** -3.046*** 
 (0.149) (0.262) (0.196) 
Interaction terms:    
head’s primary edu ´ urban - 0.374 -0.270 
  (0.244) (0.216) 
head male ´ urban - 0.152 - 
  (0.257)  
household size ´ urban 0.00229 -0.0383 0.195*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0268) (0.0210) 
head married ´ urban - 0.961*** 0.424*** 
  (0.262) (0.143) 
dependency ratio ´ household size - 0.00823 -0.0154 
  (0.0156) (0.0137) 
head Muslim ´ urban - -0.0499 0.670*** 
  (0.167) (0.136) 
head’s higher edu ´ urban - -0.871** - 
  (0.432)  
dependency ratio ´ urban 0.0530 - -0.234*** 
 (0.0873)  (0.0523) 
head’s age ´ head married - - 0.00604 
   (0.00462) 
household size ´ head married - - -0.0437 
   (0.0279) 
constant -1.294*** -0.859*** 2.444*** 
 (0.486) (0.260) (0.348) 
Observations 3439 3702 6763 
Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A 3.2: Pre-war (1989) Covariate Balancing Tests using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio  
Age of head 42.87 43.01 -1.20 -0.48 0.63 0.98 
Age of head sq 1958.50 1971.20 -1.10 -0.45 0.65 1.07 
Head male 0.86 0.87 -2.60 -0.98 0.33 0.99 
Head cohabiting 0.93 0.93 -0.90 -0.34 0.73 1.02 
Dependency ratio 0.90 0.88 1.90 0.84 0.40 1.13 
Urban 0.34 0.36 -3.20 -1.17 0.24 1.00 
Head prim edu 0.57 0.59 -4.40 -1.55 0.12 0.97 
Head higher edu 0.43 0.41 4.50 1.55 0.12 0.97 
Household size 5.41 5.44 -0.70 -0.28 0.78 1.01 
Household size sq 41.52 41.65 -0.20 -0.09 0.93 1.07 
Head prim edu ´ urban 0.19 0.19 -1.20 -0.44 0.66 0.98 
Head male ´ urban 0.29 0.31 -2.90 -1.06 0.29 0.99 
Note: *if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2] 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2 






Table A 3.3: Post-war (2003) Covariate Balancing Tests using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio 
Age of head 46.80 46.66 1.00 0.29 0.77 0.99 
Age of head sq 2386.00 2374.70 0.80 0.22 0.82 0.99 
Head male 0.82 0.83 -4.90 -1.47 0.14 0.87 
Head married 0.84 0.86 -5.10 -1.58 0.11 1.11 
Dependency ratio 0.95 0.94 1.50 0.44 0.66 1.10 
Urban 0.30 0.30 -0.80 -0.24 0.81 0.99 
Head prim edu 0.09 0.09 0.30 0.09 0.93 1.01 
Head higher edu 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.95 1.01 
Household size 6.28 6.25 1.30 0.40 0.69 1.01 
Head prim edu ´ urban 0.04 0.04 0.70 0.22 0.83 1.04 
Head male ´ urban 0.25 0.25 -0.60 -0.17 0.86 0.98 
Dependency ratio ´ urban 0.30 0.30 -0.20 -0.08 0.94 1.08 
Household size sq 46.28 45.75 1.20 0.38 0.71 1.01 
Household size ´ urban 1.87 1.90 -0.80 -0.24 0.81 0.99 
Head married ´ urban 0.25 0.26 -1.60 -0.46 0.65 0.98 
Head Muslim 0.80 0.80 -0.10 -0.02 0.99 1.00 
Head from Temne tribe 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.07 0.94 1.00 
Note: * if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2] 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2 














Table A 3.4: Post-war (2011) Covariate Balancing Tests using Conflict Exposure Treatment  
Treated Control %bias t-value p>t Variance 
Ratio 
Age of head 45.70 46.05 -2.40 -0.87 0.38 1.05 
Head primary edu 0.07 0.06 0.90 0.36 0.72 1.05 
Head higher edu 0.05 0.04 1.60 0.70 0.48 1.09 
Head male 0.73 0.74 -2.20 -0.78 0.44 1.03 
Head married 0.81 0.82 -2.40 -0.92 0.36 1.03 
Dependency ratio 1.08 1.09 -0.80 -0.30 0.77 1.01 
Household size 5.65 5.66 -0.40 -0.17 0.86 1.11 
Age of head sq 2304.40 2320.10 -1.10 -0.38 0.70 1.06 
Urban 0.17 0.17 -0.20 -0.09 0.93 0.99 
Dependency ratio ´ urban 0.19 0.19 -0.40 -0.19 0.85 1.04 
Head married ´ urban 0.12 0.12 -0.30 -0.12 0.91 0.99 
Head male ´ urban 0.11 0.12 -0.80 -0.36 0.72 0.97 
Head prim edu ´ urban 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.96 0.99 
Household size ´ urban 0.96 0.94 0.50 0.22 0.82 1.01 
Household size sq 37.98 37.45 1.30 0.54 0.59 1.11 
Head Muslim 0.78 0.78 -1.10 -0.40 0.69 1.02 
Head Muslin ´ urban 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.99 1.00 
Note: * if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2] 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2 
prim edu – primary education; higher edu – higher education 
 
Table A 3.5: The Rubin’s Overall Balancing Property Diagnostics Results across the Three 
Years for Matched Observations  
Ps R2 LR 
chi2 
p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %concern %bad 
1989: 
         
Exposure  0.00 11.20 0.43 2.10 1.60 9.10 1.24 0.00 0.00 
2003: 
         
Exposure 0.003 19.84 0.283 2.40 2.10 13.00 1.46 0.00 0.00 
Events 0.00 17.76 0.54 1.30 1.00 12.20 1.06 0.00 0.00 
2011: 
         
Exposure 0.00 10.79 0.867 1.20 0.80 7.40 1.15 0.00 0.00 
Events 0.00 18.84 0.40 1.30 1.40 8.60 1.04 0.00 0.00 






















Table A 3.6: Semi-parametric Local Logistic Regression Model for the Treatment Assignment 
Equation - Quantile Treatment Effect Estimation 
 Exposure Events 
VARIABLES 1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
      
Head’s age 0.0008615 0.00661** -0.00221 0.00938*** 0.0184 
 (0.022450) (0.00290) (0.0113) (0.00359) (0.0123) 
Head’s age sq -0.000124*** - -4.33e-05 - -0.000153 
 (3.93e-05)  (0.000105)  (0.000117) 
Head male -0.171 0.626*** 0.337*** 0.0511 -0.291*** 
 (0.146) (0.186) (0.0736) (0.0942) (0.0818) 
Married head 0.0970 -0.657*** -0.294 0.400** 0.344 
 (0.182) (0.210) (0.261) (0.204) (0.256) 
Dependency ratio -0.122** 0.186 0.173** 0.145* 0.0571 
 (0.0599) (0.122) (0.0778) (0.0796) (0.0777) 
Urban settlement  0.0205 -1.974*** -3.046*** -0.950*** -1.222*** 
 (0.177) (0.282) (0.196) (0.162) (0.191) 
Primary  -0.670*** 0.957*** 0.471*** 0.555*** 0.370** 
 (0.0944) (0.235) (0.165) (0.127) (0.183) 
Higher  - 0.790* -0.493*** 0.305 -0.0749 
  (0.433) (0.0752) (0.236) (0.0796) 
Household size -0.0723* -0.149*** -0.152*** -0.0666** 0.0963** 
 (0.0403) (0.0570) (0.0379) (0.0323) (0.0383) 
Primary ´ urban - -0.867*** -0.270 -0.511*** 0.158 
  (0.306) (0.216) (0.172) (0.240) 
Male ´ urban - -1.496***  -0.140  
  (0.287)  (0.116)  
Household size sq 0.00192 0.00312 0.00334* 0.000829 -0.00449** 
 (0.00225) (0.00330) (0.00196) (0.00191) (0.00193) 
Household size ´ urban -0.0245 0.161*** 0.195*** 0.0965*** 0.0577*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0291) (0.0210) (0.0169) (0.0224) 
Married ´ urban - 1.843*** 0.424***  -0.186 
  (0.297) (0.143)  (0.144) 
Muslim - 0.545*** -0.724*** 0.191*** -0.0905 
  (0.126) (0.0999) (0.0720) (0.105) 
Temne tribe - -1.886***  -1.017***  
  (0.0915)  (0.0531)  
Muslim ´ urban - 0.222 0.670*** 0.250** 0.366*** 
  (0.179) (0.136) (0.106) (0.139) 
Higher ´ urban - -1.727***  -0.799***  
  (0.500)  (0.279)  
Dependency ´ urban 0.0843  -0.234***  -0.219*** 
 (0.0945)  (0.0523)  (0.0588) 
Dependency sq -  0.00934 -0.00320 -0.00784 
   (0.0131) (0.0141) (0.0151) 
Constant 2.523*** 1.651*** 2.444*** 0.431* 0.476 
 (0.227) (0.310) (0.348) (0.234) (0.349) 
Observations 3439 3702 6763 3702 6763 
Standard errors in parentheses. 









Table A 3.7: Quantile Treatment Effects on the Treated using Log Household Expenditure – 
Conflict Exposure (without Freetown) 
 OLS 10th 25th  50th  75th  90th   
1989:       
Conflict exposure 0.2066*** -0.0506 0.0661 0.2283 0.4849*** 0.2627*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0745) (0.0817) (0.1561) (0.0631) (0.0710) 
Observations 3439 3439 3439 3439 3439 3439 
2003:       
Conflict exposure -0.1292*** -0.0081 -0.0309 -0.0572** -0.1626*** -0.3522*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0448) (0.0283) (0.0291) (0.0373) (0.0499) 
Observations 3582 3582 3582 3582 3582 3582 
2011:       
           Conflict exposure -0.1284*** -0.0974*** -0.0934*** -0.1065*** -0.1563*** -0.2119*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0312) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0324) 
Observations 6683 6641 6644 6644 6644 6685 
The regressions have the following covariates: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size and it square; 
household dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction variables. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 
Significance levels  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A 3.8: The Impact of Conflict on the Gini Coefficient using the Inverse Probability 
Weighting (without Freetown)  
Exposure Events 
 
1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
ATT 0.0031 -0.0780*** -0.0003 -0.0736*** -0.0079  
(0.0147) (0.0127) (0.0048) (0.0395) (0.0065) 
Observations: 3439 3582 6,578 3,696 6,685 
Treatment 1167 1666 4041 1319 5110 
Control 2272 1916 2537 2377 1653 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A 3.9: Overidentification Test from the IPW Estimation  
Exposure Events 
 Chi(2) P-value Chi(2) P-value 
1989 18.9270 0.1254 - - 
2003 29.9779 0.1190 19.3462 0.4348 
2011 18.5821 0.3530 30.4737 0.1695 









Table A 3.10: Quantile Treatment Effects using Log Household Expenditure – Conflict 
Exposure (64 chiefdoms) 
 OLS 10th 25th  50th  75th  90th   
1989:       
Conflict exposure 0.2066*** -0.0506 0.0661 0.2283 0.4849*** 0.2627*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0745) (0.0817) (0.1561) (0.0631) (0.0710) 
Observations 3439 3439 3439 3439 3439 3439 
2003:       
Conflict exposure -0.3918*** -0.1013 -0.2222*** -0.2961** -0.4577*** -0.6048*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0675) (0.0465) (0.0404) (0.0491) (0.0532) 
Observations 2156 2156 2156 2156 2156 2156 
2011:       
           Conflict exposure -0.1625*** -0.0831** -0.0976*** -0.1405*** -0.2576*** -0.3235*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0367) (0.0290) (0.0253) (0.0324) (0.0452) 
Observations 3778 3778 3778 3778 3778 3778 
The regressions have the following covariates: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size 
and it square; household dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction 
variables. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 
Significance levels  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A 3.11: The Impact of Conflict on the Gini Coefficient using Inverse Probability 
Weighting (64 Chiefdoms)  
Exposure Events  
1989 2003 2011 2003 2011 
ATT 0.0031 -0.0950*** -0.0016 -0.0736*** -0.0079  
(0.0147) (0.0193) (0.0068) (0.0395) (0.0065) 
Observations: 3439 2156 3736 3696 6685 
Treatment 1167 894 2233 1319 5110 
Control 2272 1262 1503 2377 1653 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A 3.12: Quantile Treatment Effects using Log Household Expenditure – Conflict 
Exposure (Other Issues) 
 OLS 10th 25th  50th  75th  90th   
2003_Migration issue:       
Conflict exposure -0.1468*** -0.0149 -0.0542 -0.0928*** -0.2208*** -0.4167*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0500) (0.0358) (0.0318) (0.0384) (0.0512) 
Observations 3584 3584 3584 3584 3584 3584 
2011_Displacement issue:       
           Conflict exposure -0.1237*** -0.0976** -0.0968*** -0.1123*** -0.1552*** -0.2115*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0294) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0236) (0.0326) 
Observations 6540 6540 6540 6540 6540 6540 
The regressions have the following covariates: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size 
and it square; household dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction 
variables. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 
Significance levels  







Table A 3.13: The Impact of Conflict on the Gini Coefficient using Inverse Probability 
Weighting (Other Issues)  
2003_migration 2011_Displacement  
ATT -0.0967*** -0.0130**  
(0.0132)  (0.0049) 
Observations: 3584 6464 
Treatment 1580 4063 
Control 2004 2477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A 3.14: Log Household Expenditure RIF Regression using propensity score matching – 
Conflict Events 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
2003:      
ATT -0.1805*** -0.2885*** -0.4072*** -0.4419*** -0.6171*** 
 (0.0866) (0.0776) (0.0592) (0.0692) (0.0873) 
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696 3696 
2011:      
ATT 0.1634*** 0.0613 0.0288 -0.0395 -0.0332 
 (0.0500) (0.0316) (0.0358) (0.0446) (0.0588) 
Observations 6763 6763 6763 6763 6763 
The regressions have the following covariates: age, sex, education, and marital status of heads; household size 
and it square; household dependency ratio; household in urban area; and some urban and gender interaction 
variables. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 250 replications. 


















Table A 3.15: OLS Estimates for the Household Determinants of the Gini Coefficient 
(Unweighted) - Full Estimate Table 
 
Variables 1989 2003 2011 
Conflict 0.00398 -0.0908*** -0.00519 
 (0.0156) (0.0126) (0.00501) 
Head’s Characteristics:    
head’s age 0.00801 0.000236 0.00139 
 (0.00518) (0.000498) (0.00105) 
head male -0.0329 0.0506* 0.000888 
 (0.0221) (0.0294) (0.00768) 
head married 0.0276 -0.0430 -0.0394 
 (0.0274) (0.0369) (0.0352) 






head’s primary edu -0.0765*** 0.103* 0.0352*** 







head from Temne tribe - -0.0140  
  (0.0179)  






Other Characteristics:    
dependency ratio 0.0156** 0.0163 -0.0617*** 
 (0.00732) (0.0240) (0.0120) 
dependency ratio sq - - -0.00532** 
   (0.00257) 
Urban -0.0602 0.0494 -0.266*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0589) (0.0231) 
household size -0.0119 -0.00251 -0.0705*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.00575) 
household size sq 0.00103 0.000316 0.00251*** 
 (0.000712) (0.000798) (0.000422) 
Interactions:    
head’s primary edu ´ urban - -0.107 -0.0243 
  (0.0731) (0.0222) 
head male ´ urban - 0.0184  
  (0.0541)  
household size ´ urban -0.0149** 0.0116 0.0436*** 
 (0.00700) (0.00977) (0.00373) 
head married ´ urban - -0.101 -0.00931 
  (0.0639) (0.0156) 
dependency ratio ´ size - -0.00202 0.0131*** 
  (0.00411) (0.00294) 
head Muslim ´ urban - -0.0431 -0.0107 
  (0.0363) (0.0160) 
head’s higher edu ´ urban - 0.191 - 
  (0.116)  






head’s age ´ head married - - 0.000295 
   (0.000440) 
household size ´ head married - - 0.000630 
   (0.00589) 
constant 0.594*** 0.454*** 0.623*** 
 (0.108) (0.0590) (0.0353) 
observations 3439 3702 6685 
R-squared 0.040 0.027 0.107 
Significance levels  







Table A 3.16: OLS Estimates for the Household Determinants of the Gini Coefficient 
(Weighted) - Full Estimate Table 
 Exposure 
Variables 1989 2003 2011 
Conflict 0.00253 -0.0804*** 0.00356 
 (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.00481) 
Head’s characteristics:    
head’s age 0.00802* 5.08e-05 0.000874 
 (0.00429) (0.000398) (0.000934) 
head’s age sq -7.08e-05*  -7.69e-06 
 (4.04e-05)  (8.35e-06) 
head male -0.0323 0.0422* -0.000389 
 (0.0201) (0.0237) (0.00682) 
head married 0.0168 -0.0332 -0.0472* 
 (0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0262) 
head’s primary edu -0.0734*** 0.103* 0.0328*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0619) (0.0119) 
head’s higher edu  -0.0400 -0.000165 
  (0.0284) (0.00765) 
head Muslim - -0.00668 0.00447 
head from Temne tribe - -0.0121  
  (0.0172)  
  (0.0181) (0.00640) 
Other Household characteristics:    
household size -0.00946 -0.00142 -0.0684*** 
 (0.00925) (0.0103) (0.00454) 
household size sq 0.000772 0.000248 0.00237*** 
 (0.000480) (0.000667) (0.000321) 
dependency ratio sq - - -0.00276* 
   (0.00163) 
dependency ratio 0.0131** 0.0144 -0.0430*** 
 (0.00657) (0.0183) (0.00807) 
urban -0.101* 0.0536 -0.238*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0513) (0.0223) 
Interactions:    
head primary edu ´ urban - -0.103 -0.0337 
  (0.0734) (0.0228) 
head male ´ urban - 0.0400 - 
  (0.0453)  
household size ´ urban -0.0178** 0.00717 0.0408*** 
 (0.00785) (0.00729) (0.00377) 
head married ´ urban - -0.0959* -0.00628 
  (0.0546) (0.0155) 
dependency ratio ´ size - -0.00120 0.00820*** 
  (0.00290) (0.00190) 
head Muslim ´ urban - -0.0391 -0.0234 
  (0.0348) (0.0174) 
head’s higher edu ´ urban - 0.163* - 
  (0.0891)  
dependency ratio ´ urban -0.0461***  0.0278*** 
 (0.0165)  (0.00698) 
head’s age ´ head married - - -0.000121 
   (0.000401) 
household size ´ head married - - 0.00617 
   (0.00395) 
constant 0.603*** 0.448*** 0.623*** 
 (0.0926) (0.0522) (0.0301) 
observations 3439 3702 6685 
R-squared 0.048 0.021 0.117 
Significance levels  






Table A 3.17: OLS Estimates for the Household Determinants of the Gini Coefficient for 
Conflict Events - Full Estimate Table 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 2003 2011 2003 2011 
conflict -0.0802*** 0.000775 -0.0751*** -0.00556 
 (0.0183) (0.00693) (0.0214) (0.00617) 
head’s age 0.000821 0.00126 0.00129 0.000812 
 (0.00180) (0.00108) (0.00166) (0.00100) 
head male 0.0951*** 0.000986 0.0908*** 0.00174 
 (0.0287) (0.00775) (0.0300) (0.00684) 
head married -0.0539 -0.0399 -0.0111 -0.0277 
 (0.0857) (0.0331) (0.0810) (0.0353) 
dependency ratio 0.000344 -0.0632*** -0.0119 -0.0543*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0150) (0.0271) (0.0114) 
urban 0.0280 -0.282*** -0.00116 -0.264*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0198) (0.0565) (0.0192) 
head’s primary edu 0.117* 0.0246** 0.106* 0.0247** 
 (0.0620) (0.0108) (0.0596) (0.0101) 
head’s higher edu -0.0355 0.0168* -0.0349 0.00509 
 (0.0288) (0.00882) (0.0304) (0.00794) 
household size -0.00791 -0.0751*** -0.0138 -0.0730*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00773) (0.0126) (0.00724) 
head’s primary edu ´ urban -0.126* - -0.0990 - 
 (0.0739)  (0.0723)  
head male ´ urban -0.0736 - -0.0838 - 
 (0.0577)  (0.0667)  
household size sq 0.000710 0.00244*** 0.00104 0.00250*** 
 (0.000830) (0.000426) (0.00101) (0.000451) 
household size ´ urban 0.0136 0.0435*** 0.0167 0.0406*** 
 (0.00921) (0.00369) (0.0118) (0.00359) 
head Muslim -0.00865 - -0.0133 - 
 (0.0196)  (0.0212)  
head from Temne tribe -0.0450** - -0.0449** - 
 (0.0188)  (0.0213)  
dependency ratio ´ size -0.00641 0.0129*** -0.00596 0.0109*** 
 (0.00507) (0.00283) (0.00626) (0.00253) 
head Muslim ´ urban -0.0371 - -0.0232 - 
 (0.0358)  (0.0392)  
head’s higher edu ´ urban 0.186 - 0.238* - 
 (0.114)  (0.140)  
head’s age ´ head married -0.000691 0.000170 -0.00135 -5.07e-05 
 (0.00190) (0.000473) (0.00182) (0.000432) 
dependency ratio sq 0.00901* -0.00531** 0.0119** -0.00477** 
 (0.00525) (0.00268) (0.00553) (0.00210) 
head’s age sq - -1.96e-05* - -1.31e-05 
  (1.01e-05)  (9.59e-06) 
dependency ratio ´ urban - 0.0280*** - 0.0261*** 
  (0.00695)  (0.00684) 
head’s age ´ size - 0.000114 - 0.000101 
  (0.000123)  (0.000126) 
head married ´ household size - 0.000996 - 0.000307 
  (0.00583)  (0.00621) 
head’s age ´ dependency ratio - 4.67e-05 - 9.65e-05 
  (0.000257)  (0.000178) 
constant 0.484*** 0.644*** 0.483*** 0.646*** 
 (0.0974) (0.0377) (0.0869) (0.0335) 
observations 3696 6685 3696 6685 
R-squared 0.024 0.107 0.022 0.124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






 4 Chapter Four -The Impact of the Ebola Virus on Household 




The world has experienced significant waves of both epidemics and pandemics over recent 
centuries. Plagues and other virus or disease types have induced exogenous shocks on affected 
regions and countries that have adverse consequences. The impacts of epidemics and 
pandemics are generally accompanied by economic, social, and political shocks that exacerbate 
mortality rates and undermine economic activity. Virus outbreaks are among the highest tier 
of epidemics that have adversely affected economies in the past. Africa has suffered many 
deadly health shock episodes in more recent times. The 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic 
represents one in a sequence of different viral episodes that have ravaged the continent in 
addition to malaria, yellow fever, cholera, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). There 
have been over 20 smaller outbreaks of the zoonotic Ebola virus in different strains since its 
first occurrence in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1976. The 2014-2016 West Africa 
outbreak started in Guinea and was found to be related to the human consumption of an infected 
bat. Bats are known to host many viruses but have developed excellent immune systems 
rendering them less vulnerable to these diseases. Their ability to fly long distances and their 
social roosting behaviour in areas close to human settlements render them an effective vector 
for the transmission of diseases across species. The death rate recorded within three months of 
the Guinea outbreak was significant because inadequate control measures were not put in place 
sufficiently early. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared this outbreak an epidemic 
on March 23rd 2014. 
 
Epidemics can destroy lives and disrupt economic and community activity. Developing 




pressure on the health, education, and political systems, which are already characteristically 
weak in developing countries, thus amplifying their socio-economic impact on affected 
economies. The evaluation of the impact of epidemics on macroeconomic growth has 
accounted for most of the literature that has sought to investigate the economic impacts of 
disease in developing countries. In contrast, the microeconomic research on the topic remains 
limited. The effects of epidemics on economic growth can be long-term or short-term. For 
instance, the HIV epidemic produced a long-term impact on economic growth. The affected 
African economies witnessed a reduction in economic growth (GDP) of between 0.15% and 
4% per annum over the period from 1990 to 2015. Poor labour productivity, weak labour 
supply, and increased spending on medical treatments accounted for much of the negative 
impact on economic growth (see Dixon, McDonald, and Robert, 2002). However, given the 
failure to develop a cure for HIV, the medical response was more focused on treatment, and 
the HIV pandemic yielded a U-shaped recovery pattern. The nature of the economic recovery 
after an epidemic or pandemic can be slow and more often than not follows a U-shaped pattern. 
Nevertheless, some epidemics yield a V-shaped economic growth pattern, suggesting a faster 
economic rebound or recovery. The latter suggests a scenario of short-run disruption to growth 
but with recovery occurring within a more rapid time period. Given that HIV has been an ever-
present disease in Africa since the late 1980s, its economic effects have been more persistent 
compared to other, more short-term epidemics like Ebola. Hence, one would anticipate that the 
former yields a U-shaped economic recovery, with the latter more likely generating a V-shaped 
recovery pattern.  
 
As noted above, the bulk of the literature on the impact of epidemics or pandemics on affected 
countries has been at the macro-level with an emphasis on economic growth (Dixon, 2002; 




extensively researched, especially for those occurring in Africa. The existing dearth of research 
on the effects of epidemics at the micro-level on household welfare provides the research 
justification for this essay. The research on this topic has been limited for a number of reasons. 
First, data limitations pre-outbreak and post-outbreak constrain efforts to provide a systematic 
quantitative analysis of epidemics at the micro-level. This chapter makes use of a rich dataset 
on household economic indicators (e.g., household expenditure) and related measures of 
household welfare conducted at a national level after the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone.  
 
Second, even when micro-level data are available, the literature has relied more heavily on 
descriptive analysis. Most of the micro-level analyses are of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, focus on 
household livelihoods and socio-economic status, and are largely descriptive in nature (see 
Chapoto and Jayne, 2008; Nabyonga-Orem, Bezayo, Okema, Karamagi, and Walker, 2008). 
This essay takes the micro-level research a step further by using both household survey and 
scientific/medical data on confirmed and suspected cases of Ebola at the chiefdom level. The 
variation in cases across chiefdoms provides an empirical basis for the separation of households 
between treated and control groups in order to evaluate the socio-economic impact of the 
disease. These rich scientific/medical data provide insights on the different patterns of the 
Ebola outbreak within and across chiefdoms. 
 
Third, the literature on the impact of the West African Ebola outbreak on households is limited, 
with only descriptive analysis generally available. The literature provides discussion of country 
susceptibility to the Ebola virus, with most research emphasising the impact on poverty and 
the increased food insecurity that emerges with the spread of the disease (Fallah, Skip, Gertler, 
Yasmin, and Galvani, 2015; Troncoso, 2015; Thomas, Nkumzimana, Hoyos, and Kayitakire, 




and Sierra Leone in particular. Prior to the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone was in the process of 
recovering from a civil war that had ravaged the country for 10 years (1992-2002). Economic 
growth was gradually improving, with a steady reduction in poverty in the five years 
immediately prior to the Ebola outbreak (World Bank, 2015). Hence, its effect on household 
welfare is potentially significant and worth exploring, as the country struggled to develop. 
Therefore, this chapter adds to a small body of literature on the micro-level evidence for the 
epidemic’s impact on an African economy.  
 
Health shocks’ impacts on economic and social indicators and their effects can be exacerbated 
or controlled through curtailment policies imposed by governments. The global policy response 
to the recent and ongoing Covid-19 pandemic is actually comparable to that used in Sierra 
Leone to tackle the Ebola virus. A heavily enforced restrictive response was used to contain 
the spread of the disease, with adverse social and economic consequences. Hence, this research 
provides insights on the effects of strict curtailment measures on socio-economic indicators 
that may have broader contemporary relevance beyond Sierra Leone.  
  
In summary, the objective of this chapter’s research is to evaluate the impact of the Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone on household poverty (measured both objectively and subjectively), 
food insecurity, and household expenditure and its distribution. The approach uses two 
measures of Ebola (confirmed cases and quarantined chiefdoms) to explore the consequences 
of the disease on selected household welfare indicators and the policy responses to it. The 
motivation for this is to evaluate whether any impacts observed were directly driven by the 
prevalence of Ebola cases within a chiefdom or more indirectly through the quarantine policies 





The empirical methodology employs a variety of different techniques to interrogate the key 
research questions outlined above. These include using probit regression models to evaluate 
the effect of Ebola on both overall poverty and food poverty in terms of the objective data 
available as well as using subjective responses from households. In addition, the analysis also 
uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to examine the impact of the disease on mean household 
expenditure. Furthermore, the research uses the propensity score matching technique in an 
attempt to causally identify the average treatment effect of Ebola on the selected array of 
household welfare indicators. The impact of the virus on the distribution of household 
expenditure is also explored using the Recentred Influence Function (RIF), which is employed 
both to develop a regression-based Gini household empirical methodology and to estimate 
selected unconditional quantile regression models at selected quantiles of the household 
expenditure distribution.  
 
It is hoped that the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter provides an understanding of 
Ebola’s impact on household welfare. The empirical analysis reveals that the two measures 
used to capture the effect of the Ebola disease both exert negative impacts on household 
expenditure. The effect was found to be largest and most significant for those households at 
the top end of the expenditure distribution. In addition, both objective and subjective household 
poverty increased significantly as a result of the disease for those households in either Ebola-
affected or quarantined (i.e., locked-down) areas. Specifically, the number of households below 
the food poverty line increased sharply in chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases and in 
quarantined chiefdoms. The findings comport with the micro-level evidence on epidemics’ 
impacts on household welfare (Chapoto and Jayne, 2008; Nabyonga-Orem et al., 2008). The 
disease was also found to have a negative effect on a subjective welfare comparison of 




significant impact of Ebola on household subjective food insecurity. Finally, as with the effect 
of conflict in the last chapter, inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was found to 
reduce in the immediate aftermath of the Ebola outbreak. This finding is found to be in close 
accordance with Walter Scheidel’s historical findings on conflicts, epidemics, and pandemics 
as levellers of economic inequality (Scheidel, 2017).  
 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows: the next two sections outline the contextual 
framework of the Ebola outbreak and the relevant literature detailing the economic impact of 
diseases. Two subsequent sections focus on the econometric methodology and the empirical 
results. The final section provides some conclusions and policy implications associated with 
the empirical findings.  
 
4.2 The Sierra Leone Ebola Outbreak and Economic Background 
 
The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was first discovered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) in 1976. There have been over 20 significant outbreaks of the virus in other parts of 
Africa since. However, the outbreak in West Africa between 2013-2016 was the worst in the 
short history of the virus. Its severity and traits were different from those experienced in the 
past. The outbreak was termed an epidemic by the WHO on the 23 March 2014, and ultimately 
claimed about 11,316 lives. The West Africa outbreak was associated with animal-to-human 
(i.e., zoonotic) transmission in the district of Gueckedou in Guinea. This district borders Sierra 
Leone to the east. The spread mostly affected Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Nigeria and 
a small number of other African countries also experienced sporadic outbreaks of the disease 
for relatively short periods. The United States of America was also exposed to the virus during 
a later period in 2015 with the return of international medics originally assigned to West Africa 





The virus inhabits animal species and is believed to be originally found in bats (as with many 
viruses). Transmission occurs through contact with contaminated fluids from animals, humans, 
or inanimate objects. The symptoms include high fever, severe muscle pain, diarrhoea, and 
vomiting. Additional symptoms include external and internal haemorrhaging, mostly through 
the eyes and mouth. The virus has a potential incubation period of 21 days and once 
symptomatic, death can occur within one to two weeks. The case fatality rate ranges from 25% 
to 90% conditional on the stage of the virus, the age and health status of the patient, and the 
treatment received. This renders it more lethal than Covid-19, for instance. The West Africa 
Ebola outbreak presented a more dynamic form of the virus. The period between virus onset 
and symptom manifestation was on average 8-12 days, with related deaths 4-5 days after 
symptoms appeared (Kerkhove et al., 2015), again considerably more rapid than Covid-19. The 
virus can only be scientifically detected after symptoms appear and the infectiousness is high 
at the later stages of the virus. In particular, it is known to be highly contagious in dead bodies. 
Recovery from the virus gives immunity against it, but potential health issues like loss of sight, 
joint pain, and other ailments can persist over time. Social stigma and the inability to embark 
on certain livelihood tasks can impair post-Ebola virus recovery for an individual within West 
African culture. During the outbreak there was no vaccine, and the lack of understanding of 
the evolution of the virus provided an additional challenge to preventing its spread. Hence, 
governments were left with no option than to resort to strong anti-contagion measures like 
military quarantine, isolation of patients, contact tracing techniques, protective behavioural 
patterns, and controlled burials (see Fast et al., 2015; Richards et al., 2015). Some of these 
conventional approaches have also been seen in the curtailment of the Covid-19 pandemic that 





Sierra Leone was one of the countries hit hardest by Ebola in the region due to its close ties to 
Liberia and Guinea, were the virus originated. The virus was first detected and confirmed in 
Sierra Leone on the 25 May 2014. This first case was associated with a traditional healer who 
cared for a victim from Guinea in Sokoma village in the eastern Province. The spread of the 
disease swept through the eastern part of the country bordering Guinea, which was the epicentre 
of the virus. Contagion occurred mostly in the provincial areas but finally reached the outskirts 
of the capital city in July 2014. Community denial and a traditional belief system centred 
around close care for the dead led to rampant infection in provincial areas. The rate of infection 
escalated within the densely populated capital, warranting an emergency response from the 
government. The country’s health system was exposed as weak and unable to manage or cope 
with the spread of the virus. In response to the virus, the Sierra Leone government and local 
authorities introduced strategies restricting movement, banning public gatherings, instituting 
curfews, and forbidding Sunday markets. However, virus transmission was not curtailed, and 
the government resorted to a set of much stronger restrictive measures. A military quarantine 
was enacted on 6 August 2014 in districts that were severely affected by the virus outbreak. 
This was also complemented by military checkpoints to control movement across borders. The 
whole of Kailahun and Kenema administrative districts were the first areas in the east that were 
subject to quarantine as they recorded the most Ebola cases. The lockdown was initially 
imposed for a 21-day period and then extended indefinitely when cases were found not to be 
abating. This quarantine measure was extended further to Moyamba in the east and Bombali 
and Port Loko in the north. The quarantine measures lasted no less than 21 days and stretched 
over 3 to 4 months in some districts, especially in the east. The northern part of Sierra Leone 
was the last to be exposed to the virus. Tonkolili district in the north was the final district 
subjected to military quarantine but recovered quickly as local leaders ensured adherence to 




about one-third of the population. The government of Sierra Leone enforced a national three-
day lockdown from 19 to 21 September 2014 to help with contact tracing and rapid door-to-
door sensitisation. A team of 28,500 community workers and volunteers promoted infection 
control and encouraged households to send victims to testing centres. In early October 2014, 
the United Nations Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER) strategised a 
campaign to isolate all reported cases of EVD through active case finding and contact tracing. 
They also promoted safe and dignified burial for those whose deaths were Ebola-related.  
 
The government in conjunction with international organisations facilitated the construction of 
health testing and treatment centres. Diagnostic laboratories were built, and community 
engagement and social mobilisation were promoted to help track transmission and supress the 
infection rate. There was no vaccine or therapeutic medication for treating Ebola and this non-
availability characterised the outbreak. A vaccine was not actually developed until late 2016, 
when it was successfully trialled in Guinea. The first vaccine for Ebola was eventually 
approved in 2019 by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Ebola virus 
gradually levelled out in Sierra Leone a year and a half after its first occurrence there. The 
country survived the outbreak through suppression of its spread by movement restriction and 
the use of isolation centres. As discussed by Richards (2014) the transformation or evolution 
of traditional activities by Sierra Leonians through education mitigated the virus spread and 
eventually helped end the West Africa Ebola epidemic. For example, limited social interactions 
and cultural belief sensitisation on safe burial and the washing of dead bodies helped control 
the virus. Thus, community social responsibility and cohesion provided the pathway to 
overcoming the disease. On 7 November 2015, the WHO declared no new transmissions in 
Sierra Leone. The virus had been defeated, but Sierra Leone confirmed the number of EVD 





EVD exhibited variation in its spread across Sierra Leone. The transmission dynamic was 
researched and documented by Fang et al. (2016). They used a weighted-average linkage 
clustering method to divide chiefdoms into six different patterns (see Figure A4.1 for a heat 
map of Ebola by chiefdom). The first three patterns included chiefdoms that experienced 
sporadic outbreaks of the epidemic, chiefdoms that experienced several cases that lasted for 2-
3 weeks, and chiefdoms with cases of small-scale outbreaks over a shorter period. The other 
three patterns included chiefdoms recording multiple or continuous outbreaks over short, 
medium, and longer periods, respectively. The within-chiefdom transmission rate was high 
compared to importation from neighbouring chiefdoms. Transmission mainly occurred through 
person-to-person contact.  
 
The Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone led to substantial changes in community behaviour. The 
national and local authorities enforced safe burial and isolation of affected cases. This hindered 
the popular ‘washing of dead bodies’ as a last sign of respect among the majority of ethnic 
groups in Sierra Leone. Densely populated chiefdoms saw higher-intensity Ebola outbreaks. 
High-cropland chiefdoms exhibited high transmission rates and large numbers of confirmed 
cases, which affected agricultural activities (Richards, 2016; Coltart et al., 2017). This mainly 
applied to eastern and southern chiefdoms involved in cash crop planting. The non-gathering 
of large crowds disrupted the periodic markets, known as ‘Lumas’, regularly held in most 
chiefdoms. The food security of these chiefdoms became an important policy issue as most 
households in the rural areas of Sierra Leone were involved in subsistence farming. The few 
that operated on a commercial basis depended on daily sales for meeting their food needs. The 
Ebola outbreak had both short-term and long-term impacts on household poverty and food 




to mitigate the negative economic shocks that can accompany such epidemics in the future, 
particularly at the household level.  
 
Before the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone was on the verge of recovering from the negative 
economic impacts of the country’s armed conflict. The country was on a trajectory to attain 
middle-income development status by 2035 (World Bank, 2019). From 2009, GDP was 
steadily increasing and then exhibited a sharp decline after the Ebola outbreak in 2014. Figure 
4.1 below depicts the annual percentage growth rate of Sierra Leone’s GDP between 2012 and 
2019. Prior to the Ebola outbreak, the annual percentage increase in GDP was 20.7 percent in 
2013. The GDP growth rate started declining after the Ebola outbreak in 2014. The growth rate 
stood at 4.6 percent in 2014 and the economy was in recession in 2015 with a negative growth 
rate of 20.5 percent. The economy experienced a recovery in 2016 with an annual growth rate 
of 6 percent, slowing down to 3.8 percent and 3.5 percent in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The 
decline persisted for two years, with a slower pace of recovery compared to the pre-Ebola trend 
















Figure 4.1: Sierra Leone Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Annual Growth Rate in Percentages (2008-
2019) 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
The GDP trend after the epidemic depicts a V-shaped recovery from the negative growth rate 
but not a return to the pre-Ebola trend. The plot anticipates sluggish economic recovery with 
relatively low growth rates to 2019. It should be noted that in addition to EVD, in 2015, the 
economy also experienced an additional economic shock through the sharp decline in iron ore 
prices leading to the closure of a number of mining companies.11 Nevertheless, the economic 
output lost during the Ebola outbreak is estimated to have amounted to about $75 million, with 
significant disruption to the agricultural sector. Over 50% of private sector employment was 
directly affected by either EVD or the curtailment policies, and the manufacturing sector 
incurred a 60% loss in employment (see Government of Sierra Leone, National Road to Ebola 
Recovery report, 2015). Overall, although other minor economic shocks also characterised this 
 
11 The two largest mining companies, Africa Minerals and London Mining, closed their operations in March and 
October in 2015, respectively. The mining industry accounted for 30% of Sierra Leone’s GDP in 2012. Hence a 
deep fall in iron prices, the major contributor, caused a negative shock in the economy. Tonkolili district was the 
home of these two giant mining companies. The downward spiral of world prices of iron and the Ebola crisis 
presented a perfect storm for the mining industry (see https://www.metalbulletin.com for a detailed synopsis of 
the iron mining crisis in Sierra Leone). Marampa and Biriwa chiefdoms in the northern districts contained mining 




period, the impact of EVD was to reduce economic activity and macroeconomic growth and 
plunge Sierra Leone into another economic crisis. The magnitude of the effects of the 
contraction due to EVD are subject to debate but are likely to be sizeable compared to, for 
example, the impact of the closure of iron ore mines. It is intended that the research in this 
chapter will provide some empirical insights on the potential magnitude of these effects.  
 
It is not subject to debate that the country’s socio-economic indicators exhibited a sharp 
contraction after the first phase of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. According to the report 
from the 2015 Ebola High Frequency Cell Phone Survey, conducted by Statistics Sierra Leone 
in collaboration with the World Bank, employment, food security, and education were 
significantly affected.12 Statistics Sierra Leone conducted three rounds of the survey, in 
November 2014, January-February 2015, and May 2015. The responses suggested that a 
reduction in agricultural activities and business closures due to curtailment procedures were 
largely responsible for the downturn. By the end of the second phase after the lockdown, there 
was evidence of recovery in the agricultural sector and greater access to social services (e.g., 
health facilities). However, the employment rate was low as most businesses were still 
struggling to run effectively given the restrictions on their commercial activity. The survey also 
highlighted coping strategies used by households as the primary mitigating factors off-setting 
the negative impact of the Ebola virus on food security. The coping strategies became less 
significant as the government became more effective in mobilising food transfers and other 
support for affected households and regions. Urban employment and improvements in 
agricultural harvests reduced the adverse impacts on food security (Statistics Sierra Leone, 
 
12 The Ebola High Frequency Cell Phone Survey was conducted for a sample of households drawn from the 2014 
Labour Force Survey. The survey was conducted on the phone with heads of households on the socio-economic 
indicators during the Ebola crisis in three different rounds. In total, 1,780 households responded to at least one of 





2015). Although it is acknowledged that the closure of mines exerted some effect on economic 
activity over this period, the overall adverse effects appear to be related to the Ebola virus and 
the policy responses introduced to mitigate its effects.  
 
4.3 Literature Review 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the impact of the 2014 EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone on 
the country’s poverty status and an array of other welfare indicators. Development monitoring 
and policy interventions have focused heavily on the reduction of poverty, as measured by 
household income or consumption. These policies were central to the structural adjustment 
programmes initiated in the 1980s and in the attempts to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals in more recent decades. As noted in the first essay, poverty measures are based on 
household monetary metrics, which are usually benchmarked against a pre-determined 
monetary value defined as the poverty line. This is derived from household expenditure or 
income and yields an absolute poverty line that demarcates the poor as those below the poverty 
line (Ravallion, 2012). This measure was used in the previous two essays of this thesis and is 
used again here. 
 
Understanding poverty and how to alleviate it is a key policy concern for any country facing a 
public health shock. Therefore, it is important to use a variety of different metrics of household 
welfare to investigate the impact of the disease. To this end, researchers distinguish between 
the concept of subjective and objective poverty, where the latter is determined directly by a 
household’s income or expenditure as above. However, an understanding of both is relevant 
for cross-referencing and for understanding the dynamic pathways of poverty. This research 
will borrow from both strands to assess the impact of Ebola in Sierra Leone on poverty in terms 





The impact of Ebola on poverty has been investigated mostly using descriptive statistics rather 
than econometric analysis. The former type of analysis has placed the disease among the group 
of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs). Troncoso (2015) describes the outcome of NTDs on 
poor countries as a further potential channel into poverty and greater inequality. This effect is 
ossified through the already poor health facilities and the low availability and usage of 
pharmaceutical treatment interventions. In addition, the development of vaccines for such 
diseases in poorer countries is limited given their prohibitive research costs.  
 
The socio-economic status of a community or a country was a major factor in the transmission 
of Ebola in West Africa. An investigation into the transmission and spread of the epidemic 
showed higher intensity for those regions, counties, or communities that were disadvantaged 
and characterised by higher levels of poverty. Fallah et al. (2015) categorised 300 communities 
in Montserrado County, Liberia according to their socio-economic status (SES) to evaluate 
their susceptibility to Ebola. The authors used data on 4,437 Ebola cases in a time-dependent 
stochastic model framework. The base data were used to evaluate contact tracing in detecting 
new cases. The authors found that low-SES communities reported three more contacts on 
average per person, which is double the number compared to the average-SES communities. 
The effect increased to 3.5 times when compared to those in high-SES communities. This 
provides an indication of the greater vulnerability to Ebola transmission of those locations with 
already-high levels of poverty and privation. In other words, as with Covid-19, poorer socio-
economic groups also appear more vulnerable to EVD.  
 
In the context of Sierra Leone, M’bayo (2018) discussed an array of historical indicators 
establishing a link between the epidemic, poverty, and socio-economic inequality. Extracting 




since the colonial period, news, and reports of health parastatals, the author proposed a number 
of mechanisms through which the Ebola outbreak sheds light on the underdevelopment of the 
country. The author suggested political mismanagement, nepotism, inequality of access to 
public amenities, and lack of public trust as the main drivers that reinforced the spread of EVD 
in Sierra Leone.  
 
The impact of disease or virus outbreak on household food security is also relevant to policy 
formulation and implementation. A descriptive analysis of the West Africa Ebola epidemic on 
food security suggests an adverse effect for households directly impacted by the virus (i.e., 
through death or surviving Ebola-infected victims) and impacted through direct government 
quarantine policies. Reducing household income through restrictions on movement and trade 
can directly affect food security, as accessibility is often limited. The informal sector and 
agricultural households are likely to experience a disproportionate change in their incomes. 
Border closures suppress the income inflow for households dealing in cash crop production 
(see Thomas et al., 2014). 
 
Epidemic outbreaks generate significant economic shocks that can lead to substantial changes 
in the development process. Diseases have repercussions for economic growth in African 
countries. The HIV and AIDS diseases identified in the early 1980s resulted in an estimated 32 
million deaths world-wide as of 2018, rendering it a pandemic that ravaged all continents. 
Dixon, McDonald and Roberts (2002) evaluated the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS on 
African development. Their findings confirmed a negative effect on Africa’s growth, with an 
estimated 2% to 4% reduction in average national economic growth rates. The contraction is 
due to two economic costs: first, the direct cost of lost labour and productivity, and second, the 




and social stereotypes made it challenging to overcome its negative effects in many African 
countries.  
 
Weil (2013) evaluated the impact of diseases like Malaria and AIDS on African economic 
growth. The author researched existing literature and provided a practical explanation for the 
policy challenges in Africa. The findings support the negative impact of disease on economic 
growth through the direct and indirect channels highlighted in the work of Dixon et al. (2012). 
Importantly, diseases that affect working-age people can lead to low labour productivity and 
an accompanying decline in income generation. Haacker (2008) evaluated the socio-economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa and reported a negative impact on per capita income 
through a decline in productivity, human capital accumulation, and work experience.  
 
The literature on the impact of epidemics and pandemics on socio-economic outcomes is 
limited at the micro-level. Nabyonga-Orem et al. (2008) conducted a descriptive quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS on household poverty status, informing 
poverty reduction strategies for Uganda. The study provides summary statistics on household 
income and other socio-demographic profiles from a cross-sectional household survey of 1,239 
households, of which 602 were directly affected by HIV/AIDS. The findings revealed a 
reduction in household income for those affected by HIV/AIDS. At the micro-level, Chapoto 
and Jayne (2008) provided empirical analysis on the impact of HIV/AIDS-related prime-age 
deaths on household livelihoods in Zambia. Using a difference-in-difference estimation 
method, the results revealed a severe impact on the livelihoods of poorer households.  
 
The economic impact of epidemics like the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 




agricultural and rural employment activities. The Chinese economy, the largest one affected 
by the SARS virus, experienced a loss of 0.5% GDP as a consequence of the disease. It has 
been argued that the impact of SARS was amplified by economic status, weak infrastructure, 
and poor public health systems (Hanna and Haung, 2004). Brahmbhatt (2008) argued that the 
economic disruption from the SARS epidemic was linked more to panic and misinformation 
rather than the rate of infection or case fatality. Lee and McKibbin (2004) evaluated the 
mechanisms through which SARS influenced the global economy. The highlighted 
mechanisms included a reduction in consumer demand as a result of restricted social 
interactions. The second channel was uncertainty regarding the future economic outlook of the 
affected countries. The last channel emphasised the cost of preventing the spread of the disease 
on selected industries and economic sectors like retail, travel, and services.  
 
An interesting piece of analysis on the impact of pandemics on socio-economic indicators is 
also provided in the work of Scheidel (2017), which was discussed in the previous chapter. The 
author recounted the ravaging diseases that emerged during the 17th to 19th centuries across 
Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East. The author also extended the focus to Africa. 
Irrespective of the direct impact of such diseases on human lives, the study examines their 
broader impacts on socio-economic indicators. The study analysed diseases, like chickenpox, 
smallpox, malaria, measles, influenza, and the black death, in an attempt to evaluate their 
social, economic, and political effects. The author documented systematic historical evidence 
confirming sharp contractions in resources and inequality that ultimately emerged after various 
historical pandemic episodes.  
 
The EVD curtailment measures adopted in Sierra Leone find resonance in the fight against the 




fight against this deadly virus. The IMF have estimated that economic growth for emerging 
and developing economies will see a contraction of 1% in GDP (International Monetary Fund, 
2020). Ongoing research has predicted a decrease in household income, especially in rural 
areas and those engaged in agricultural activity. Food insecurity will increase as a result of 
market distortions and transportation challenges. The economic downturn will be aggravated 
by curtailment policies based on movement restrictions and lockdowns (Wiggins et al., 2020). 
An evaluation of household income and food security in two East African countries (Kenya 
and Uganda) revealed that two-thirds of respondents reported a shock to their income as a result 
of Covid-19. Empirical analysis, undertaken using probit regression analysis, indicated a harder 
Covid-19 hit for poorer households more dependent on labour-intensive income activities. 
However, agricultural households incurred a smaller impact on their food security (Kansime et 
al., 2020).  
 
The empirically well-established negative impacts of diseases and viruses at the macro level 
cannot provide a complete portrait for informing policies in combating the impact of diseases 
at the micro-economic level. Macro-economic growth indicators like GDP have limited use in 
shaping policies to mitigate the negative impact on households or individuals directly affected. 
Hence, a micro-level analysis of the impact of diseases on household welfare indicators (like 
poverty and inequality) can provide a better understanding to inform policy formulation and 
implementation. Thus, the current research evaluates the direct and indirect costs of a disease 
outbreak on household welfare. This research seeks to provide an empirical analysis of the 
EVD’s impact on household welfare and its distribution in Sierra Leone. It also evaluates the 
household food security consequences of the virus outbreak. Overall, it adds to a literature on 





4.4 Data and Variable Description  
 
An empirical assessment of the impact of the Sierra Leone EVD outbreak on household poverty 
is undertaken using the 2018 Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey (SLIHS) and data on 
Ebola cases per chiefdom compiled by Fang et al. (2016). This second dataset provides 
information on the number of confirmed and suspected cases for each chiefdom in Sierra 
Leone. The clinical data comprise a comprehensive dataset of EVD testing records for persons 
under investigation (PUIs) as reported by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation in Sierra Leone. 
A total of 8,358 confirmed cases were generated from the EVD testing records and mapped out 
to chiefdom level. The dates of the reports range from May 2014 to September 2015. The total 
number of chiefdoms with confirmed cases was 114 out of a total of 150 chiefdoms. The 
clinical data are presented with other individual characteristics by Fang et al. (2016) and are 
accessible from their website.13 The data used here are based both on their research on the 
transmission dynamic of EVD and on the government intervention measures used in Sierra 
Leone to control the virus spread.  
 
The 2018 SLIHS was conducted approximately two years after the end of the Ebola epidemic 
in Sierra Leone. The survey provides informative data on post-Ebola socio-economic 
household-level characteristics. This survey was conducted by Sierra Leone Statistics in 
conjunction with the World Bank, adhering to the standards of the World Bank’s Living 
Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) and the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES). It represents the third round of data collection in this series, with the first completed 
in 2003. The survey updated geographical references based on the 2015 Sierra Leone 
Population Census. The data collection was undertaken representatively across all chiefdoms 
 
13 See their website www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1518587113 for details of the data and a complete 




and regions of the country. Sample stratification was by district and incorporated new district 
divisions. In 2017, a new district demarcation created a total of 14 districts, where previously 
there had just been 12. A total of 6,840 households were surveyed in the 2018 SLIHS.  
 
The 2018 SLIHS is the most recent national survey conducted in Sierra Leone after the Ebola 
outbreak and is thus well suited to provide the basis for investigating the research questions in 
this chapter. The survey contains information on household aggregated consumption 
expenditures for food and non-food items. It provides other household characteristics relevant 
for assessing household welfare after the Ebola outbreak. In the context of this research, we 
use household consumption expenditure to construct poverty-related indicators and to provide 
a measure of overall household welfare. We follow the methodology proposed and defined by 
the World Bank and Statistics Sierra Leone in constructing both total and food poverty lines 
(see Statistics Sierra Leone/World Bank, 2019). Table 4.1 below describes the key outcome 
and treatment variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
The aim of this research is to empirically estimate the impact of the Sierra Leone Ebola 
outbreak on household poverty status, food security, and inequality. In so doing, we distinguish 
the impact of the virus on both objective and subjective measures of household poverty and on 
whether food needs are satisfied. The objective poverty measures are based on a monetary 
measure with household consumption providing the expenditure metric. The subjective poverty 








Table 4.1: Description of Dependent and Treatment Variables 
 Variables Description 
Household Welfare Household Total 
Expenditure 
A continuous variable measuring the total household 
expenditure in thousands of Leones (local currency) on 
an annual basis. 
 Household Food 
Expenditure  
A continuous variable measuring the total household 
food expenditure in thousands of Leones (local 
currency) on an annual basis. 
Objective Poverty Poor A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if household 
expenditure per capita is below the national poverty 
line, and 0 otherwise. 
Food A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if household 
food expenditure per capita is below the national food 
poverty line, and 0 otherwise. 
Subjective Poverty Poor A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a household 
reports being poor relative to other households in their 
neighbourhood, and 0 otherwise. 
Food Insecurity A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a household 
reports difficulty (sometimes and always) in satisfying 
food demand in the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise. 
Treatment Ebola A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a chiefdom 
had confirmed Ebola cases, and 0 otherwise.  
Quarantine A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a chiefdom 
was subjected to the government quarantine, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The log of household per capita expenditure is constructed by aggregating household food and 
non-food consumption expenditures per adult equivalent. We then use the household 
expenditure together with the estimated poverty lines in the local currency to assess households 
as either being below or above these lines.14 A dummy variable is created for both absolute 
poverty and food poverty using the relevant poverty lines as benchmarks. Absolute poverty 
takes the value 1 if household per capita expenditure is below or equals the poverty line and 0 
if not. Food poverty is also a 0/1 outcome variable which takes the value 1 for households with 
per capita food expenditure below or at the computed food poverty line and 0 otherwise. In 
addition to the above welfare indicators, an inequality measure is calculated based on the actual 
household expenditure using the concept of the Gini coefficient. How this is undertaken is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 




In order to complement the analysis using these objective welfare measures, we also look at 
the impact of the Ebola outbreak on subjective measures of household poverty. As discussed 
by Ravallion (2012), subjective measures are less susceptible to measurement bias because 
they are non-monetary metrics; there is less hesitation to subjectively rank one’s livelihood 
status than to provide information on one’s actual income or expenditure levels. The survey 
includes information on how households assess their socio-economic status relative to their 
neighbours’ standard of living. This relative self-assessed poverty question allows households 
to rank themselves as ‘poor’, ‘average’, or ‘rich’ as compared to other households in their 
neighbourhood. In a similar spirit, households were also asked about any difficulties 
encountered in the past 12 months in meeting their food needs. The response categories were 
‘never’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘always’. The analysis using this framework exploits responses 
across these categories to define whether households were exhibiting elements of food 
insecurity. Given the 12-month recall time, the answer ‘always’ is necessary but not sufficient 
to capture difficulty in meeting food needs. It is acknowledged that recall can bring about some 
bias in subjective poverty research. Hence, if a household can recall that sometimes in the 
previous 12 months they have experienced some lack of food needs satisfied, then they are 
considered food poor.  
 
The 2018 SLIHS stratification is at the chiefdom level, which is the second smallest 
geographical division in Sierra Leone. This information is combined with scientific and clinical 
appraisal data on Ebola cases (both confirmed and suspected) at the chiefdom level (see Fang 
et al., 2016). The Ebola epidemic also prompted government curtailment policies like 
quarantines and restrictions on movement. The chiefdoms with high levels of Ebola cases and 
high contagion rates were quarantined. All regions in Sierra Leone experienced incidents of 




Coltart et al. (2017), the regions quarantined were characterised by poor control and 
management of the Ebola Control Centres and were thus overwhelmed with Ebola patients. 
The increasing cases necessitated the use of general medical wards, and with poor control, the 
infection rate spread as non-Ebola patients contracted the virus. They further established that 
the virus transmission was largely uncontrolled on long commuter roads, with small chains 
connecting networks of small villages. In September 2014, Freetown experienced sustained 
transmission from the eastern regions, and the high population density led to high infection 
rates. The health workers in Sierra Leone also went on strike due to poor working conditions, 
lack of payment, and the high fatality rate among front-line health workers. In partnership with 
international organisations, like Save the Children and the UK military, the Government of 
Sierra Leone opened Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs) in urban areas to mitigate the 
transmission from Ebola patients transported to ETCs in the eastern regions. High-risk districts 
with fewer health workers and poor ETC facilities were subjected to lockdown, but not the 
more urban areas and the capital city. Nevertheless, the quarantine measures deterred 
movement from Ebola ‘hot-spots’ to non-Ebola-affected areas. 
 
In order to capture the distinct nature of these two types of restriction, two separate Ebola 
treatment variables are constructed. The first is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
household was in a chiefdom that recorded confirmed cases of Ebola and 0 otherwise. The 
second is also a dummy variable assigned the value 1 if a household was in a chiefdom that 
was under government (or military) quarantine and 0 otherwise15. The aim of using the two 
separate approaches is to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of Ebola. Direct 
effects are those associated with the presence of Ebola cases, while indirect effects are those 
 
15 The duration of the government quarantine measure ranged from 3 weeks to a maximum of 4 months in some 
districts, especially Kenema in the east. However, the government enforced the same restriction for all quarantined 
chiefdoms. The average quarantine period per affected chiefdom was about 3 months. This helped stabilise the 




from policies restricting economic and non-economic movement as a result of the Ebola 
epidemic in Sierra Leone. This research aims to analyse whether the epidemic’s effects on 
household welfare indicators were driven by the curtailment policies or more directly through 
the Ebola infections themselves. 
 
The household survey contains relevant household characteristics that inform on the 
demographic profile of households. The age of the head of household and their education, 
employment, marital status, ethnic status, and religious affiliation comprise some of the 
information used in this analysis. A number of asset indicators are also constructed from the 
data (see below). In addition, household size, dependency ratio, settlement type, and location 
are also variables used that inform on general household wellbeing.  
 
This chapter also used the 2011 SLIHS to provide comparable estimated effects for the selected 
welfare indicators pre-Ebola. This is the only available household survey that pre-dates the 
Ebola outbreak for Sierra Leone. It provides a description of the household welfare indicators 
before the Ebola outbreak and potentially allows for more confidence in the causal 












4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The distribution of household expenditure across the Ebola-affected and non-Ebola-affected 
chiefdoms for both total and food household expenditures are presented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively. In Figure 4.2, the log of total per capita expenditure has a greater distribution of 
households to the left of the poverty line for chiefdoms with Ebola cases as compared to those 
where Ebola cases were absent.  
 




The area under the solid line (Ebola) is greater than the area under the dotted line (Non-Ebola), 
indicating that there were more Ebola than Non-Ebola households in poverty. The food 
expenditure distributions for Ebola and Non-Ebola households are broadly similar to those 
depicted in Figure 4.2 (see Figure 4.3). However, the food expenditure difference across areas 
is slightly less pronounced than that for total expenditure. Overall, however, both figures reveal 
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Figure 4.3: Log of per Capita Household Food Expenditure by Ebola Status in 2018 
 
 
Districts that were severely affected by Ebola cases and contagion, and thus subject to 
government quarantine measures, also exhibit a sharp difference compared to the non-
quarantine districts. This is depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 for total and food expenditures, 
respectively (with the poverty line also imposed). In Figure 4.4, the area under the solid line to 
the left of the poverty line is larger than that under the dotted line. The total household 
expenditure distribution is different between quarantine and non-quarantine households. 
Similar distributions are evident in Figure 4.5 regarding the household food expenditure metric. 
The pattern for both total and food expenditure with respect to government quarantine 
measures reveals a sizeable change in household expenditures for both affected areas. This 
again suggests a negative correlation between the quarantine policy and household welfare. 
There are more households falling into poverty post-Ebola in those areas that were subject to 
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Figure 4.5: Log of per Capita Food Expenditure by Quarantine Status 
 
 
Our attention now turns to Table 4.2, which provides summary statistics of household objective 
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poverty stood at 57% and 54% respectively two years after Sierra Leone was declared Ebola-
free. There was a 21 percentage-point difference in total and food poverty rates between 
households in chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases and those in unaffected chiefdoms.  
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Household Poverty by Ebola and Quarantine Status (2018) 
  Ebola  
 
Quarantine 







Objective Poverty        
Poor 0.5679*** 0.6751*** 0.4624*** 0.2127*** 0.7087*** 0.4576*** 0.2511*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0118) (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0118) 
Food 0.5352*** 0.6447*** 0.4274*** 0.2173*** 0.6905*** 0.4135*** 0.2770*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0118) (0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0118) 
Subjective Poverty        
Poor 0.5301*** 0.6480*** 0.4142*** 0.2337*** 0.6220*** 0.4581*** 0.1639*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0118) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0121) 
        
Food Insecurity 0.5445*** 0.5568*** 0.5323*** 0.0245*** 0.5624*** 0.5305*** 0.0319 
 (0.0061) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0212) 
Samples 6738 3339 3399  2956 3782  
Note: standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The findings for the objective food poverty measure comport with the total expenditure poverty 
measure for Ebola status. This narrative is broadly similar for the national quarantine policy 
status but suggests a wider differential of between 25 and 27 percentage points for total and 
food poverty, respectively. In terms of subjective measures of poverty and food insecurity, 
more households assessed themselves as poor relative to their neighbours for both the Ebola 
and quarantine status treatments. The proportion of households falling into poverty is higher in 
areas affected by Ebola, due to both the cases themselves and the quarantine status. This is true 
both for objective poverty and for households’ self-assessments of their economic status 
relative to their neighbours as well as in meeting their daily food needs. In comparison to the 




reported higher food insecurity levels. The pre-Ebola differences are depicted in Table 4.3 
below.  
Table 4.3: Pre-Ebola Statistical Differences in Objective and Subjective Poverty (2011) 
 EBOLA QUARANTINE 
Variable Ebola Non-Ebola Differential Quarantine 
Non- 
Quarantine Differential 
Objective Poverty       
Total Poverty 0.6561*** 0.4375*** 0.2186*** 0.6916*** 0.4747*** 0.2168*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0100) (0.0122) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0118) 
Food Poverty 0.4241*** 0.3398*** 0.0842*** 0.4541*** 
 
0.3399*** 0.1142*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0096) (0.0123) (0.0089) 
 
(0.0079)    (0.1191) 
Subjective poverty     
 
 
Poor 0.6152*** 0.5319*** 0.0833*** 0.5800*** 0.5885*** -0.0085 
 (0.0074) (0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0121) 
 
Food Insecurity 0.7245*** 0.6532*** 0.0712*** 0.7422*** 
 
0.6603*** 0.0822*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0096) (0.0116) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0112) 
Samples 4177 2507  3100 3568  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition, as depicted in Figure 4.6, the distribution of household expenditure shows more 
households with low expenditure in the quarantined chiefdoms. The proportion of quarantined 
households below the poverty line is greater than that of non-quarantined households. Our 
preferred estimates centre on the national government quarantine measures. The curtailment 
measure acted as a strong impediment to the virus’s spread but also impacted economic and 
social mobility. It is also worth noting that the pre-Ebola quarantined chiefdoms also appear to 
have had a disadvantageous socio-economic position prior to the spread of the Ebola virus. 
 
The same is confirmed for chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases. The pre-Ebola quarantined 
chiefdoms had no significant difference in inequality on the basis of the total and food 
expenditure Gini coefficients. The pre-Ebola (both total and food) levels suggest a negative 
gap between the quarantine and non-quarantined chiefdoms (see Table A4.3 in the appendix). 
Thus, the pre-Ebola differences in objective poverty indicate historical rather than Ebola-




among the poorest regions in the country and had a history of disease susceptibility. They were 
rural areas whose populations possessed strong traditional beliefs and engaged in indigenous 
social practices. These populations shared strong beliefs regarding caring for the sick and 
washing dead bodies, as well as a preference for traditional medicine. Paul (2016) explained 
how culture and social norms helped the spread of Ebola in rural areas. Nevertheless, there was 
no evidence of a difference in subjective poverty rates by quarantine status pre-Ebola (see 
Table 4.3).  
 




Table 4.4 below reveals that the virus and the quarantine policies exhibit a heterogeneous 
impact on household expenditure across selected percentiles of the unconditional log 
expenditure distribution. Households across the different expenditure quantiles experience 
reductions across both total and food expenditure categories. However, households in 
chiefdoms that reported confirmed cases register a larger impact at the bottom end of the 























12 14 16 18
Log of per capita total expenditure
Quarantine Non-Quarantine




between the two treatments. The effects appear broadly comparable here. Household inequality 
measured by the expenditure Gini does not reveal any statistical differences for those 
households in chiefdoms with or without reported Ebola cases. However, the quarantined 
households are subject to a reduced level of inequality two years after the end of the epidemic. 
The raw statistics again confirm a negative association between Ebola and the various 
household welfare indicators.  
 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Household Welfare Indicators by Ebola and Quarantine 
Status (2018) 
  Ebola  Quarantine  







Log of per capita Total 




Total  16.6495 16.444 16.852 -0.408*** 16.494 16.772 -0.278*** 
    (0.015)   (0.016) 
Food  15.9604 15.743 16.175 -0.432*** 15.792 16.093 -0.301*** 
    (0.016)   (0.016) 
Log of per capita Total 




10th 15.7747 15.554 15.992 -0.437*** 15.658 15.867 -0.209*** 
    (0.043)   (0.044) 
25th 16.2718 16.105 16.436 -0.332*** 16.122 16.39 -0.268*** 
    (0.019)   (0.019) 
50th 16.6343 16.404 16.861 -0.456*** 16.506 16.736 -0.230*** 
    (0.018)   (0.019) 
75th  17.0947 16.878 17.308 -0.430*** 16.891 17.255 -0.364*** 
    (0.021)   (0.021) 
90th  17.5529 17.377 17.726 -0.350*** 17.330 17.729 -0.399*** 
    (0.020)   (0.020) 
Gini Coefficients        
Total  0.3454 0.348 0.343 0.006 0.323 0.363 -0.041*** 
    (0.006)   (0.006) 
Food 0.3552 0.359 0.351 0.008 0.332 0.374 -0.042*** 
    (0.006)   (0.006) 
Samples 6738 3339 3399  2956 3782  
Note: standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, the areas most affected by Ebola appear to be poorer than those less affected by the 
disease. This highlights the importance of a careful interpretation of the raw data reported here. 




of underlying factors that rendered some chiefdoms more susceptible to the spread of the 
disease. Thus, the objective of the research undertaken in this essay is to establish the causal 
impact of both Ebola and the quarantine policy on household welfare, which goes beyond the 
analysis of a statistical association between these two variables. The empirical framework used 
for this purpose is discussed in the next section.  
 
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of Household Characteristics by Ebola and Quarantine Status (2018) 












Household characteristics:        




46.3906 1.403*** 46.4100 47.9460 -1.535*** 
 
Household size 7.1236 
 
7.1135 7.1337 -0.020 6.8410 7.4840 -0.643*** 
Dependency ratio 1.7571 1.6466 1.8657 -0.219*** 1.8030 1.6990 0.104*** 
Female head 0.2630 0.2719 0.2542 -0.017** 0.2650 0.2610 0.004 
Head’s education:         
No education 0.5242 0.6532 0.4894 0.164*** 0.4680 0.5950 -0.126*** 
Primary  0.1409 0.0995 0.1815 -0. 080*** 0.1650 0.1100 0.055*** 
Secondary  0.2148 0.1655 0.2633 -0.0978*** 0.2230 0.2050 0.018* 
Higher  0.1202 0.0818 0.1579 -0.0761*** 0.1440 0.0900 0.053*** 
Employment status:        
Self-employed  0.1801 0.0794 0.2791 -0.200*** 0.2130 0.1380 0.075*** 
Farm  0.4160 0.5778 0.2568 0.321*** 0.3530 0.4960 -0.143*** 
Unemployed 0.1220 0.1117 0.1322 -0.021*** 0.0980 0.1520 -0.054*** 
Other 0.2819 0.2311 0.3319 -0.101 0.3360 0.2140 0.122*** 
Head’s Marital status:        
Married 0.6073 0.6766 0.5391 0.138*** 0.5910 0.6280 -0.038*** 
Single 0.3299 0.2714 0.3875 -0.116*** 0.3380 0.3190 0.019* 
Other 0.0139 0.0149 0.0129 0.002 0.0110 0.0030 0.008*** 
Cohabit 0.0074 0.0039 0.0109 -0.007*** 0.0110 0.0170 -0.006** 
Head’s religion:        
Christian 0.1466 0.1132 0.1795 -0.066 0.1520 0.1390 0.013 
Muslin 0.5729 0.5754 0.5705 0.005 0.5650 0.5830 -0.018 
Other 0.2805 0.3114 0.2500 0.061 0.2830 0.2770 0.005 
Settlement Type        
Urban 0.5474 0.3447 0.7470 -0.402*** 0.6120 0.4650 0.147*** 
Other household facilities  
  
    
Electricity 0.2703 0.1341 0.4042 -0.270*** 0.3310 0.1930 0.137*** 
Number of rooms occupied 3.5828 3.8723 3.2987 0.574*** 3.2430 4.0180 -0.774*** 
Agricultural Land Access        
Land size in hectare 0.8516 0.8749 0.8516 -0.023 0.7640 0.9940 -0.229*** 
Durable asset 0.1420 0.1442 0.1398 0.004 0.1400 0.1440 -0.003 
Principal components:        
Housing characteristics 0.5132 -0.2210 0.2175 -0.4385*** 0.1540 -0.1970 0.351*** 
Amenities characteristics -0.0093 0.0094 -0.0093 0.0187 0.0050 -0.0060 0.011 
Sample Sizes 6738 3339 3399  2956 3782  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





As noted earlier, the 2018 SLIHS also provides detailed information on additional household 
and socio-economic characteristics. The total number of households used in the analysis is 
6,738, with approximately 50% resident in chiefdoms that recorded Ebola cases. Quarantine 
households accounted for 44% of households in the survey.  
 
The characteristics are presented in Table 4.5, with differences by Ebola status reported. On 
the basis of Table 4.5, households in chiefdoms with recorded Ebola cases have younger heads, 
more female heads, and lower dependency ratios. The quarantine households have similar 
characteristics, but higher dependency ratios. There are a significant number of heads with no 
education in the Ebola-affected areas. Educational background is significantly different by 
Ebola status. Households involved in agricultural activities are more prevalent in Ebola-
affected regions than in quarantined chiefdoms. Marital status differs by Ebola status, but there 
are no statistically significant religious differences detected here.  
 
There are more households in urban areas in chiefdoms that did not report Ebola cases, but this 
is not so for the quarantined chiefdoms. Ebola cases were more prevalent in rural areas, and 
electricity access was lower in the Ebola case areas than in the quarantined areas. The 
population density and economic activities in urban areas might have been a cause of contagion 
and hence warranted the imposition of a government quarantine. Economic amenities like 
electricity and access to social facilities like hospitals and markets were available and 
maintained for quarantined households. There are no significant differences in terms of 
household durable assets. However, housing and amenity characteristics, which are measured 
using principal components, only reported a significant difference for housing characteristics 




Table A4.2 for the variables used in constructing the principal component measures). 
Individual household head characteristics are found to be similar for both treatment variables. 
There is some evidence that the Ebola impact was random across the set of individual and 
household characteristics. In addition, according to the Ebola Response Unit report, there is no 
evidence of a disproportionate impact of the disease based on ethnic group affiliation (Statistics 
Sierra Leone, 2015). 
 
The above variables comprise the input or explanatory variables that may assist in determining 
potential causal impacts of the Ebola outbreak and the government quarantine policy in Sierra 
Leone on household welfare. The next section of this chapter describes the empirical 
methodologies used to evaluate the impact of Ebola and the quarantine policy on household 






























4.6 Econometric Methodology  
 
We first explore some descriptive econometric analysis examining the impact of both Ebola 
and the quarantine policy on household welfare metrics and food security using a variety of 
regression models. For the analysis of poverty, the descriptive analysis uses a binary (0/1) 
dependent variable. Using the poverty lines highlighted in the data section, households are 
assigned 1 if below the poverty line and 0 otherwise. A probit regression model is then specified 
as follows: 
 
prob[poverty. = 1] = F(α + βEbola. + 𝛄𝐗𝐢)	                               [4.1] 
 
where F(. ) is the cumulative distribution function operator for the standard normal; poverty. 
is a binary variable that represents whether the ith household is at or below the total poverty or 
food poverty line; Ebola. captures either of the two Ebola-related treatments (i.e., either 
households in chiefdoms that recorded confirmed cases of Ebola or households in chiefdoms 
with government quarantine policies imposed in response to Ebola); and 𝐗𝐢 is a vector for the 
ith household that includes realisations for household covariates relating to, inter alia, the 
head’s age, education, marital status, and religion, and further comprises household size, 
settlement type, access to basic amenities, dwelling characteristics, and living conditions (see 
Table 4.4 above for more detailed descriptions of these variables).   
 
In addition to a binary poverty measure, we also use the underlying continuous measure for log 
household expenditure. The estimation of the impact of Ebola on household expenditure is 
obtained from the following specification: 
 





where welfare. represents a variety of continuous logged indicators of welfare for each 
household (i.e., log per capita household expenditure or log per capita food expenditure); 
Ebola., our main treatment variable of interest, represents households in chiefdoms that either 
recorded confirmed cases of Ebola or were subjected to the government quarantine policy; and 
𝐗𝐢 are household characteristics viewed as relevant determinants of household welfare as 
defined earlier for [4.1] above. The equations described by [4.2] are initially estimated by OLS. 
 
The impact of Ebola (or the quarantine policy) at different quantiles of the household welfare 
distribution is evaluated using unconditional quantile regressions based on Recentred Influence 
Functions (RIFs). This approach is now outlined. Assume IF(y;ν) is the influence function 
corresponding to an observed outcome variable y and the distributional statistic is defined as 
ν(Fy). Assume the RIF corresponding to this case is defined as RIF(y; ν) where y is the log of 
household expenditure (either total or food):  
RIF(y; ν) = ν(Fy) + IF(y; ν)        [4.3] 
For distributional statistics like quantiles, the IF is defined as: 
IF(y; Qt)  =   (t – I[y ≤ Qt]) ÷ fy(Qt)       [4.4] 
where t is the quantile of interest, I(×) is an indicator function assuming a value of 1 if the 
expression in parentheses is satisfied, Qt is the population quantile of the tth quantile of the 
unconditional distribution of y, and fy(Qt) is the density of the marginal distribution of the 
outcome variable evaluated at Qt. The corresponding RIF is then expressed as:  
RIF(y; Qt)  = Qt  +   (t – I[y ≤ Qt]) ÷ fy(Qt)      [4.5] 




E[RIF(y; Qt) | X] = 𝛃𝐗𝐢	        [4.6]  
where the RIF is assumed to be a linear function of the covariates originally specified in [4.2] 
above but now defined as contained in X. This expression can be estimated by OLS. Firpo et 
al. (2009) show that such an OLS regression provides estimates for β that represent the effect 
of the x covariates on the unconditional tth quantile of the outcome variable y. This is why the 
authors refer to an equation like [4.6] as an unconditional quantile regression.16 
As a prelude to the estimation of equation [4.6] by OLS, the RIF expression [4.5] needs to be 
computed. This emphasises a conceptual difference between the conditional and the 
unconditional quantile regression approach. In the former case, the specification of the 
covariates determines the quantile (given it is conditional on the covariates contained in the 
specification) but in the latter case the quantile is independent of the covariates used as it is 
computed pre-regression.  
The expression [4.5] is unobserved in practice, so the corresponding sample analogues are 
used. This requires computing the sample t and then estimating the density value at this point 
( t) using non-parametric kernel density methods. An estimate of the RIF for each 
observation is then obtained by plugging the density estimates into expression [4.5]. It is the 
multiplication of the probability by the inverse of the density that yields the quantile values in 
this case. The approach is known in the literature as the ‘plug-in’ method. Thus, this procedure 
changes the outcome variable at each quantile in expression [4.5] in such a way that the mean 
of the recentred function corresponds to the quantile.  
In summary, the RIF-OLS regression approach involves the following steps: 
 
16 It is the case that if the RIF in [4.6] is recast in terms of the mean statistic, the application of OLS yields mean 










1. Estimate a linear probability model for being above the quantile of interest (Qt). 
This estimation procedure yields estimated marginal (for continuous variables) and impact (for 
dummy variables) effects expressed in probability units. 
2. Divide these marginal/impact effects by the kernel (probability) density evaluated at the 
quantile of interest. 
This locally inverts the (unconditional) probability effects into (unconditional) quantile effects. 
The estimator of the density for y is obtained using a kernel density estimator. Define Ky(z) to 
be a kernel function and bY a positive scalar bandwidth. The kernel density estimator is defined 





6>.4#        [4.7] 
where Ky(z) can be from a choice of kernel densities (e.g., Gaussian or Epanechnikov) and the 
bandwidth (by) is set in advance (e.g., 0.1). We choose the appropriate weight from the 
estimated kernel density for the relevant quantile. The estimated scaling factor #
7C&(∙)
 is then used 
to invert the probability effects back to the relevant quantile effects. We re-express the equation 
[4.6] as follows given the focus on Ebola: 
E[RIF(y.; 	Qt)|X, Ebola] = 𝛃𝐗𝐢 + αEbola.      [4.8] 
 
The main regression model (equation 4.8) is estimated by OLS and the estimates provide the 
effect of the covariates on the unconditional quantile of interest. The selected quantiles in this 
case comprise the 10th, 25th, the median, the 75th, and the 90th percentile. This regression model 
enables us to determine the impact of Ebola or government quarantine at different points of the 





The impact of Ebola on household inequality using the Gini coefficient is also explored through 
using the Recentred Influence Function (RIF). Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) developed 
this influence function (IF) concept to go beyond the mean (as with the unconditional quantiles 
above) and extended it to other distributional statistics like variances and the Gini coefficient. 
Essamah-Nssah and Lambert (2011) outlined how the RIF concept can be applied to the Gini 
coefficient. In this context, the RIF for the Gini coefficient is used and will enable us to examine 
the impact of Ebola on the distribution of household inequality as measured by the RIF-based 
form of the Gini coefficient. As noted in Essay 2 of this thesis, the RIF-based Gini can be 
expressed systematically as an approximate linear relationship with the selected household and 
Ebola treatment as in the equation above. Specifically, we regress the RIF-based Gini 
coefficient measure on a set of household covariates (𝐗𝐢) and the Ebola treatment 
variables	(Ebola.) using a standard OLS approach to determine the Ebola impact on inequality 
using an equation as described below:  
 
E[RIF(y.; 	Gini)|X, Ebola] = 𝛄𝐗𝐢 	+ αEbola.   [4.9] 
 
The impact of the Ebola outbreak (both through Ebola cases and quarantine status) on 
subjective welfare is also investigated in this chapter through the use of two categorical 
variables based on self-assessed poverty and food insecurity. Household poverty is self-defined 
relative to neighbours’ living standards as belonging to one of three categories (i.e., poor, 
average, and rich). The second subjective welfare dimension is food insecurity, which assesses 
a household’s ability to meet their food needs within the last 12 months. Households self-
reported their difficulties using the terms ‘always’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘never’. In this case, the 
empirical analysis constructs subjective welfare outcomes for food insecurity and poverty from 




taking the value 1 if a household reports being poor relative to its neighbours’ standard of living 
and takes the value 0 otherwise. In the same vein, food insecurity is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if a household reports either ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ having difficulty in meeting its 
food needs in the last 12 months and 0 otherwise. Hence, if a household can recall experiencing 
difficulty in meeting its daily food needs, it is classified as food insecure. A binary dependent 
subjective poverty variable is used as opposed to an ordinal measure. This provides a 
comparable measure to the objective poverty dependent variable used in expression [4.1]. As 
presented in table 3.2, the raw averages are similar for both objective and subjective poverty 
measures. A probit model is then specified as follows: 
 
prob[subjective	welfare. = 1] = F(α + βEbola. + 𝐗𝐢𝛄)			    [4.10] 
 
where subjective welfare is the dummy variable for either subjective poverty or food insecurity 
as discussed in this section. Ebola. and the covariates included in the 𝐗𝐢 vector are as defined 
earlier.  
 
It is acknowledged that the above analysis, while informative, is largely descriptive in nature. 
In order to estimate a causal impact of Ebola on household welfare, poverty, and food 
insecurity, we expand our methodologies to include the propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique. This enables the estimation of the average treatment effect of the Ebola epidemic 
on household expenditure, poverty (subjective and objective), and food insecurity. This is 
potentially important in the current context because the more adversely affected chiefdoms 
were those with poorer socio-economic profiles. In order to obtain the causal effects, we again 




the quarantine policy on the treated households in terms of the selected welfare indicators 
discussed above.  
 
As extensively discussed in the two earlier essays of this thesis, the PSM methodology allows 
for the simulation of randomly allocated households into treatment and control groups based 
on their propensity scores, which are derived from a treatment assignment equation estimated 
using a binary logit regression model. The included covariates in the treatment assignment 
equation influence household welfare indicators and the treatment but are not affected by the 
treatment itself (i.e., Ebola-affected chiefdoms or quarantine status). The included covariates 
are the same welfare determinants or input variables used in the various equations specified 
above. Given the nature of Ebola, it provides a natural experiment that leads to the division of 
households into control and treatment groups. The PSM provides the framework for computing 
the average treatment effect on the treated of the Ebola outbreak in terms of both cases and the 
quarantine policy.  
 
Treatment contamination from spill-overs from the control group has the potential to 
undermine the internal validity of our estimation. In terms of the quarantine measures, the 
national curtailment policies were strongly managed with military checkpoints, and curfews 
were extensively used. This impeded movement from the control to the treatment chiefdoms. 
In addition, there is generally only a single route connecting chiefdoms, which renders the use 
of checkpoints effective in mitigating spill-over effects. The national quarantine was imposed 
at the chiefdom level, thus putting an entire chiefdom under lockdown regardless of the level 






4.7 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are now presented, starting with the impact of the incidence of Ebola 
cases on household objective poverty (total and food). This is then followed by a discussion of 
the Ebola impact on log per capita household expenditure, its distribution, and finally its effect 
on the household Gini coefficient. The analysis is then extended to the quarantine policy. The 
estimated results from the probit, OLS, RIF-quantile, and RIF-Gini specifications will form the 
first sets of descriptive estimates for interpretation and discussion.  
 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the probit estimates (equation 4.1) on the determinants of 
household poverty, including households in chiefdoms that reported confirmed cases of Ebola. 
The first and second columns comprise the probit impact effects on objective (total and food) 
poverty for households in chiefdoms with reported Ebola cases. The last two columns include 
the impact effects of the Ebola Quarantine policy.  
 
Table 4.6: Probit Impact Effects of Ebola on Household Objective Poor and Food Poverty by 
Ebola and Quarantine Status (2018) 
 Ebola  Quarantine 
VARIABLES Poor Food  Poor   Food  
Ebola 0.0260* 0.0610*** 0.2000** 0.2330*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0130) 
Pseudo R2 0.1956 0.1477 0.1960 0.1481 
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 
Household & Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The regression estimations control variables are household characteristics like head’s age, gender, education, employment, 
religion, and marital status. Additionally, the control variables include settlement areas, household facilities like electricity 
access, durable assets, and the number of rooms occupied. Agricultural land access and indices of household dwelling and 
amenities form part of the regression controls. 
 
The estimate in the first column of Table 4.6 suggests that Ebola increased objective poverty 
by 2.6 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, though the estimate is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test. In contrast, household food 




effect from the probit analysis is on the modest side compared to the raw differences of 21 
percentage points for both food and total poverty reported earlier in Table 4.2. This suggests 
that most of the difference is actually driven by endowment differences between Ebola-affected 
chiefdoms and unaffected chiefdoms rather than through the influence of the Ebola disease 
itself. Thus, the magnitude of the Ebola effect on poverty is actually relatively modest in 
magnitude. 
 
The last two columns present the analysis of the effects on poverty of the government 
quarantine policy imposed to curtail the Ebola outbreak. In contrast to the first set of estimates 
discussed above, the impact of the Ebola quarantine is sizeable compared to that associated 
with having confirmed cases. The effect of the quarantine policy yields a 20.0 and 23.3 
percentage-point increase in total and food poverty, respectively. This delineation of 
households by quarantine status suggests a stronger impact on household poverty status. The 
raw differentials observed are thus not now driven by differentials in household or chiefdom 
characteristics but by the quarantine policy. The policy introduced restrictions on both social 
and economic behaviour. Markets were closed and the restrictions on movement reduced 
employment, largely within the informal sector. The national government mobilised the 
distribution of food for individuals in Ebola case centres and Ebola-affected households 
(Statistics Sierra Leone, 2016) and this may explain why the Ebola-affected chiefdoms report 
lower estimated effects of the disease. As discussed by Coltart et al. (2017), the quarantine 
policy was centred around factors that actually exacerbated the poor welfare conditions of 
households as economic activities were cut-off. In general, the quarantined districts had weak 
health systems, poor trust in national governance, a lack of vehicle and motorable road access 
to remote sites, shortages of health care workers, and a lack of community engagement (Coltart 





Table 4.7: OLS Regression on the Determinants of Log Household Expenditure and its 
Distribution (2018) 
 Log Expenditure and Gini Log Expenditure Percentiles 
 Total Food Gini 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
PANEL A         
Ebola -0.0477*** -0.0512*** -0.0172*** 0.0227 -0.0351* -0.0388** -0.0315 -0.0996*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.00567) (0.0494) (0.0199) (0.0171) (0.0208) (0.0179) 
         
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 
R-squared 0.465 0.484 0.081 0.487 0.485 0.397 0.358 0.465 
         
PANEL B         
Quarantine -0.120*** -0.135*** -0.0469*** 0.00290 -0.139*** -0.0522*** -0.197*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.00554) (0.0449) (0.0186) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0162) 
         
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 
R-squared 0.471 0.492 0.089 0.116 0.262 0.395 0.372 0.292 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The regression models include control variables for household characteristics like head’s age, gender, education, 
employment, religion, and marital status. Additionally, the control variables include settlement areas, household facilities 
like electricity access, durable assets, and the number of rooms occupied. Agricultural land access and indices of household 
dwelling and amenities form part of the regression controls. 
 
The foregoing examined the impact of the Ebola virus and the government’s quarantine policy 
on objective poverty measures based on expenditure-based poverty lines. Our attention now 
turns to an evaluation of the impact of Ebola on household expenditure itself and its distribution 
(equation 4.2, 4.8 and 4.9 respectively). This will provide empirical insights into where along 
the unconditional household expenditure distribution the Ebola outbreak and the government 
policy responses had their strongest effects. Table 4.7 presents the result on household 
expenditure for both interventions (Ebola and Quarantine) in panels A and B, respectively. 
Again, the first three columns of Table 4.7 contain the estimates of mean household 
expenditure and the Gini coefficient analysis. The estimated unconditional quantile effects are 
presented in the last five columns of this table. In Panel A of Table 4.7, households in 
chiefdoms with confirmed cases of Ebola exhibit a reduction in both household expenditure 




respectively, on average and ceteris paribus. In contrast, inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient decreased by 1.7 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus.  
 
The last five columns report the effects of chiefdoms having confirmed Ebola cases on the 
distribution of household expenditure at different quantiles of the unconditional distribution. 
The effect shows a gradual but steady reduction in expenditure from the bottom to the top 
selected quantiles. Households located at the bottom quantiles of the distribution do not report 
significant changes in their expenditure patterns in response to the presence of Ebola cases. 
However, the median expenditure level sees a 3.9% reduction. This negative impact is of 
greater magnitude for households located at the top percentile of the unconditional log 
household expenditure distribution, with a 10% reduction in household expenditure detected 
for the Ebola-affected chiefdoms at the 90th percentile of the distribution. Overall, the data 
reveal a reduction in household expenditure inequality of about 1.7 percentage points as 
measured by the Gini.  
 
Our attention now turns to examining the effects on household expenditure (both total and 
food) of the government quarantine policy. The results of this analysis are also presented in 
Panel B of Table 4.7 above. The quarantine policy has a strong negative impact on household 
expenditure, the Gini coefficient, and across the top end of the unconditional log household 
expenditure distribution. Households in a chiefdom subjected to the quarantine policy incurred 
a 12% and 13.5% reduction in total and food household expenditures, respectively. The 
household inequality index (Gini coefficient) reduces by 4.7 percentage points on average. 
However, the households at the bottom end of the expenditure distribution do not incur any 
significant changes in their expenditure levels. Conversely, the effect is stronger and negative 




incur about a 14% reduction in their expenditures. The quarantine impact softens at the median 
level, but the negative impact intensifies for the 75th and 90th percentiles, at which households 
experience 19.7% and 28.8% reductions in their expenditures, respectively, ceteris paribus. 
This set of results suggest a greater adverse impact of the quarantine policy on household 
expenditure and its distribution than that associated with the presence of Ebola cases in the 
household chiefdom area. On the basis of the raw differences reported in Table 4.2, the 
compelling differences are not explained by differentials in household control variables across 
the two groups separated by the quarantine policy.  
 
The above results provide a descriptive understanding of the association between household 
welfare and exposure to the two Ebola-related treatment measures (the presence of cases and 
the government quarantine policy). Therefore, the subsequent analysis attempts to provide a 
causal estimate of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone on household welfare indicators using 
PSM. The treatment assignment logit equation estimation results for both Ebola cases and the 
quarantine measures are presented in Table A4.4 in the appendix. In addition, Tables A4.5 to 
A4.7 in the appendix document (and confirm) how the balancing properties are satisfied in both 
cases.   
 
Table 4.8 reports the PSM estimates. The treatment effect of households in chiefdoms that 
reported confirmed cases of Ebola reveals a significant 3.8 percentage point reduction in food 
poverty but no change in total poverty. The impact on household expenditure is not significant 
but suggests a levelling effect on household inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient). 
The treatment effect of Ebola on the Gini coefficient, using Chiefdom-level confirmed cases, 





Table 4.8: PSM Average Treatment Effect of Ebola and Quarantine on Welfare Indicators (2018) 
 Ebola Quarantine 
Poor -0.0100 0.1170*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0123) 
Food  0.0376*** 0.1673*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0123) 
Log per capita total expenditure 0.0237 -0.0638*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0167) 
Log per capita total food expenditure 0.0222 -0.0766*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0171) 
Expenditure Gini -0.0287*** -0.0287*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0063) 
Samples: Treatment 3339 2956 
Control 3399 3782 
Bootstrap standard errors with 500 reps in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results on the treatment effect of the government quarantine policy suggest a stronger 
effect on household welfare in comparison to that associated with those chiefdoms with 
confirmed Ebola cases. Household objective poverty increases for those in the quarantined 
areas by 11.7 percentage points on average. Households below the food poverty line increased 
significantly by 16.7 percentage points for those subjected to the Ebola quarantine measures. 
The impact on objective poverty already noted is further reflected through reductions in total 
and food household expenditures of 6.4% and 7.7 %, respectively, on average and ceteris 
paribus.  
 
The strong quarantine-based effect is not observed for chiefdoms that reported confirmed cases 
of Ebola. This suggests that quarantine policies during the Ebola epidemic had a sharper 
adverse impact on household welfare. However, it is worth noting that the inequality impact 
for the quarantined chiefdoms is of the same magnitude as that for the chiefdoms with 
confirmed Ebola cases. Both treatment effects reveal a reduction in household expenditure 





The quarantine policy effects represent the preferred estimates informing the policy 
implications of the Ebola outbreak on household welfare in Sierra Leone. The national 
quarantine exacerbated this strong negative effect as the curtailment policies imposed stringent 
economic and social restrictions. The presence of Ebola cases represents an individual direct 
impact that has low potential to reduce economic activities on a broader scale in contrast to the 
quarantine policies. Government supporting activities in terms of food provision for individual 
households with Ebola victims may have mitigated the national quarantine’s more substantial 
impact. However, the national quarantine policy disturbed any potential for welfare smoothing, 
hence its stronger negative impacts on household welfare. 
 
The above results potentially reveal the causal impacts of the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone on 
objective poverty, household expenditure, and inequality. To provide a more concrete causal 
interpretation of the results, pre-Ebola estimates of the selected welfare indicators are presented 
in Table 4.9 for 2011 with difference-in-difference estimates for quarantine policy provided in 
the last column. The 2011 estimates are computed using the same estimation technique as the 
main results using the 2018 data. Propensity score matching enables the calculation of the 
average treatment effect but is limited in capturing the role of unobservable differences 
between the Ebola and non-Ebola chiefdoms. Hence, the difference-in-difference estimation 
provides a solution to mitigate the effect of time-invariant unobservable differences between 
the treatment and control groups. As noted in the contextualisation and the description section, 
there was a legacy of household poverty in the Ebola-quarantined chiefdoms before the 
outbreak. Hence, the Ebola-quarantined chiefdoms may have some unobserved characteristics 






Table 4.9: PSM Average Treatment Effect and Difference-in-Difference Estimate of Ebola and 
Quarantine on Welfare Indicators 
 2011 2018 D-i-D 
 Ebola Quarantine Ebola Quarantine Quarantine 
Poor 0.06035*** 0.0610*** -0.0100 0.1170*** 0.056*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.0186) 
Food  0.0342*** 0.0562*** 0.0376*** 0.1673*** 0.1111*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.0189) 
Log per capita total expenditure -0.0693*** -0.0430 0.0237 -0.0638*** -0.0208 
 (0.0280) (0.0243) (0.0196) (0.0167) (0.0294) 
Log per capita total food expenditure -0.0565*** -0.0369** 0.0222 -0.0766*** -0.0397** 
 (0.0196) (0.0170) (0.0202) (0.0171) (0.2411) 
Expenditure Gini 0.0043*** 0.0234*** -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.0521*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0109) 
Samples: Treatment 4177 3100 3339 2956  
Control 2507 3568 3399 3782  
Note: The estimates are the average treatment effect of chiefdoms simulated to have confirmed Ebola cases and the 
quarantine policy treatment measure. The results are computed using the 2011 SLIHS data, which was collected three years 
before the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
D-I-D denotes the difference-in-difference between pre- and post-Ebola quarantine measures to inform on causality. 
Bootstrap standard errors with 500 reps in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On average, Sierra Leone’s pre-Ebola conditions portray a legacy of poverty (in terms of both 
total and food poverty). Households in the quarantined regions had a higher level of poverty 
by 6 percentage points than those in the non-quarantined chiefdoms before the Ebola outbreak. 
However, the poverty status was made worse by the national quarantine policy, yielding a 5.6 
percentage point increase. Food poverty increased significantly, with a difference-in-difference 
estimate revealing an 11.1 percentage point increase, on average and ceteris paribus. Also, 
household expenditure exhibited a marginal decrease due to the quarantine policy, but the level 
of inequality contracted by 5.2 Gini percentage points. The results in Table 4.9 provide further 
evidence that our main estimates are potentially causal in nature. 
 
We now explore the impact of the Ebola outbreak (cases and quarantine) on subjective 
household welfare measures. Table 4.10 presents the results for subjective welfare using both 




the four sets of results relating to the confirmed Ebola cases and the quarantine measures. The 
second section presents the average treatment effect on household subjective welfare. The first 
two columns relate to the Ebola cases measure. The last two columns provide the results for 
the government quarantine policy.  
 
In panel 1, column 1, households in chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases register a negative 
poverty status effect relative to their neighbours. Subjective poverty increased by 12.5 
percentage points for households in chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases. The estimated 
effect is similar in magnitude for households in quarantined chiefdoms (see column 3). In some 
sense, this confirms the utility of subjective measures in informing on poverty incidence, as the 
estimates are broadly comparable to those obtained using the objective measures. The 
government policy of quarantining chiefdoms to curtail the Ebola outbreak led to households 
judging their welfare less favourably relative to their neighbours. The subjective poverty 
impact is comparable across the two treatments.  
 
Table 4.10: Probit Impact Effects and PSM ATT for Subjective and Food Poverty (2018) 
 EBOLA  QUARANTINE 








Probit 0.1245*** -0.0074 0.1188*** 0.0204 
 (0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0133) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.1648 0.0352 0.1648 0.0354 
Observations 6213 6228 6228 6228 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 2     
     
PSM ATT 0.1175*** 0.01447 0.1082*** 0.0277** 
 (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0126) (0.0132) 
Observations     
Treatment 3336 3336 2691 2691 
Control 3387 3387 3537 3537 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In panel 1, the regression estimation control variables are household characteristics like head’s age, gender, education, 
employment, religion, and marital status. Additionally, the control variables include settlement areas, household facilities 
like electricity access, durable assets, and the number of rooms occupied. Agricultural land access and indices of household 





The next part of the analysis examines the impact of the Ebola outbreak on household food 
security based on household-reported difficulties in satisfying their daily food needs in the 
previous 12 months. As noted above, we construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
households assessed themselves as having difficulties in meeting their daily food needs either 
‘always’ or ‘sometimes’, and 0 otherwise. The treatment variables of interest, both confirmed 
Ebola cases and quarantined chiefdoms, appear to exert no significant impact in pushing 
households into food insecurity.  
 
Our attention now turns to the average treatment effects (ATTs) of Ebola (both cases and 
quarantine policy) on household subjective poverty and food security. The bottom panel of 
Table 4.10 above presents the PSM ATT estimates. Columns 1 and 3 in the lower panel present 
the results for subjective poverty for the Ebola cases and the government quarantine treatments, 
respectively. On average, ceteris paribus, the Ebola outbreak yielded a statistically significant 
11 percentage-point increase in household subjective poverty for those households in 
chiefdoms that reported confirmed cases. The magnitude is similar for households in the 
quarantined chiefdoms. Again, households in chiefdoms that reported confirmed Ebola cases 
do not incur a significant impact on their food security. However, the average treatment effect 
for households in the quarantined chiefdoms reveals an increase in subjective food insecurity 
of 2.8 percentage points. The curtailment policy clearly exerted a negative impact on household 
subjective poverty and the ability of households to meet their daily food needs. Given that the 
analysis uses data collected almost two years after the end of the Ebola outbreak, the quarantine 







4.8 Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
The Ebola outbreak represents an additional adverse socio-economic shock for the Sierra 
Leone economy after the end of the 10-years civil war. Hence, its effect on household welfare 
is potentially significant. Prior to the outbreak, the health system in Sierra Leone was among 
one of the poorest-resourced globally according to international rankings. The doctor-patient 
ratio was deficient, with 136 doctors for a population of six million (0.2 per 1,000) in 2015 
(World Health Organisation, 2016). Preceding the Ebola outbreak, the country had about 17 
government (or publicly run) hospitals, with a higher number of less well-equipped health 
clinics around the country. The Ebola outbreak exposed the vulnerability of the country’s 
inherently weak and poorly managed public health system. The eastern area was particularly 
badly affected by Ebola. The treatment centres were overstretched in these areas, and isolation 
and quarantine measures were the only feasible solution given no vaccine or therapeutic 
treatment for the virus was available at that time (Coltart et al., 2017).  
 
The foregoing results suggest that the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone had a causal impact on a 
set of household welfare indicators across a number of dimensions. The findings establish that 
there was a legacy of disadvantage between the treatment and control groups prior to the Ebola 
outbreak and the levels deteriorated as a result of the outbreak (see the difference-in-difference 
estimates in Table 4.9). This is in agreement with existing micro-level studies, which generally 
find negative impact of epidemics on household livelihoods (Chapoto and Jayne, 2008; 
Nabyonga-Orem et al., 2008). On average, the epidemic outbreak in 2014 resulted in welfare 
hardship and reduced inequality even after two years of being Ebola free. Thus, the anticipation 
of a V-shaped recovery is not entirely vindicated by these data. In general terms, the impact of 
the Ebola outbreak was to reduce household expenditure, increase objective and subjective 




was not unambiguously negative and, in some cases, yielded no statistically significant effect 
at all.  
 
The analysis reported here suggests that the government quarantine policy potentially had a 
sharper and deeper impact on household welfare in terms of poverty and the household 
expenditure distribution than did the presence of the disease itself at the chiefdom level. The 
harsh impact of the quarantine policy can be linked to an underresourced pre-Ebola health 
system, implementation and management of the quarantine measures, and the embedded 
geographical and institutional make-up of the set of quarantined chiefdoms. The impact of the 
disease and the curtailment policy responses on food poverty was negative and more significant 
for objective poverty, as measured by the poverty line, compared to what was found using a 
subjective household assessment metric. However, households did not experience difficulties 
in satisfying their food needs under either of the two Ebola treatment measures. Nevertheless, 
food poverty increased, and the magnitude was significantly higher using the quarantine 
treatment measure. Household inequality reduced by approximately the same amount using 
both measures.  
 
Overall, the Ebola curtailment policies disrupted economic activity and had a harsh impact on 
the socio-economic household welfare indicators for Sierra Leone. The 6.4% estimated 
reduction in total household expenditure two years after the end of the crisis is substantial, as 
household expenditures comprise the overwhelming share of Sierra Leone’s GDP (Statistics 
Sierra Leone, 2020).17 The magnitude of this estimate is comparable with the macro-level 
 
17 The impact of the iron ore price collapse that led to the closure of two significant mining companies is unrelated 
to the effect of the quarantine measures. Additional analysis, not presented here, revealed no impact on our 
estimates when both Biriwa and Marampa chiefdoms were dropped from the analysis. These chiefdoms were the 
hubs of activity for the London Mining and Africa Minerals mining companies. Hence, the empirical results 




findings reported for the effect of the EVD on GDP growth post-Ebola. Although restrictive 
policies led to reductions in household welfare as measured both in objective and subjective 
terms, the incidence of reported food insecurity was low. This might have resulted from the 
government’s support in providing household essentials and food for those in quarantined areas 
and at other medical treatment centres. Sierra Leone is an economy that depends on the 
importation of staple foods like rice and other basic foods, and this might have mitigated the 
negative impact of the Ebola outbreak on the population’s food security. Therefore, this factor 
may have influenced the self-reported lack of difficulty experienced by households in meeting 
food needs in the aftermath of the Ebola crisis. 
 
The closure of the borders to international travel was also part of the containment policies. The 
Sierra Leone government established a national task force in March 2014 given knowledge of 
the virus in neighbouring Guinea and in anticipation of its spread across the border. The 
strategy included sensitisation and awareness about the virus, training of laboratory technicians 
and health care workers, and border surveillance. A descriptive analysis from relevant 
stakeholders’ interviews revealed that these efforts were not practical, and coordination was 
poor (Ross, 2017). Although the practice of curtailment helped to stop the transmission of the 
disease, the restrictive policies introduced provided the central mechanisms through which the 
epidemic impacted socio-economic indicators.  
 
The lack of co-ordination between the ministry of health and other international organisations 
also worsened the negative consequences of the Ebola outbreak. The international response 
was slow, and failure to appreciate the severity of the virus invited difficulties for the country 
in combating the outbreak. A climate of denial of the scale of the potential problem in 




The inadequate pre-Ebola response undermined the health sector’s capacity to cope with the 
virus outbreak. In addition, the mobilisation and management of the outbreak were generally 
chaotic and affected by operational failures. As discussed by Ross (2017), the declaration of a 
state of emergency following the episode of failed pre-responses and information on the virus 
severity disturbed the management process. More drastic measures were then required as a 
result of failing to provide adequate coping measures in advance.  
 
The resultant impact of the Ebola outbreak on household welfare increased poverty, reduced 
household expenditure and levelled inequality in the manner predicted by the historical work 
of Scheidel (2017).18 The levelling of inequality associated with pandemics is also highlighted 
by Deaton (2021) regarding the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on individual countries and 
global inequality. Income inequality has reduced for countries with higher Covid-19 death rates 
and greater economic restrictions. However, global inequality saw a slight increase because 
China, a less-rich country, has not lagged behind in productivity because of Covid-19 death 
compared to rich countries, thus widening the inequality gap globally.  
 
The deployment of measures to halt epidemic or pandemic spread inevitably impacts economic 
activity in developed countries. The effects are amplified in developing countries by an absence 
of social welfare safety-nets that protect the more vulnerable households from falling into 
poverty. The on-going effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the economic status of developed 
countries has drawn attention to the role of curtailment policies and their adverse economic 
consequences. Government policies for controlling the spread of an epidemic are important, 
but minimising the economic welfare impact of such measures is not an easy task, as many 
 
18 In 2017, a year after Sierra Leone was declared Ebola-free, the country experienced another devastating natural 
disaster in the form of a mudslide in a rural mountainous area in the west of the country. This was a year before 
the SLIHS data, the main data used in this analysis, was collected. In a robustness check on the empirical results, 




developed countries have found. The rate of Covid-19 spread in Sierra Leone to date has been 
among the lowest in the world. The government of Sierra Leone closed the country’s borders 
to international flights immediately after the virus’s uncontrolled spread was announced by the 
World Health Organisation. Sensitisation and the implementation of a curfew between 11pm 
and 5am to stop social interactions were the main curtailment measures. The virus spread has 
been controlled without a prolonged national lockdown, suggesting that some lessons have 
been learned from the EVD event. However, more recent trends have seen an increase in new 
cases. Nevertheless, the Sierra Leone policy response to Covid-19 appears broadly similar to 
that adopted for EVD, so it remains to be seen if COVID-19 spreads more aggressively within 
the country.   
 
It is acknowledged that diseases like HIV/AIDS exert longer-term and more sustained impacts 
on economic growth and welfare in African countries than the Ebola or related outbreaks do. 
In general, the potential micro-level impacts are seen in terms of household loss of employment 
and health-related costs, but for viruses like Ebola these may be more short-term. The impact 
of Ebola on household welfare appears to be following something closer to a V-shaped rather 
than a U-shaped recovery, though the impact still persists two years after the epidemic. The 
results from this research concur with the judgment offered by the macro-economic literature 
on the adverse effects of diseases like HIV/AIDS on economic activity (see Dixon, McDonald, 
and Roberts, 2002; Haacker, 2008), with Weil’s (2013) research more nuanced in terms of the 
channel through which the adverse effects are mediated. The rate of HIV/AIDS infection since 
it first detection in 1987 has been increasing in Sierra Leone. The protracted civil war between 
1991-2002 in conjunction with poor health facilities led to a 7% increase in new infections and 
a 6% increase in related deaths between 2006-2016. This disease and Covid-19 may represent 






This chapter investigated the effects of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone on a series of 
household-level welfare indicators. The welfare metrics included household poverty (both total 
and food), household expenditure, and the Gini coefficient (as a measure of household 
inequality). The analysis further explored the nature of total and food poverty using an 
internationally acknowledged poverty line, as well as subjective relative assessments of 
household poverty status. The empirical findings of this study contribute to the limited 
literature on the impacts of epidemics on household socio-economic status in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In the wake of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, Sierra Leone suffered the worst of all West 
African countries given its weaker institutions and public health infrastructure, and the fact that 
it was just recovering from a 10-year civil war. Understanding the socio-economic impact of 
the Ebola outbreak (and related diseases) is of paramount urgency. This research focused on 
household-level analysis in terms of poverty and inequality rather than political or 
psychological impacts, which are currently the more prominent themes in the literature on 
epidemics and pandemics. It is important to note that this is the first study to have evaluated 
the empirical impact of the Sierra Leone Ebola outbreak on selected household welfare 
indicators.  
 
In undertaking this research, two treatment measures for the effect of Ebola were created. The 
first considered households in chiefdoms with recorded confirmed cases of the zoonotic virus. 
The second considered households subjected to the government quarantine policy. The 
government quarantine policy yielded a stronger negative effect on household welfare in 
comparison to that due to households being in chiefdoms with confirmed Ebola cases. The 




like HIV/AIDS in Africa reported in the literature (e.g., see Chapoto and Jayne, 2005; 
Nabyonga-Orem et al, 2008). 
 
The imposition of restrictions on movement impeded economic activity in all sectors, and this 
translated into impacts on household welfare. Hence, it is clear that curtailment procedures and 
policies associated with epidemics and pandemics adversely impact household welfare. The 
estimated Ebola quarantine policy impact can be compared to the civil war impact on average 
household welfare in Sierra Leone. The civil war was another economy-wide shock 
experienced by Sierra Leone from 1991-2002. In Essay 1, the estimated annual impact of the 
civil war was shown to be approximately of the order of a 2.2% reduction in household 
expenditure. The annual impact of EVD on household welfare reported in this essay is broadly 
comparable in scale to this effect.  
 
Linking the findings of the Ebola disease impact on household welfare to other diseases like 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa emphasises the economic vulnerability of African countries 
to disease outbreaks (Hacker, 2008). The literature on the HIV/AIDS pandemic predicted an 
average negative impact on GDP of between 2% to 4% per annum (Dixon et al., 2002). The 
impact presents a longer-term reduction in overall economic activity and delineates a U-shaped 
recovery from this persistently present disease. The HIV/AIDS disease is a life-long 
contraction for which there is currently no vaccine or treatment, and the therapeutical 
procedures currently used can actually impede individual-level productivity over the long-run. 
On the other hand, the Ebola outbreak caused a sharp decline in economy-wide productivity 
due to the curtailment measures adopted. As the survivors may be free of Ebola within weeks, 






An empirical analysis of health shocks can provide a pathway towards understanding how 
affected countries are vulnerable to such shocks and the economic impact of policies required 
to combat and control the spread of disease. Data limitations have posed a challenge to studying 
the socio-economic impacts of health shocks in the past, especially for developing countries. 
The recent impact of the Covid-19 virus on the economic status of developed countries has 
drawn attention to the role of curtailment policies and their potentially harsh effects. 
Government policies in developing countries for controlling the spread of an epidemic should 
also consider the potential impact on household welfare in contexts where safety nets are non-
existent. This is not an easy task, and determining trade-offs is difficult. Nevertheless, early 
warning systems and policies designed to render health systems more resilient and less 
vulnerable to the impact of epidemics are desirable objectives for future health planning in 
developing countries. In addition, an understanding of the economic costs of 
curtailment/quarantine policies is also required for policy-makers faced with the deadly 
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See context for definition of each pattern
Ebola Case Patterns
Note: National district quarantine represented by dots
National Quarantine Measure
 




Table A 4.1: Ebola Cases per Chiefdom and per 10,000 of Chiefdom Population (2018) 
Chiefdom No. of cases District Chiefdom population 
Ebola cases per 
10,000 people 
Badjia 6 Bo 8042 7.4604 
Gbo 4 Bo 5170 7.7367 
Jaiama Bo 3 Bo 31021 0.9671 
Komboya 7 Bo 15510 4.5131 
Niawa Len 19 Bo 13787 13.7810 
Selenga 1 Bo 9191 1.0880 
Tikonko 29 Bo 52850 5.4872 
Valunia 15 Bo 35617 4.2115 
Wunde 6 Bo 15510 3.8684 
Bagbo 2 Bo  25851 0.7737 
Biriwa 17 Bombali 47574 3.5734 
Bombali Shebora 582 Bombali 163520 35.5920 
Gbanti-Kamaranka 14 Bombali 28666 4.8838 
Libeisaygahun 2 Bombali 16468 1.2145 
Makari Gbanti 262 Bombali 81730 32.0570 
Mambolo 42 Bombali 67091 6.2601 
Masungbal 8 Bombali 56113 1.4257 
Ngowahun 30 Bombali 39035 7.6854 
Paki Masa 59 Bombali 20127 29.3133 
Safroko Limba 24 Bombali 31716 7.5672 
Sanda Loko 20 Bombali 45134 4.4312 
Sella Limba 22 Bombali 58552 3.7573 
Tambakka 6 Bombali 38425 1.5615 
Baoma 22 Bonthe 15886 13.8484 
Bum 48 Bonthe 24028 19.9766 
Imperi 1 Bonthe 32964 0.3034 
Jong 3 Bonthe 33361 0.8992 
Kakua 152 Bonthe 17674 86.0042 
Kpanga Kemo 2 Bonthe 10326 1.9368 
Sogbini 2 Bonthe 10723 1.8651 
Dea 1 Kailahun 13120 0.7622 
Jawei 187 Kailahun 50907 36.7335 
Kissi Kama 10 Kailahun 20468 4.8857 
Kissi Tenge 52 Kailahun 45134 11.5212 
Kissi Tonge 15 Kailahun 50907 2.9465 
Luawa 49 Kailahun 80822 6.0627 
Malema 8 Kailahun 36737 2.1776 
Mandu 7 Kailahun 30964 2.2607 
Njaluahun 44 Kailahun 60879 7.2275 
Peje Bong 49 Kailahun 25191 19.4512 
Penguia 1 Kailahun 26241 0.3811 
Upper Bambara 65 Kailahun 26766 24.2849 
Yawei 21 Kailahun 29390 7.1454 
Peje West 15 Kailahun  27290 5.4964 
Bramaia 4 Kambia 36836 1.0859 
Gbinle-Di 18 Kambia 23631 7.6171 
Magbema 115 Kambia 92786 12.3941 
Samu 20 Kambia 65333 3.0613 
Tonko Lim 34 Kambia 59077 5.7552 
Dodo 1 Kenema 22626 0.4420 
Gaura 17 Kenema 27307 6.2255 
Gorama Me 42 Kenema 50713 8.2819 
Kandu Lep 10 Kenema 34329 2.9130 
Lower Bambra 38 Kenema 122492 3.1023 
Niawa 2 Kenema 13263 1.5079 
Nongowa 375 Kenema 281653 13.3143 
Simbaru 1 Kenema 28867 0.3464 
Small Bo 3 Kenema 49153 0.6103 
Tunkia 1 Kenema 33549 0.2981 
Wandor 6 Kenema 27307 2.1972 
Kasonko 1 Koinadugu 25092 0.3985 
Neini 106 Koinadugu 78566 13.4918 
Wara Wara 4 Koinadugu 36198 1.1050 




Gbane Kan 1 Kono 6042 1.6549 
Gbense 86 Kono 107758 7.9809 
Gorama Ko 2 Kono 17624 1.1348 
Kamara 29 Kono 18631 15.5655 
Lei 1 Kono 24673 0.4053 
Maforki 153 Kono 10071 151.9244 
Nimikoro 50 Kono 66467 7.5225 
Nimiyama 24 Kono 39276 6.1106 
Sandor 5 Kono 75027 0.6664 
Soa 3 Kono 31723 0.9457 
Tankoro 57 Kono 65964 8.6411 
Bagruwa 6 Moyamba 27766 2.1609 
Bumpeh 16 Moyamba 39574 4.0431 
Fakunya 49 Moyamba 27766 17.6477 
Kaiyamba 21 Moyamba 25851 8.1236 
Kargboro 8 Moyamba 34787 2.2997 
Kori 23 Moyamba 30638 7.5070 
Kowa 1 Moyamba 9893 1.0108 
Ribbi 49 Moyamba 33191 14.7630 
Timidale 1 Moyamba 10213 0.9792 
Bkm 51 Port Loko 40106 12.7163 
Buya Rome 154 Port Loko 34553 44.5695 
Dibia 15 Port Loko 15425 9.7243 
Kaffu Bul 255 Port Loko 120935 21.0858 
Koya 151 Port Loko 23447 64.4019 
Lokomasam 137 Port Loko 78361 17.4832 
Lugbu 1 Port Loko 86999 0.1149 
Marampa 192 Port Loko 59233 32.4142 
Masimera 69 Port Loko 40723 16.9438 
Sanda Mag 1 Port Loko 24064 0.4156 
Sanda Ten 11 Port Loko 26532 4.1460 
Tms 25 Port Loko 30851 8.1035 
Yoni 81 Port Loko 130807 6.1923 
Barri 1 Pujehun 36425 0.2745 
Kpaka 1 Pujehun 16340 0.6120 
Makpele 21 Pujehun 30638 6.8542 
Malen 5 Pujehun 48340 1.0343 
Panga Kri 1 Pujehun 8851 1.1298 
Gbonkolen 63 Tonkolili 67552 9.3261 
Kafe Simi 6 Tonkolili 36702 1.6348 
Kholifa 132 Tonkolili 16489 80.0526 
Kholifa M 29 Tonkolili 16489 17.5873 
Konike Ba 11 Tonkolili 25532 4.3084 
Konike Sa 75 Tonkolili 74467 10.0716 
Malal Mar 34 Tonkolili 30851 11.0208 
Tane 58 Tonkolili 33510 17.3081 
Banta Gba 36 Bombali 219572 1.6396 
W/Rural 1146 Freetown 446803 25.6489 
W/Urban 2274 Freetown 1056725 21.5193 

















Table A 4.2: Description of the Household Principal Components and other Input Variables 
 Variables Description 
Principal Components Housing Characteristics This is an index of household dwelling features that can 
enhance household quality. The dwelling features include flush 
toilet, latrine with a slab, cemented walls and floor, and zinc 
roofed homes. Each of the variables are 0/1 dummies. The 
index is calculated using principal component analysis. The 
predicted index comes from the first component.  
Amenities Characteristics This is an index of household accessibility to public amenities. 
The index is compiled from amenities within a 1hr walking 
distance. These include transport, hospital, tap or borehole, and 
market facilities.  
Other Input Variables Household Characteristics These include the following: 
Head’s age - a continuous variable for the age of a household 
head in years. 
Household size - the total number of individuals living in a 
household 
Dependency ratio - the ratio of dependents (under 18 and over 
65) and adults (18-65) in a household 
Male head - a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the head is 
male and 0 otherwise 
Head’s Education  ‘No education’, ‘primary’, ‘secondary’, and ‘higher’ are all 
dummy variables taking the value 1 if a household head’s 
educational level falls in the stated category and 0 otherwise.  
Employment Status ‘Self’, ‘farm’, ‘other’, and ‘unemployed’ are dummy 
variables taking the value 1 if a household head’s employment 
status falls in the stated category and 0 otherwise.  
Head’s Marital Status ‘Married’, ‘single’, ‘cohabit’, and ‘other’ are dummy 
variables taking the value 1 if a household head’s marital 
status falls in the listed category and 0 otherwise.  
Head’s Religion  ‘Christian’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘other’ are dummy variables 
taking the value 1 if a household head’s religion falls under the 
stated category and 0 otherwise.  
Urban  A dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household is in an 
urban area and 0 otherwise.  
Agricultural Land Access A continuous variable that accounts for the land size in 
hectares that a household has access to (though not necessarily 
ownership of).  
Electricity  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a household has 
access to electricity and 0 otherwise.  
Durable Assets A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a household has 
durable assets (radio, furniture, refrigerator, stove, microwave, 
etc.) and 0 otherwise. 
Rechargeable Light A dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household uses 
rechargeable lights at night and 0 otherwise.  
Charcoal Cooking  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household uses 









Table A 4.3: Summary Statistics of Household Welfare Indicators by Quarantine Status (2011) 
 Overall Quarantine Non-Quarantine 
 
Raw Diff 
Log of per capita Total Expenditure     
Total  14.0222 13.8792 14.1464 -0.26725*** 
    (0.0343) 
Food  13.6071 13.4990 13.4990 -0.20250*** 
    (0.0142) 
Gini Coefficients: Total  0.3412 0.3402 0.3421 0.0019 
    (0.0059) 
Food 0.3051 0.3085 0.3022 0.0063 
    (0.0061) 
Samples 6668 3100 3568  
Note: standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A 4.4: Logistic Regression of the Treatment Assignment Equations for Ebola Status-2018 
VARIABLES Ebola Quarantine 
Head’s age -0.0212* 0.00333 
 (0.0116) (0.0104) 
Age sq 0.000184* 3.82e-05 
 (0.000111) (0.000100) 
Male head -0.406*** 0.205** 
 (0.100) (0.0847) 
Dependency ratio 0.0367 -0.0138 
 (0.0285) (0.0261) 
Primary -0.572*** 0.184 
 (0.131) (0.234) 
Secondary 0.121 0.00445 
 (0.148) (0.170) 
Higher 0.207 -0.241 
 (0.398) (0.238) 
Urban -1.261*** 0.405*** 
 (0.127) (0.116) 
Married head 0.499*** 0.371*** 
 (0.0897) (0.0948) 
Christian head -0.163 -0.423** 
 (0.166) (0.172) 
Housing index -0.245*** -0.00617 
 (0.0404) (0.0369) 
Housing index sq 0.0820*** -0.0538*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Amenities index -0.00210 -0.0135 
 (0.0260) (0.0240) 
Durable assets 0.0699 0.0435 
 (0.0793) (0.0728) 
Electricity 0.156 -0.0879 
 (0.125) (0.117) 
Rechargeable light 0.481*** -0.0891 
 (0.0977) (0.0924) 
Self employed -0.985*** -0.295*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0786) 
Charcoal cooking -0.722*** -0.731*** 
 (0.0853) (0.0806) 
Male head ´ urban 0.382*** -0.343*** 
 (0.135) (0.119) 
Primary ´ urban 0.159 -0.388*** 
 (0.178) (0.121) 
Secondary ´ urban -0.112 0.129 
 (0.177) (0.102) 
Higher ´ urban -0.489 -0.162 
 (0.412) (0.113) 
Constant 1.237*** -0.233 
 (0.315) (0.279) 
Observations 6723 6723 




Table A 4.5: Covariates Mean Difference and Variance between Treatment and Control Group 
(Ebola)-2018 
Variable Treated Control %bias T p>t V_e(C) 
Head’s age 47.79 47.36 3.00 1.21 0.23 1.01 
Age sq 2502.60 2446.20 3.80 1.54 0.12 1.04 
Male head 0.73 0.74 -1.80 -0.72 0.47 1.00 
Dependency ratio 1.65 1.64 1.40 0.63 0.53 1.11 
Primary 0.10 0.10 -1.40 -0.67 0.50 0.92 
Secondary 0.17 0.16 0.90 0.41 0.68 1.01 
Higher 0.08 0.09 -2.80 -1.33 0.18 0.92 
Urban 0.34 0.34 1.00 0.40 0.69 1.02 
Married head 0.16 0.15 2.40 0.92 0.36 1.03 
Christian head 0.03 0.03 -0.90 -0.40 0.69 0.95 
Housing index -0.22 -0.21 -1.20 -0.61 0.54 1.02 
Housing index sq 1.33 1.29 1.00 0.48 0.64 0.90 
Amenities index 0.01 0.04 -2.70 -1.15 0.25 1.09 
Durable assets 0.14 0.15 -0.50 -0.18 0.86 1.00 
Electricity 0.13 0.13 0.40 0.20 0.84 1.02 
Rechargeable light 0.78 0.78 -0.40 -0.18 0.86 1.02 
Self employed 0.08 0.08 0.50 0.26 0.80 1.03 
Charcoal cooking 0.18 0.18 0.50 0.24 0.81 1.03 
Male ´ urban 0.25 0.25 1.20 0.52 0.60 1.03 
Primary ´ urban 0.04 0.04 1.10 0.62 0.54 1.14 
Secondary ´ urban 0.11 0.10 1.50 0.74 0.46 1.04 
Higher ´ urban 0.07 0.08 -3.00 -1.45 0.15 0.91 
* if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2] 

























Table A 4.6: Covariates Mean Difference and Variance between Treatment and Control Group 
(Quarantine)-2018 
Variable Treated Control %bias T p>t V_e(C) 
Head’s age 47.95 47.61 2.30 0.89 0.37 0.98 
Age sq 2520.50 2468.30 3.50 1.33 0.18 1.03 
Male head  0.74 0.74 0.70 0.29 0.78 1.01 
Dependency ratio 1.70 1.68 1.80 0.72 0.47 1.14 
Primary 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.34 0.73 1.08 
Secondary 0.04 0.03 1.40 0.54 0.59 1.08 
Higher 0.01 0.01 -1.10 -0.50 0.62 0.90 
Urban 0.47 0.45 2.90 1.12 0.26 1.08 
Married head 0.15 0.14 2.30 0.85 0.40 1.03 
Christian head 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.14 0.89 1.03 
Housing index -0.20 -0.18 -0.80 -0.38 0.70 1.00 
Housing index sq 1.20 1.17 0.60 0.33 0.74 1.01 
Amenities index -0.01 0.00 -0.70 -0.29 0.77 1.01 
Durable assets 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.97 1.00 
Electricity 0.19 0.19 1.00 0.43 0.66 1.08 
Rechargeable light 0.71 0.71 -0.80 -0.33 0.74 1.04 
Self employed 0.14 0.13 2.00 0.84 0.40 1.12 
Charcoal cooking 0.25 0.25 -0.90 -0.39 0.70 0.94 
Male head ´ urban 0.33 0.32 2.20 0.88 0.38 1.10 
Primary ´ urban 0.06 0.05 2.50 1.17 0.24 1.17 
Secondary ´ urban 0.15 0.15 2.20 0.90 0.37 1.16 
Higher ´ urban 0.09 0.10 -3.90 -1.63 0.10 0.87 
* if ‘of concern’, i.e. variance ratio in [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2] 
** if ‘bad’, i.e. variance ratio <0.5 or >2 
 
 
Table A 4.7: Balancing Property Diagnostic Check of the Propensity Score-2018 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %concern %bad 
Ebola          
Unmatched 0.17 1607.43 0.00 31.90 24.80 107.2* 0.80 50.00 23.00 
Matched 0.00 20.40 0.56 1.50 1.20 11.10 1.22 0.00 0.00 
Quarantine          
Unmatched 0.05 456.79 0.00 15.60 11.50 53.5* 0.61 41.00 5.00 
Matched 0.00 19.66 0.60 1.60 1.30 11.50 1.24 0.00 0.00 














Table A 4.8: Marginal Effect of Household Poverty Determinants with Ebola status (Full Table)-
2018 
 Food Poverty Total Poverty 
Variables Marginal Estimates Standard Errors Marginal Estimates Standard Errors 
Ebola*    0.061*** 0.014 0.026 0.015 
Head’s age     0.008 0.003 0.011 0.003 
Head’s age sq    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Male head*   0.001 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Dependency ratio     0.003 0.020 0.048 0.021 
Dependency sq    -0.001 0.003 -0.013 0.004 
Primary*   -0.071 0.057 -0.117 0.059 
Secondary*   -0.228*** 0.040 -0.225*** 0.042 
High*  -0.193*** 0.051 -0.159*** 0.055 
Urban*   -0.327 0.015 -0.349*** 0.015 
Muslim*    0.099** 0.040 0.075 0.040 
Married*   0.042 0.042 0.046 0.043 
Self employed*   -0.101** 0.050 -0.095 0.051 
Farm employed*  -0.095 0.038 -0.085 0.040 
Housing index   -0.022 0.005 -0.031 0.005 
Amenity index     0.010 0.006 0.007 0.006 
Durable assets*   -0.010 0.019 -0.012 0.019 
Electricity*   -0.158 0.027 -0.143 0.027 
Rechargeable light*  -0.058 0.023 0.027 0.023 
Land access    0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
(*) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 



















Table A 4.9: Marginal/Impact Effects of Household Poverty Determinants for Quarantine 
Status (Full Table)-2018 
 Food Poverty Total Poverty 
Variables Marginal Estimates Standard Errors Marginal Estimates Standard Errors 
Quarantine(*)   0.233*** 0.013 0.200*** 0.014 
Head’s age     0.009 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Head’s age sq    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Male head(*) -0.005 0.016 0.014 0.017 
Dependency ratio     0.010 0.020 0.052 0.020 
Dependency sq    -0.002 0.003 -0.013 0.004 
Primary(*)  -0.064 0.059 -0.113*** 0.061 
Secondary(*)  -0.238*** 0.041 -0.237*** 0.042 
High(*)  -0.165*** 0.053 -0.134*** 0.056 
Urban(* ) -0.339*** 0.015 -0.351*** 0.015 
Muslim(*)    0.097 0.041 0.071 0.041 
Married(*) 0.025 0.044 0.030 0.044 
Self employed(*)   -0.092 0.051 -0.079 0.051 
Farm employed(*) -0.085 0.039 -0.078 0.040 
Housing index   -0.017 0.005 -0.027 0.005 
Amenity index     0.011 0.006 0.007 0.006 
Durable assets(*)   -0.011 0.019 -0.012 0.019 
Electricity(*)   -0.140*** 0.027 -0.125*** 0.027 
Rechargeable light(*)  -0.048 0.023 0.037 0.023 
Land access    -0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
(*) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 


















Table A 4.10: Probit Regression Model Estimates on the Determinants of Household Objective 
Poverty and Food Poverty (Ebola)-2018 
VARIABLES Poor Food  Poor   Food  
Ebola 0.0675* 0.154*** 0.0881** 0.153*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0358) (0.0395) (0.0385) 
Head’s age 0.0272*** 0.0213*** 0.0274*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.00648) (0.00669) (0.00645) (0.00633) 
Age sq -0.000207*** -0.000199*** -0.000209*** -0.000209*** 
 (6.18e-05) (6.32e-05) (6.14e-05) (6.06e-05) 
Male head 0.0427 0.00163 0.0390 0.000841 
 (0.0445) (0.0405) (0.0431) (0.0409) 
Dependency ratio 0.122** 0.00673 0.126** 0.00487 
 (0.0534) (0.0505) (0.0535) (0.0504) 
Dependency sq -0.0322*** -0.00265 -0.0330*** -0.00244 
 (0.00957) (0.00843) (0.00946) (0.00859) 
Primary -0.294* -0.177 -0.291* -0.170 
 (0.154) (0.148) (0.150) (0.145) 
Secondary -0.572*** -0.589*** -0.566*** -0.588*** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.111) (0.111) 
Higher -0.401*** -0.494*** -0.398*** -0.494*** 
 (0.148) (0.130) (0.141) (0.137) 
Urban -0.934*** -0.852*** -0.940*** -0.850*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0411) (0.0439) (0.0431) 
Muslim 0.195* 0.254** 0.190* 0.253** 
 (0.106) (0.103) (0.108) (0.104) 
Married 0.119 0.105 0.117 0.102 
 (0.113) (0.108) (0.113) (0.108) 
Self employed -0.239* -0.254** -0.234* -0.255** 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127) 
Farm employed -0.215** -0.240** -0.209** -0.244** 
 (0.103) (0.0984) (0.100) (0.0968) 
Housing index -0.0781*** -0.0542*** -0.0789*** -0.0546*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0132) 
Amenities index 0.0183 0.0252 0.0181 0.0250 
 (0.0166) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0160) 
Durable assets -0.0304 -0.0259 -0.0314 -0.0255 
 (0.0498) (0.0475) (0.0492) (0.0482) 
Electricity -0.363*** -0.399*** -0.363*** -0.402*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0676) (0.0693) (0.0680) 
Rechargeable light 0.0700 -0.146** 0.0729 -0.147** 
 (0.0602) (0.0584) (0.0589) (0.0573) 
Land access 0.0122 0.0137 0.0128 0.0134 
 (0.0149) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Constant -0.142 0.170 -0.145 0.156 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.183) (0.177) 
Pseudo R2 0.1956 0.1477 0.1960 0.1481 
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 














Table A 4.11: Probit Regression Estimates on the Determinants of Household Objective Poverty 
and Food Poverty (Quarantine)-2018 
 VARIABLES Poor Food  
Quarantine 0.520*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0361) 
Head’s age 0.0263*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.00638) (0.00645) 
Age sq -0.000211*** -0.000214*** 
 (6.04e-05) (6.17e-05) 
Male head 0.0348 -0.0117 
 (0.0421) (0.0422) 
Dependency ratio 0.134*** 0.0246 
 (0.0510) (0.0468) 
Dependency sq -0.0334*** -0.00505 
 (0.00898) (0.00793) 
Primary -0.286* -0.160 
 (0.159) (0.155) 
Secondary -0.605*** -0.618*** 
 (0.116) (0.119) 
Higher -0.338** -0.418*** 
 (0.153) (0.142) 
Urban -0.938*** -0.885*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0425) 
Muslim 0.185* 0.248** 
 (0.107) (0.109) 
Married 0.0779 0.0619 
 (0.113) (0.107) 
Self employed -0.200 -0.232* 
 (0.140) (0.132) 
Farm employed -0.196* -0.213** 
 (0.105) (0.0963) 
Housing index -0.0692*** -0.0435*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0133) 
Amenities index 0.0189 0.0271 
 (0.0165) (0.0172) 
Durable assets -0.0318 -0.0270 
 (0.0525) (0.0460) 
Electricity -0.318*** -0.352*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0646) 
Rechargeable light 0.0938 -0.122** 
 (0.0588) (0.0578) 
Land access -0.00844 -0.00976 
 (0.0148) (0.0138) 
Constant -0.296 0.0178 
 (0.183) (0.184) 
Pseudo R2 0.1793 0.2208 
Observations 6738 6738 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 










Table A 4.12: OLS Regression on the Determinants of Log Household Expenditure and Gini by 
Ebola (Full Table) -2018 
VARIABLES Total Food Gini 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Ebola -0.0477*** -0.0512*** -0.0172*** 0.0227 -0.0351* -0.0388** -0.0315 -0.0996*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.00567) (0.0494) (0.0199) (0.0171) (0.0208) (0.0179) 
Head’s age 0.0173*** 0.0167*** 6.90e-05 0.00419 0.0182*** 0.0227*** 0.0286*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00235) (0.000943) (0.00734) (0.00361) (0.00278) (0.00338) (0.00269) 
Age sq -0.001*** -0.00014*** -2.15e-06 1.57e-05 -0.00013*** -0.00022*** -0.00024*** -0.00010*** 
 (2.26e-05) (2.28e-05) (9.43e-06) (6.78e-05) (3.55e-05) (2.57e-05) (3.26e-05) (2.56e-05) 
Male head 0.104*** 0.104*** -0.0279*** 0.321*** 0.0412* 0.0896*** 0.0495** -0.0413* 
 (0.0152) (0.0164) (0.00720) (0.0546) (0.0220) (0.0182) (0.0210) (0.0213) 
Dependency ratio 0.162*** 0.161*** -0.00967 0.433*** 0.0497** 0.0885*** 0.218*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0183) (0.00874) (0.0649) (0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0249) (0.0374) 
Dependency sq -0.0183*** -0.0184*** 0.00505*** -0.0656*** -0.0140*** -0.0128*** -0.0200*** 0.000395 
 (0.00272) (0.00291) (0.00178) (0.0108) (0.00389) (0.00305) (0.00399) (0.00728) 
Primary 0.0275 0.0290 -0.0819*** 0.274 0.184** 0.00376 -0.154** -0.242*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0546) (0.0246) (0.214) (0.0778) (0.0744) (0.0781) (0.0668) 
Secondary 0.0701 0.0698 -0.0607*** 0.341** 0.189*** -0.0353 -0.0558 -0.147*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0448) (0.0188) (0.161) (0.0604) (0.0533) (0.0570) (0.0531) 
Higher 0.0722 0.0769 -0.00155 0.0701 0.0865 0.00432 0.132 -0.0137 
 (0.0671) (0.0624) (0.0338) (0.207) (0.0653) (0.0590) (0.0840) (0.0986) 
Urban 0.559*** 0.602*** -0.118*** 0.841*** 0.636*** 0.718*** 0.437*** 0.0989*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0178) (0.00704) (0.0597) (0.0248) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0161) 
Muslim -0.229*** -0.233*** 0.0932*** -0.598*** -0.344*** -0.204*** -0.142** 0.0417 
 (0.0406) (0.0413) (0.0205) (0.158) (0.0558) (0.0487) (0.0572) (0.0511) 
Married -0.0487 -0.0517 0.0124 -0.262 -0.0290 0.0367 0.0648 -0.0340 
 (0.0460) (0.0480) (0.0223) (0.170) (0.0588) (0.0495) (0.0576) (0.0533) 
Self employed 0.246*** 0.252*** -0.0927*** 0.737*** 0.315*** 0.236*** 0.251*** -0.144** 
 (0.0407) (0.0426) (0.0245) (0.113) (0.0432) (0.0530) (0.0789) (0.0734) 
Farm employed 0.121*** 0.127*** -0.0532*** 0.452*** 0.136** 0.0532 -0.0162 0.00883 
 (0.0442) (0.0465) (0.0177) (0.172) (0.0582) (0.0457) (0.0373) (0.0284) 
Housing index 0.0734*** 0.0748*** 0.0295*** 0.0225*** 0.0250*** 0.0670*** 0.126*** 0.0465*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00467) (0.00392) (0.00829) (0.00430) (0.00529) (0.00881) (0.0114) 
Amenities index -0.0208*** -0.0214*** 0.00165 -0.0526*** -0.0209*** -0.00705 -0.0242*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.00554) (0.00615) (0.00276) (0.0199) (0.00761) (0.00757) (0.00920) (0.00907) 
Durable assets 0.0237 0.0235 -0.000589 0.00876 0.0163 0.0507** -0.00614 -0.00694 
 (0.0174) (0.0179) (0.\00932) (0.0592) (0.0231) (0.0229) (0.0257) (0.0264) 
Electricity 0.330*** 0.347*** 0.00132 0.583*** 0.435*** 0.295*** 0.268*** 0.530*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0118) (0.0955) (0.0362) (0.0324) (0.0417) (0.0433) 
Rechargeable light 0.0809*** 0.0888*** -0.0477*** 0.470*** 0.377*** 0.0215 -0.181*** -0.0647** 
 (0.0292) (0.0289) (0.00965) (0.103) (0.0346) (0.0285) (0.0333) (0.0279) 
Land access 0.0106** 0.0102** 0.00543* 0.0270 -0.00374 0.00846 0.0111 0.0211*** 
 (0.00511) (0.00510) (0.00299) (0.0173) (0.00740) (0.00677) (0.00729) (0.00797) 
Constant 15.48*** 14.77*** 0.456*** 13.92*** 15.00*** 15.46*** 15.82*** 16.94*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0719) (0.0287) (0.223) (0.0958) (0.0814) (0.0968) (0.0935) 
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 
R-squared 0.465 0.484 0.081 0.116 0.255 0.394 0.361 0.268 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A 4.13: OLS Regression on the Determinants of Log Household Expenditure, Gini, and 
Distribution by Quarantine (Full Table)-2018 
 Log EXPENDITURE Log EXPENDITURE PERCENTILES 
 Total Food Gini 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Quarantine -0.120*** -0.135*** -0.0469*** 0.00290 -0.139*** -0.0522*** -0.197*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.00554) (0.0449) (0.0186) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0162) 
Head’s age 0.0171*** 0.0165*** 1.16e-05 0.00421 0.0181*** 0.0226*** 0.0284*** 0.00991*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.00787) (0.00345) (0.00293) (0.00322) (0.00278) 
Age sq -0.0001*** -0.000132*** -8.69e-07 1.57e-05 -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -9.31e-05*** 
 (2.24e-05) (2.27e-05) (9.53e-06) (7.31e-05) (3.38e-05) (2.70e-05) (3.12e-05) (2.66e-05) 
Male head 0.106*** 0.106*** -0.0274*** 0.320*** 0.0422** 0.0910*** 0.0501** -0.0382* 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.00689) (0.0551) (0.0206) (0.0195) (0.0207) (0.0214) 
Dependency ratio 0.160*** 0.160*** -0.0103 0.432*** 0.0471** 0.0884*** 0.213*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.00817) (0.0664) (0.0238) (0.0201) (0.0237) (0.0327) 
Dependency sq -0.0182*** -0.0183*** 0.00511*** -0.0654*** -0.0137*** -0.0129*** -0.0194*** 0.000814 
 (0.00279) (0.00280) (0.00162) (0.0110) (0.00372) (0.00298) (0.00380) (0.00626) 
Primary 0.0222 0.0231 -0.0839*** 0.275 0.179** 0.000824 -0.161** -0.254*** 
 (0.0554) (0.0558) (0.0251) (0.209) (0.0738) (0.0731) (0.0794) (0.0653) 
Secondary 0.0667 0.0662 -0.0619*** 0.342** 0.187*** -0.0383 -0.0575 -0.153*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0447) (0.0185) (0.159) (0.0608) (0.0541) (0.0592) (0.0521) 
Higher 0.0530 0.0554 -0.00901 0.0710 0.0648 -0.00437 0.102 -0.0593 
 (0.0637) (0.0639) (0.0346) (0.201) (0.0645) (0.0630) (0.0863) (0.0951) 
Urban 0.565*** 0.609*** -0.116*** 0.834*** 0.636*** 0.726*** 0.432*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.00681) (0.0555) (0.0224) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0161) 
Muslim -0.226*** -0.229*** 0.0946*** -0.597*** -0.339*** -0.204*** -0.134** 0.0506 
 (0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0208) (0.154) (0.0559) (0.0490) (0.0572) (0.0495) 
Married -0.0389 -0.0406 0.0163 -0.261 -0.0163 0.0396 0.0842 -0.00970 
 (0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0219) (0.173) (0.0599) (0.0515) (0.0579) (0.0517) 
Self employed 0.242*** 0.246*** -0.0947*** 0.732*** 0.306*** 0.239*** 0.232*** -0.158** 
 (0.0410) (0.0414) (0.0252) (0.109) (0.0439) (0.0535) (0.0769) (0.0755) 
Farm employed 0.111** 0.116*** -0.0572*** 0.452** 0.124** 0.0495 -0.0347 -0.0159 
 (0.0433) (0.0438) (0.0175) (0.179) (0.0580) (0.0441) (0.0381) (0.0299) 
Housing index 0.0708*** 0.0719*** 0.0285*** 0.0224*** 0.0219*** 0.0659*** 0.122*** 0.0402*** 
 (0.0045) (0.00451) (0.00385) (0.00851) (0.00437) (0.00505) (0.00867) (0.0112) 
Amenities index -0.0210*** -0.0216*** 0.00157 -0.0526*** -0.0212*** -0.00717 -0.0244*** -0.0245*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0028) (0.0191) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0088) 
Durable assets 0.0237 0.0235 -0.000553 0.00906 0.0166 0.0505** -0.00543 -0.00664 
 (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.00929) (0.0592) (0.0238) (0.0228) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Electricity 0.318*** 0.333*** -0.00339 0.582*** 0.421*** 0.290*** 0.246*** 0.501*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0114) (0.0994) (0.0353) (0.0320) (0.0435) (0.0431) 
Rechargeable light 0.0730*** 0.0801*** -0.0506*** 0.473*** 0.370*** 0.0163 -0.189*** -0.0823*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0284) (0.00931) (0.108) (0.0354) (0.0274) (0.0325) (0.0283) 
Land access  0.0150*** 0.0151*** 0.00715** 0.0271 0.00149 0.0102 0.0187** 0.0317*** 
 (0.00505) (0.00511) (0.00294) (0.0173) (0.00719) (0.00677) (0.00744) (0.00773) 
Constant 15.51*** 14.81*** 0.469*** 13.93*** 15.04*** 15.46*** 15.90*** 17.02*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0692) (0.0280) (0.238) (0.0921) (0.0802) (0.0903) (0.0886) 
Observations 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 
R-squared 0.471 0.492 0.089 0.116 0.262 0.395 0.372 0.292 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 







Table A 4.14: PSM Average Treatment Effect of Ebola and Quarantine on Welfare Indicators 
(Pre-Ebola - 2011) 
 Ebola Quarantine 
Poor 0.06035*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0140) 
Food  0.0342*** 0.0562*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0140) 
Log per capita total expenditure -0.0693*** -0.0430 
 (0.0280) (0.0243) 
Log per capita total food expenditure -0.0565*** -0.0369** 
 (0.0196) (0.0171) 
Expenditure Gini 0.0043*** 0.0234*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0070) 
Samples: Treatment 4177 3100 
Control 2507 3568 
Note: The estimates are the average treatment effect of chiefdoms simulated to have confirmed Ebola cases and the 
quarantine policy treatment measure. The results are computed using the 2011 SLIHS data, which was collected three years 
before the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
Bootstrap standard errors with 500 reps in parentheses. 





















 5 Chapter 5-Conclusions and Future Research Suggestions 
 
This thesis has provided an empirical evaluation of the impact of conflict and disease on 
household welfare and inequality in Sierra Leone. The contextual framework was provided by 
the 10-year civil war in Sierra Leone between 1991-2002 and the Ebola epidemic outbreak in 
2014. The three essays provide an important contribution given the limited nature of micro-
level studies on conflict and disease shocks in development economics research.  
 
The first chapter analysed the legacy of the Sierra Leone civil war on average household 
expenditure and poverty. The estimates suggested that conflict generates a significant negative 
impact on household expenditure and increases the poverty rate. The rebels’ protracted rule 
and territorial control of chiefdoms in Sierra Leone adversely impacted household welfare 
conditions in the conflict regions. The infrastructural and institutional destruction associated 
with this occupation persists even 10 years after the civil war. However, the long-run conflict 
effects have been mitigated for the victims to some extent by financial support from 
international aid agencies. However, the economic system, the provision of public goods, and 
overall governance remain weak and lack resilience. 
 
The second chapter evaluated the conflict’s impact on the distribution of household expenditure 
and inequality. This second essay aimed to go beyond the average impact and detect who were 
the biggest losers in socio-economic terms from the conflict. The empirical estimates indicated 
that the ‘haves’ in society are the ones with the most valuable assets to lose. The loss of these 
assets during the conflict helped to narrow inequality post-conflict in the short-term. The 
levelling has its origins in the wealth-targeting behaviour and activities of the rebel groups. 
The destruction and re-appropriation of wealth assets (instead of a Robin Hood style 




expenditure distribution were hardest hit because they were in chiefdoms that were under the 
control of the rebels. This levelling of inequality observed is entirely consistent with the work 
of the economic historian Walter Scheidel (2017), who has documented the historical role of 
conflict (and disease) in levelling wealth inequality.  
 
The final chapter of the thesis investigated the impact of the Sierra Leone Ebola outbreak on 
household welfare, inequality, and food security. Our findings support the adverse impact of 
epidemics/pandemics on household socio-economic status. We found that the Ebola outbreak 
in Sierra Leone accounted for reduced household expenditure, increased food poverty and 
reduced inequality. The effect of household exposure to the disease in terms of confirmed cases 
in their chiefdoms does not have as adverse an effect as the curtailment policies imposed by 
the government. The national quarantine policies for chiefdoms due to the epidemic outbreak 
left a harsher impact on household welfare and exhibited a greater levelling effect on inequality, 
certainly in the short term.  
 
The table below summarises the empirical estimates to evaluate these two adverse economic 
shocks on the Sierra Leone economy. Notwithstanding the different empirical methodologies, 
the estimates broadly reveal the impacts of the 10-year civil war and the Ebola epidemic, 
respectively. 
 
The annual impact of the civil war on household log expenditure was approximately equivalent 
to a 3% reduction in household expenditure, which persisted in the long run 10 years after the 
conclusion of the conflict. Household poverty increased by 16 percentage points, on average, 
immediately after the civil war. Inequality was levelled by the conflict, with a reduction of 5 




per annum reduction in log expenditure two years later was within the conflict impact range. 
The impact of the Ebola quarantine polices increased poverty by 11 percentage points, and 
reduced inequality by 2 percentage points using a Gini-based measure. The empirical estimates 
are consistent with both the micro-level and macro-level research on conflict and disease 
impact on socio-economic outcomes. In general, the estimates suggest a persistent economic 
impact for conflict with a U-shaped recovery pattern. Disease impact is seen to exhibit a more 
(though muted) V-shaped recovery, though the data are not yet fully available for a more long-
run interpretation.  
 
Table 5.1: ATT of Conflict and Disease on Household Welfare Indicators in Sierra Leone 
Household Welfare Indicators Conflict Exposure Ebola (Quarantine) 
 Short-term Long-term  
Log of total expenditure -0.3331*** -0.2533*** -0.0638*** 
 (0.1122) (0.1066) (0.0167) 
Poverty 0.1610*** 0.1373*** 0.1170*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0634) (0.0123) 
Inequality based on the Gini -0.0552*** 0.0049 -0.0287*** 
 
(0.0183) (0.0081) (0.0063) 
Note: the estimates represented above are the average treatment effects on the selected welfare indicators as presented in 
Essays 1, 2, and 3. The sample sizes are directly from the different essays for reference. 
Conflict exposure is the measure of conflict that captures households in chiefdoms with protracted period of rebel control. 
Short-term and long-term correspond to the 2003 and 2011 estimates. 
Ebola (Quarantine) is the treatment measure that captures the national virus curtailment policy. It represents households in 
the quarantined chiefdoms. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The analysis contained in the thesis provides a novel contribution to understanding the impact 
of conflict and disease outbreak on household welfare status. First, we noted that policies 
geared towards reparations for conflict victims could potentially mitigate the negative legacy 
on household expenditure and poverty. Direct help to foster economic independence or welfare 
enhancement can be meaningful. However, infrastructural and institutional destruction can be 
costly and apply a brake to the speed of the future trajectory of the economy. The ultimate 




the wealthy in society ultimately exerts an inequality-levelling effect. This is a relatively novel 
finding in the literature and supports the analysis reported in Scheidel (2017). The contraction 
in the distribution of welfare is not necessarily a positive development given the underlying 
redistribution is not represented by a shift of wealth from the rich to the poor but by either a 
total destruction of wealth or its appropriation by the rebels for their own personal use. This 
renders everyone poorer, but the greatest losers are those with conspicuous and tangible assets 
or valuables.  
 
Second, this thesis offers a unique contribution in its micro-level linking of a disease epidemic 
to household welfare, poverty, inequality, and food security. The key finding was that disease 
curtailment policies are the major mechanism through which household livelihoods are 
ultimately affected.  
 
Although the empirical analysis of the conflict and disease impact on household expenditure, 
poverty, inequality, and food security was one of the most systematic undertaken for Sierra 
Leone, there are some limitations. These are emphasised here to outline a set of research 
suggestions for future work. In the first two chapters, we were unable to empirically estimate 
the direct impact of the reparation programme established by Sierra Leone’s government on 
household welfare. Data that identify beneficiaries may provide the basis for a clean 
experimental approach that helps identify the effect of the mitigating policies introduced post-
conflict. Unfortunately, no known data were available at the time of the research. Nevertheless, 
future research along this dimension would help assess the merits and importance of the safety-
net mechanisms introduced as part of the post-conflict recovery policies. Specifically, data on 
labour productivity and earnings of individuals that benefitted from the reparation programmes 





We were also unable to obtain the geo-coordinates of households, which would have provided 
additional useful information for the empirical analysis. Information on household location 
during and after the conflict would have provided an enhanced basis for a cleaner identification 
of those most directly affected by the conflict. Hence, data collection in conflict-affected 
economies can benefit from geo-coded information for households.  
 
In Essays 1 and 2, and as already noted above, the role of donors and international assistance 
during and after the conflict was not captured directly. Humanitarian support was significant 
in Sierra Leone after the conflict. The post-conflict recovery process has been assisted through 
the joint efforts of national and international organisations. Hence, the impact of these various 
contributions in the post-conflict recovery process on household welfare for Sierra Leone is 
worth exploring as part of an agenda for future research.  
 
Essay 3 evaluated the impact of the 2014 Ebola epidemic on Sierra Leone’s household welfare. 
However, the outbreak also affected the other two countries in the Mano River region -  
Liberia and Guinea. A cross-country micro-level analysis of the impact of Ebola on household 
welfare indicators could potentially provide a fruitful basis for future research. It could help in 
evaluating the different state-level policy interventions for a disease that affected different 
economies concurrently. All three countries used quarantine measures to fight the disease 
outbreak. Hence a comparative evaluation of the impact might shed light on whether or not the 
measures exerted a heterogeneous impact. The global Covid-19 pandemic and its effect on the 
selected household indicators for Sierra Leone could provide lessons on how the country is 
dealing with the pandemic. Whether or not the government has refined its approach due to the 





Finally, the disease evaluated in this thesis does not include other important viruses that have 
affected West Africa and Sierra Leone in particular (e.g., HIV/AIDS and Malaria). Also, 
research on the recent outbreak of Hepatitis-B in West Africa could provide an understanding 
of the household welfare impact of this disease. The current Sierra Leone Integrated Household 
Surveys and the Demographic Health Surveys have information on HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
which could inform useful research on the impact of disease outbreak on household welfare 
and inequality. An analysis of other diseases could offer more informed insights on the 
household welfare–disease nexus, with a focus on longer-term diseases rather than on short-
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